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1998) PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT 
This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; 
The words expressly are "a pound of flesh:" 
Then take thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh; 
But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed 
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods 
Are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate 
Unto the state ofVenice.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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By pleading for the literal application of the law in The Merchant of 
Venice, Portia hopes to avoid the bloody result of a bad bargain. In 
pointing out that Shylock is entitled to "a pound of flesh," but nothing 
more, she identifies the justice that an advocate requests and a judge 
grants in applying the law, if the parties are willing to accept the foresee­
able result of that application. Perhaps believing that with admission 
would come acceptance,2 the would-be Portias of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries pied for the literal application of the laws that 
would have allowed them to appear as attorneys in the English courts.3 
While their own lawyers desired the literal outcome of the applicable 
statutes, the judges and the official representatives of the organized bar 
did not.4 Their reluctance to accept the legitimate outcome of properly 
drawn and enacted legislation allowed them to formulate a legal theory 
that successfully prevented the admission of women to the English legal 
profession for nearly fifty years after Parliament decreed that the status 
quo should be changed.s 
The character of Portia in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice is 
one of the most familiar figures to be classed as a "woman lawyer" in 
literature or in life, even though she is not a member of the bar.6 The ref­
erence is so common that Horace Rumpole' s dubbing of Phyllida Trant 
Erskine-Browne as "the Portia of our Chambers" is immediately under­
standable to English-speaking readers.1 Yet, any recognition of the right 
1. Wn..UAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, SC. 1, lines 307-1 3 (William 
Lyon Phelps ed., Yale University Press 1923). 
2. The literature makes it clear that this was not the case. See infra notes 17, 443-64 and 
accompanying text. 
3. See ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSO N, SEXISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE 
BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND TifE UNITED STATES 27-33 (1978) (discussing cases 
where women applied for positions of law agent, barrister and solicitor in the English courts). 
4. See id. 
5. See id. at 40-53 (discussing the "myth of judicial neutrality" and how the fact that the 
judiciary was exclusively male made judicial neutrality towards women's involvement virtually a 
myth). 
6. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, line 170. Portia's famous scene begins here. 
See generally Isabel Giles, The Twentieth Century Portia, 21 CASE & COM . 353 (1914) (discussing 
the future of women attorneys in the twentieth century). 
7. Jmm MORTIMER, Rumpole and the Right to Silence, in RUMPOLE A LA CARTE 103, 121 
(1990); see Giles, supra note 6, at 352 (providing a reproduction of an oil painting by Sir John 
Millais titled "Portia"); David Cuthbert, Last Call For Rumpole: Tonight's 'Mystery!' Marks the 
Beginning of the End for Leo McKem' s Turn as the Wiley Old Barrister of the Old Bailey, NEW 
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of women to be admitted to the English legal profession �as a rarity until 
the late nineteenth century, after various states of the Umted �tates,' an
.
d 
then the provinces of Canada,9 admitte? women. Per�ps �1s de� y is 
understandable in a country whose nat10nal symbol 1s a ht1gant. Re­
cently, contemporary women lawyers hav� becom�
1 
a su�jec� of �uch 
study, in both serious historical and legal literature, an
.
d m d1scuss1ons 
of popular culture. 12 Their problems with the male-dommated legal cul­
ture continue to occupy our attention. 
ORLEANS TrMEs-PICAYUNE, Apr. 13, 1995. at El (discussing a television show based on John 
Mortimer's Rumpole). Patricia Hodge, an actress who plays Phyllida in the show, bean an uncanny 
resemblance to the model in Millais's painting. 
8. See infra notes 255, 371 and accompanying text. 1lte battle was won state by state, 
however, and admission to the practice of law did not imply that states were willing to admit women 
to ancillary professions such as notary public. See Bickett v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418 (N.C. 1915) 
(holding that women are ineligible for the public office of notary public since women are not voters 
in the state); see also Recenr Cases: Public Office---Can a Woman Be a Notary Public?. 64 U. PA. L. 
REV. 95, 105 (1915) (examining cases prohibiting women from public office positions and 
discussing the theory behind the restriction of women from the position of notary public). 
9. See infra Part ill.A. I. 
10. "John Bull" is the main character in the political allegory and satirical pamphlets written 
by John Arbuthnot and published in 1712 by John Morphew. &e JOHN ARBUTHNOT, THE HISTORY 
OF JOHN BULL (Alan W. Bower & Robert A. Erickson eds., 1976). In the pamphlets, Bull sues Lewis 
Baboon, where the lawsuit represented the war with France. 
11. See CYNTHIA FuCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1981) {analyzing the ways in which 
women attorneys are treated by their colleagues and their families, the pressures they face, and the 
manner in which they deal with p roblems); Christine Haight Farley, Confronling Expectations: 
Women in the Legal Academy, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333 (1996) {providing an extensive 
bibliography for U.S. materials); see also ROB ERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS 
OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992) (detailing legal education at Harvard Law School and its 
effect on ideals); LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAw SCHOOL. AND 
INSTITimONAL CHANGE 103-69 (1997) (providing important bibliographic information); Robert 
Granfield, Contextualizing the Different Voice: Women, Occupational Goals, and Legal Education, 
16 LAW & PoL'Y 1 (1994) (examining gender differences among students attending Harvard Law 
School). 
12. See, e.g., Christine A. Corcos, Women Lawyers,  in PRIME TIME LAW (Robert Jarvis and 
Paul Joseph eds., 1998); Diane M. Glass, Portia in Primetime: Women Lawyers, Television, and LA. 
Law, 2 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 371 (1990) (examining the image of women lawyers in the television 
drama, L.A. Law, viewed in the historical context of women's depiction on television); Louise 
Everett Graham & Geraldine Maschio, A False Public Sentiment: Narrative and Visual Images of 
Women Lawyers in Film, 84 KY. L.J. 1027 (1966) (exploring cinematic images of women lawyers); 
Judith Mayne, L.A. Law and P rime-Time Feminism, 10 DISCOURSE 30 (1988) (discussing the 
depiction of female attorneys on television); Carolyn Lisa Miller, "What a Waste. Beautiful, Sexy 
Gal. Hell of a Lawyer.": Film and the Female Attorney, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 203 (1994) 
(analyzing films which feature female attorneys); Carole Shapiro, Women Lawyers in Celluloid: 
Why Hollywood Skirts the Truth, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 955 (1995) (examining women lawyers in film 
because they illustrate the way visual images help maintain gender roles); Ric Sheffield, Taking 
Exception to Six Decades on Film: A Social History of Women Lawyers in Popular Culture 1930 to 
1990, 14 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 73 (1993) (suggesting that stereotypical depictions of women lawyers 
in film may influence or reinforce the stereotypes about female attorneys in practice to the detriment 
of society and the legal profession); Elaine Weiss, Who's Missing in This Picture?, BARRISTER 
MAG., Winter 1989-90, at 4 (reviewing the treatment of women lawyers in film and television). 
The "double standard" which continues to confront women professionals generally has also 
been explored humorously in films and television broadcasts. See, e.g. ,  BABY BOOM (United Artists 
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The question of admission of women to the English Bar is not sim­
ply an interesting side issue in legal history. It illustrates the familiar 
battle of an excluded group for inclusion in a larger society that has tra­
ditionally maintained control by becoming self-defining.13 In the case of 
barristers, this self-definition was exacerbated by the fact that only the 
Inns of Court were authorized to bestow the designation of "barrister" 
and the Inns of Court, because they were self-regulating, insured their 
control of the profession. In addition, judges were chosen from the bar­
rister class, and judgeships were for life barring gross misconduct. 14 An 
early twentieth century American woman attorney made the point elo­
quently: 
It is a well known fact that no man really understands a woman, and 
yet until recently we have had only men to decide what is right and 
wrong as far as we are concerned. Is it not only natural that men, 
looking at things from their standpoint, will often make mistakes? If 
there is one place where women ought to be it is in law. Our laws for 
women are made by man. How can man do justice to a creature 
which he frankly admits no man ever understands?15 
Much of the discussion on the fitness of women to practice law in 
England parallels contemporaneous discussion of the actual performance 
of female attorneys in countries that had already admitted women, nota­
bly France and the United States. The English Bar thus demonstrated that 
while it followed certain peculiarities of thought on the subject, most 
dictated by the structure and history of the English common law, the 
quality of its debate reflected the spirit and the style of its brethren in 
other lands. 
Because the battle is for inclusion into the legal profession, that is, 
the profession that decides what issues are properly the focus of the law 
and what issues are not, participation in it represents an essential goal for 
any marginalized group. "Medicine, Science, Arts, had all been thor-
1987); Baby Boom (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 1986-Jan. 1989); TOOTSIE (Columbia 1982); 
VICTOR/VICTORIA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1982). For a discussion of the double standard in 
English legal history, see Ann Sumner Holmes, The Double Standard in the English Divorce Laws, 
1857-1923, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995). The 1987 film ADAM'S RIB (MGM/UA Home 
Video 1987) is primarily about the legal double standard. 
13. See generally Daniel Duman, Pathway to Professionalism: The English Bar in the 
Eighteenth and Niru!teenth Centuries, 13 J. Soc. HIST. 615 (1980) (discussing the mechanics of self­
definition). 
14. See 15 SIR WILLIA!d HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 244 (A.L. Goodhart & 
H.G. Hanbury eds., 1965). 
15. Women in the Law, 58 Omo L. BULL. 133, 134 (1913). Some male lawyers are still not 
trying very hard to understand women's frustrations. See generally Elizabeth A. Delfs, Foul Play in 
Courtroom: Persistence, Cause and Remedies, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 309 (1996) (analyzing the 
parameters of foul play). However, one popular commentator asserts that laws and society in general 
benefit women more than men. WARREN FARRELL, WHY MEN ARE TIIE WAY THEY ARE 161-68 
(1986). While Farrell's reasoning fails to take into account the historical and cultural reasons for 
what he sees as .favoritism, his position illustrates the anger and confusion that many men, not just 
professionals, feel toward the "mixed messages" that they believe women send. 
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oughly explored before Law was thought of. This was probably ?ue 
.
in 
part to the fact that the Law itself prevented women from entenng its 
precincts, and numerous initial difficulties had to be remo
.
ved · 
.
... "16 As 
women admitted to the bar in England and other countnes discovered, 
however, the right of admission was not a guarantee of social or profe1:-. al tan 17 s1on accep ce. 
Thus, the nature of the anti-feminist argument over the admission of 
women bears scrutiny. It expresses the understandable fears and resent­
ments of men who had labored for centuries, taken economic, social and 
political chances, and sometimes risked their lives to acquire certain 
rights and positions in the political and legal system. A group which de­
manded inclusion in that system but which had not, as men saw it, "paid 
its dues," was making excessive and unacceptable demands. Many male 
"gatekeepers" of the system saw attacks on all fronts, including the pro­
fession of law, and were offended and dismayed. They shared and ex­
pressed, along with their male colleagues in other countries, a concern 
that women were not, indeed could not be, adequately socialized or edu­
cated to be members of a profession that formulated and interpreted soci­
ety's rules. 
' The battle over women's admission to the bar in England also illus­
trated the willingness. of the English judiciary to make law while it de­
nied that it was doing so. By placing the interpretation of what it deemed 
to be custom and the common law above the plain meaning of certain 
relevant statutes, the English judges involved forced Parliament to con­
sider an issue that it thought it had already settled. By redefining the 
question as one that the appellant really did not present and asserting that 
they were asked to decide it, the judiciary both trivialized the issue and 
temporarily redirected the attention of the profession. The attempt to 
repel women from the profession was only temporarily successful, how­
ever, because it failed to take into account both the political and philo­
sophical strength of the women's movement and support for that move­
ment from men for whom the equity arguments outweighed fears about 
either the inadequacy or potential competition from women. Further, by 
16. G. Flos. Greig, The Law as a Profession for Women, 6 COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 145, 147 
(1909). 
17. The literature on the marginalization of women attorneys continues to grow. Apart from 
the extensive "glass ceiling" studies that are available, some writers have begun to study the 
situation of women law school academics. See Farley, supra note 11. The phenomenon has even 
begun to engender its own jurisprudence. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open 
Doors: ��men's �dv�ncement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1995) (exploring 
women s mtegratlon mto large corporate law practices and their mobility within firms); Marie s. 
Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against Women 
Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17 (1994) (examining, in part, the glass ceiling that women law partners 
face). On
.
English women attorneys, more specifically, see David Podmore & Anne Spencer, Women 
La_wyer� m England: The Experience of Inequality, 9 WORK & OcCUPATIONS 337, 339-42 (1982) 
(discussing the entry of women into the profession and the reactions of opponents). 
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refusin� to acc��t �e plain meaning of the statute at  bar, the judges in­
volved m the htigallon over the admission of women to the bar denied 
these Portias the outcome obtained by their namesake, a literal interpre­
tation of the law. 
Although several writers have produced exhaustive (and exhausting) 
histories of the English legal profession, the question of women's admis­
sion is disposed of in a few pages or worse yet, paragraphs.18 Contempo­
rary writers are more concerned with the current status of women law­
yers; 19 yet, much of the discrimination today's female attorneys experi­
ence is rooted in the reluctance of many male barristers and solicitors to 
welcome them to begin with, or work with them to make those accom­
modations necessary to encourage their full participation in the profes­
sion. Continued acceptance of traditional gender roles is a major barrier 
to many women attorneys. Yet, an understanding of its origins is neces­
sary to its effective neutralization. Otherwise women attorneys will con­
tinue to be shunted into those legal specializations deemed "appropriate" 
for females. 
A 1985 survey of the members of the Association of Women Solici­
tors found that the proportion temporarily retired from practice in or­
der to raise children ranged from 8.6 per cent of those 36-40 years old 
to 17.4 per cent of those 3 1-35. Furthermore, those in private practice 
took short maternity leaves (an average of 5.2 months, but only 2.4 
months for partners), and though 87.2 per cent returned to the same 
job, only 53.7 per cent kept the same hours; 22.7 per cent of those in 
private practice were working part time, and 34 per cent of those with 
children thought their career prospects were changed by 
motherhood. 20 
18. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 172-76 
(1988); MICHAEL BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 276-78 (1960); cf Norman St. John-Stevas, 
Women in Public Law, in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW: 1857-1957, at 256, 276-78 (R.H. Graveson 
& F.R. Crane eds., 1957) (providing a more in-depth discussion of women in the legal profession). 
Some may question the importance of studying or writing legal history. For those for whom the 
answer is not intuitive, we should remember that much of present day law is based on assumptions, 
sometimes mistaken ones, about the past. Challenging those assumptions in an intellectually honest 
way will make the present more comprehensible and the future, possibly, more just. John Orth offers 
a practical reason that will be persuasive to those for whom the Whig interpretation of history is 
most comfortable. See John V. Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 10 N.C. L. 
REV. 287 (1991 ). Orth writes: "The obvious reason for thinking about law historically is that it helps 
us to solve problems in the present." Id. at 287. The rest of his essay points out more subtle but 
powerful reasons for studying history, not the least of which is to learn in what cases we make 
decisions or write policy based on biased or incorrect information. Id. 
19. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 173-76; David Podmore & Anne Spencer, The Law as a 
Sex-Typed Profession, 9 J.L. & Soc'Y 21 (1982) (offering a careful analysis of the consequences to 
the legal profession of overidentification with one sex). 
20. ABEL, supra note 18, at 174 (citing Pauline Molyneux, Association of Women Solicitors -
Membership Survey, 83 LAW Soc'Y GAZETIE 3082 (1986)). Molyneux's survey does not reveal 
whether married male solicitors made any changes in their work schedules to accommodate child 
rearing. See Molyneux, supra. Molyneux's advice to ambitious female lawyers is to "delay starting a 
family until they are partners." Id. at 3084. 
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Women solicitors tend to concentrate their practices in the areas of 
probate and trust, family law, and domestic conveyancing, although liti­
gation is by far the most popular area,21 possibly because of its high visi­
bility .22 A 1982 study suggests that this "bunching " in specializations is at 
least partly due to "conceptions of the appropriate roles and qualities of 
women in the labour force .... The 'servant' image inhibits the promo­
tion of women to 'master' positions whilst the image of women as sex 
objects militates against their being taken seriously as persons in their 
own right."23 Neither the authors of this study nor a 1986 survey24 explain 
why litigation, one of the more aggressive specializations, is so popular; 
although the litigator's easily recognizable image as a dominant figure in 
law may be part of the attraction. 
21. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 175 (citing Molyneux, supra note 20). Other 
commentators have stated: 
Just as women police officers (until relatively equal work was recently introduced in 
return for equal pay) found that little work came their way besides "women's" offences 
(prostitution, shop-lifting) and "juveniles," so women lawyers are disproportionately 
involved in family and divorce work, or "back room" routinized work .. .. The over­
representation of women lawyers in "back room" work has also been justified by the 
claim that "clients would object" to dealing with a woman. 
Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 27. Note that in some cases, a woman lawyer may provide a 
stronger symbol than a man. In the film, Jagged Edge, lawyer Teddi Barnes points out that the jury 
will be influenced by seeing her client, an accused wife-murderer, carrying her briefcase and taking 
her advice. JAGGED EDGE (RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video 1985). 
22. See Molyneux, supra note 20, at 3083. 
23. See Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 24. The perception that women are much more 
likely than men to leave the workplace for the demands of childrearing also figure into the 
disinclination to promote them into positions of authority. The statutory period for maternity leave is 
generous: "(A)n employee's maternity leave period continues for  the period of fourteen weeks from 
its commencement or until the birth of the child, if later." Employment Rights Act of 1996, ch. 18, 
pt. VIII, § 73 (Eng.). Employees with two years or longer also have "the right to return to work at 
any time during the period beginning at the end of her maternity leave period and ending twenty­
nine weeks after the beginning of the week in which childbirth occurs." Id. § 79. 
It might in fact create serious business problems for an employer who makes the effort to hire 
women as fifty percent of its staff if, for example, a substantial part of half of the workforce were to 
take maternity leave on a rotating basis every few years. 
�y senior partners will express reluctance to employ a woman solicitor because of 
the likelihood that she will have children and consequently the finn will suffer either by 
losing the solicitor altogether or by her taking time off to have the baby. It may be of 
some consolation to such senior partners that the average length of leave from the date of 
leaving until the date of return was only 5.24 months. For those respondents who were 
partners at the date of maternity leave, the period was much shorter being only 2.43 
months. It should be borne in mind however that the employment protection legislation 
d�s not cover. partners and in such cases the length of time off and arrangements for domg work dunng that period were matters for negotiation between the individual partner 
and her firm. 
Molyneux, supra note 20, at 3083-84. From the employer's point of view the female employee 
covered by relevant legislation is taking nearly as much time as she is entitled to, without regard for 
the convenience of the employer. From the employee's point of view, she is attempting to fulfill the 
expecta�on of �th her employer (faithfully returning to work when required) and of society (staying 
home with her mfant and proving herself a "good mother''). Thus, the situation seems to become 
?1uch. 
mo
.
re adversarial than perhaps it needs to be. This issue clearly needs more objective 
mvest:Jgallon . 
24. See Molyneux, supra note 20. 
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE LATE 
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TwENTIETH CENTURIES 
PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT 
A. In General 
. 
The Engli!h �� in �e late sev�nteenth century was, as it is today, a 
bifurcated bar. D1v1ded mto the twm professions of solicitor and barris­
ter, the bar established and maintained a careful and rigorous distinction 
between the non-litigious role of the lawyer, eventually taken by the so­
licitor, and the litigious aspects, eventually taken by the barrister.26 
We have seen that the distinction between the attorney who repre­
sents a person for the purposes of litigation, and the pleader who 
speaks for a litigant in court, is fundamental in early law. The idea 
that one man can represent another is foreign to early law. When first 
it is introduced it is regarded as an exceptional privilege, and the rep­
resentative must be solemnly appointed. On the other hand, the idea 
that a litigant may get assistance from his friends or others to conduct 
his case in court is known to and recognized by early law. Thus the 
appointment by a litigant of an attorney, and the obtaining by the liti­
gant of the assistance of a pleader, are two very different things; and 
so the class of attorneys and the class of pleaders naturally tended, 
25. See generally BIRKS, supra note 18 (discussing history of the legal system); 6 W.S. 
HOI.DSWORTII, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 431-81 (1924) (discussing the general history of the 
English Bar in the latter half of the seventeenth century); T'HEOOORE F.T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW pt. II (1929) (discussing the history of the law courts and the legal 
profession). For a discussion of the English Bar in the Jacobean and early modem period, see C.W. 
BROOKS, PElTYFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALIB: THE 'LoWER BRANCH' OF TIIE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1986); J.S. COCKBURN, A 
HlsTORY OF ENGLISH AssIZES: 1558-1714 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1986); DA YID LEMMINGS, GENILEMEN 
AND BARRISTERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENGLISH BAR: 1680-1730 (1990); BRIAN P. 
LEvACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND: 1603-1641, A PoLmCAL STUDY (1973). For a 
discussion of the Victorian period, see RAYMOND COCKS, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN BAR 
(1983). See also, e.g., Daniel Duman, Pathway to Professionalism: The English Bar in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 13 J. Soc. HIST. 615 (1980) (suggesting that the bar developed 
its own model of professionalism before other occupations); W. Wesley Pue, In Pursuit of Better 
Myth: Lawyers' Histories and Histories of Lawyers, 33 ALTA. L. REV. 730 (1995) (advancing the 
view that lawyers, Canadian lawyers in particular, are enamoured with history because it allows 
them to create and recreate more flattering images of themselves). 
Currently, some movement is underway to change the sttucture of the E nglish Bar. This 
discussion is not new. Some of the commentators who favored the admission of women into the 
profession also favored a dismantling of the distinction between solicitor and barrister, as had 
already been done in some other countries in the Commonwealth, as well as in the United States. On 
the structure of the legal profession in the Commonwealth during the period discussed in this essay, 
see C.E.A. Bedwell, Conditions of Admission to the Legal Profession Througlwut the British 
Empire, 12 J. Soc'y COMP. LEG. 209 (1912) (discussing the conditions of admission to the legal 
profession within the Commonwealth); Holford Knight, The Organisation of the Bar in the British 
Empire, 15 J. Soc'Y COMP. LEG. 161 (1915) (examining the structure of the Bar in the British 
Empire). 
26. See 6 HOI.DSWORTH, supra note 25, at 432, 504-05. 
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from a very early period, to become quite distinct. English law has 
retained this distinction throughout its history.27 
For the most part, the profession in the British Empire was closed to 
women; although a few Commonwealth jurisdictions such as New 
Brunswick28 and Newfoundland29 in Canada, and Queensland30 (which 
eliminated the bifurcated bar in 188 1),11 Tasmania,32 and Victoria11 m 
Australia admitted women during the period. 
B. Other Countries of the Union 
1. Scotland 
In 1900, eighteen-year-old Margaret Hall requested permission to sit 
for the first of two required examinations given by the Examiners of 
Law-Agents.34 The organization refused, and Hall brought suit against the 
Incorporated Society of Law-Agents in Scotland.35 The Society, surpris­
ingly, volunteered that although "[a]ccording to inveterate usage and 
custom in Scotland, that practice has in all departments of the law been 
hitherto confined exclusively to men .... [It did not] conceive it to be 
their interest or duty to maintain that women ought not to be enrolled as 
law-agents."36 
The Hall case, like the Chauvin case across the Channel,37 turned on 
the court's narrow interpretation of its power to act in what might be 
considered a purely administrative matter. In the Chauvin case, the 
French court refused to order the petitioner's admission on the grounds 
that the law did not permit it to usurp the power of the relevant profes­
sional association.38 In the Hall case, the court worried about its ability to 
take such a drastic step absent a very clear indication from the legislature 
that the admission of women as law-agents was contemplated when the 
statute was drawn, even though the professional organization in question 
did not oppose the admission of women.39 The organization did, however, 
27. Id. at 432. 
28. See Bedwell, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Act Enabling Women to Practice Law, 1906, 6 
Edw. 7, ch. S, §1 (Eng.)). 
29. See id. at 221 (citing 10 Edw. 7, ch. 16 (Eng.)). 
30. See id. at 223 (citing 5 Edw. 7, no. 10 (Eng.)). 
31. See 45 Viet., no. 5 (1881). 
32. See Bedwell, supra note 25, at 224 (citing 4 Edw. 7, no. 14 (Eng.)). 
33. See id. at 225 (citing 3 Edw. 7, no. 1837, § 2 (Eng.)). 
34. Hall v. lncorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059 (1901). 
35. See id. at 1059-60. 
36. See id. at 1060. 
37. See Christine Alice Corcos, Lawyers for Marianne: The Nature of Discourse of the Entry 
of French Women into the Legal Profession, 1894-1926, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 443-56 (1996). 
38. See id. 
39. See Hall, 3 Fr. at 1062-64. 
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"pass the buck" to the court by indicating some hesitation on the question 
of the admissibility of women to practice law in Scotland: 
The respondents do not feel called upon to oppose the prayer of the 
petition. At the same time there may be a question whether women 
have a legal right to be admitted to practise the profession of the law. 
According to inveterate usage and custom in Scotland, that practice 
has in all departments of the law been hitherto confined exclusively to 
40 . men. 
Custom apart, however, "[t]he respondents ... do not conceive it to be 
their interest or duty to maintain that women ought not to b e  emolled as 
law-agents. "41 
Hall herself maintained that the law presently permitted the admis­
sion of women, but even if the justices disagreed with her interpretation, 
the court still had the power to admit women as part of its traditional role 
as regulator of the Scottish Bar.42 She based much of her case on the 
wording of the Law-Agents Act of 187343 which held that "[f]rom and 
after the passing of this Act no person shall be admitted as a law-agent in 
Scotland except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. •'44 As Hall 
pointed out, "no person" applied equally to men and women (unless the 
court deemed for some reason not to recognize women as "persons" for 
the purposes of the statute): 
The Act neither expressly nor by implication excluded women. It 
contained express notice of disability of minority, but none of dis­
ability of sex. Its terms, strictly construed, included women. The sub­
stantive used throughout was the general one, "person," which was 
followed in accordance with English usage, even where the term ap­
plied to both genders, by the masculine pronoun "he," "his" or "him." 
Moreover, previous to the passing of the Act of 1873, Lord 
Brougham's Act of 1850 had been passed, which provided that after 
1850 "in all Acts words importing the masculine gender shall be 
deemed and taken to include females, unless the contrary as to gender 
is expressly provided." The Act of 1873, construed in the light of 
Lord Brougham's Act, included women. Lord Brougham's Act was 
repealed and substantially re-enacted by the Interpretation Act, 1889, 
section 1. 45 
Further, even if the statute was not capable of the reading Hall gave it, 
she asserted that the court had, by custom and statute, the responsibility 
of admitting all law-agents who met the appropriate standards: 
40. Id. at 1060. 
41. Id. 
42. See id. 
43. 36 & 37 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.). 
44. Id.§ 2. 
45. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1061 (1901) (citations 
omitted). 
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It was competent for . the Court, and within its discretion, to admit 
them. The Act of 1873 created no new duty in the Court, and gave it 
no new power with regard to this question. The duty of regulating the 
admission of persons desiring to practise as law-agents had been ex­
ercised by the Lord of Council and Session of their own motion ever 
since they first admitted agents to practise before the Courts, and 
simply as a matter of the administration of the Courts . . . .  The Court 
had, ever since they had first admitted agents to practise either in the 
superior or inferior Courts, regulated their admission merely as one of 
the incidents of the administration of the Courts of the country with­
out any further power conferred upon them by the Legislature than 
that of conducting the business of the Courts. . . . Seeing, then, that 
the admission of persons as law-agents had always been treated by 
the Lords of Session as one solely of administration in conducting the 
business of the Courts, it could not be said to be incompetent for the 
Court to admit women to practise law.46 
By presenting the question of admission as one of simple administration, 
requiring little judgment on the part of the court except a willingness to 
"go along," Hall clearly hoped to diffuse the question on which the Soci­
ety attached its refusal, that of technical inability to support admission, 
even though the Society had never really been requested to do so. Hall 's  
initial petition to the Law-Agents had simply been for the right to sit "for 
the first of the two examinations which intending law-agents" were re­
quired to pasS.47 
Turning to the question of custom, Hall pointed to historical in­
stances of female advocates, including that of Lady Crawford, who ob­
tained an acquittal for her client. 48 
That the Court might not have been entirely averse to admitting 
women to the practice of the law, even in early times, might be gath­
ered from the fact that the Justiciary records contained a report of a 
trial on 12th June 1563 in which the Lady Crawford appeared as ad­
vocate in the High Court of Justiciary for the defence of a prisoner 
who was ultimately acquitted. 49 
Note the addition of the phrase "even in early times," implying that in 
fact women could point to a long tradition of admission, even though the 
last documented instance was 350 years previous. The words suggested 
to the court that even the culturally benighted legal profession of Renais­
sance Scotland recognized the rights of able women in this regard. 
Hall also answered other objections. Women were now able to earn 
the appropriate education at the University; therefore they could not be 
46. Id. at 1061-62. 
47. Id. at 1059. 
48. Id. at 1062 (citing SCO'ITJSH L. �. Feb. 9, 1901,  at 1 26). 
49. Id. 
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said to be �acking in training.50 Other countries, including the United 
States, admitted women to the bar, and even in Scotland women were 
admitted to the practice of medicine and allowed to hold other positions 
of authority.51 
The Incorporated Society of Law-Agents responded by asserting 
that women never had been law-agents, or held any other office bearing 
on the practice of law.52 Further, even after the Act of 1873, legislation 
regulating the practice of law always used the masculine form. "The 
masculine gender was used throughout the whole of the Acts of Parlia­
ment and Acts of Sederunt both prior and subsequent to the Law-Agents 
Act of 1873, and there was nothing to suggest that Parliament or the 
Court contemplated women acting as agents."53 
In addressing the questions of interpretation posed by the Interpre­
tation Act of 1 889,54 the Society cited two cases which clearly contra­
vened the intent of the Act, Beresford Hope v. Sandhursr5 and Chorlton 
v. Lings,5() both of which assumed that Parliament could not have meant 
what it said. In Beresford Hope, the presiding justice held that in order to 
detennine whether use of the masculine gender also included the femi­
nine, as required by the Interpretation Act, "'the history of the matter' 
must be looked at. "51 In the suffrage case, Chorlton, "it was held that 
'man' did not include ' woman,' notwithstanding the provision of Lord 
Brougham's Act."53 As the Bebb court would later suggest,59 the Law 
Society suggested Parliament simply could not have meant what it said. 
Thus, the court, which prided itself on its adherence to the letter of the 
law, must necessarily find that Parliament's actual language meant the 
opposite if to give effect to the literal meaning meant a change in the 
status quo. 
As far as custom was concerned, "[i]t did not appear that women at 
any time prior to the present application sought to be admitted as 
agents.''60 Further, citing to the case of Sophia Jex-Blake, who had re­
quested admission to medical school,61 the Society quoted Lord Neaves, 
who 
SO. See id. at 1 062-63. 
St. See id. at 1063. 
S2. See id. 
S3. Id. at 1064. 
54. 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.). 
SS. 23 Q.B.D. 79 (1 889). 
S6. 4L.R.-C.P. 374 (1 868). 
064 (1901) 57. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1 
· 
�:: �bb v. Law Society, 24 T.L.R. 634 (1913), aff d, 30 T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1 9 1 3)-, See infra 
Parts IV.C.2, IV.C.3. 
60. Hall, 3 Fr. at 1064. 
61. Jex-Blake v. University of Edinburgh, 10 M. 549 ( 1873). 
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referred to the Roman law disabling women from acting as procura­
tors, and further said that he never heard it suggested that a woman 
could be a member of the College of Justice. Reference to the Roman 
law, and to the reason for women being disabled, was made in an ad­
dress of Sir Robert Spottiswood, Lord President of the College of 
Justice, to the members of the Faculty of Advocates, summer session, 
1633.62 
Regardless of the outcome of Jex-Blake 's petition, women were ulti­
mately admitted to medical school and to the practice of medicine. The 
dicta in that case, citing to the practice of the seventeenth century, was 
comparable to the arguments advanced in the Bebb case concerning Sir 
Edward Coke's pronouncements on the legal disabilities of women. 
Further, the Society pointed out that "the respondents had commu­
nicated with the societies corresponding to their own in England and 
Ireland, and had been infonned that no woman had been admitted to 
practise as a law-agent in these countries. No woman, it appeared, had 
hitherto sought to be admitted."63 Yet, the Society concluded lamely, 
"[t]he respondents . . .  did not . . .  conceive it to be their interest or duty 
to maintain that women ought not to be admitted to practise the profes­
sion of law.''64 The Society did not make it clear whether it considered 
such a position legally questionable, or simply politically unwise. 
While the judges of the Second Division agreed that, within the 
confines of the Interpretation Act, "persons" included both males and 
females,65 it disagreed that Parliament meant what it said. 
[l]n the case of an ambiguous term, that meaning must be assigned to 
it which is in accordance with inveterate usage. Accordingly we in­
terpret the word as meaning "male persons," as no other has ever 
been admitted as a law-agent. If females are now to be admitted as 
law-agents, that must, in our view, be authorised by the Legislature.66 
What was "ambiguous" about the use of the word "person" is unclear, 
given the very clear explanation in the Interpretation Act of 1 889,67 un­
less the court was requiring that Parliament anticipate which of its uses 
of the word might seem radical should it be interpreted to include 
women, and thus use the phrase "male and female" instead of "person." 
The other judges delivering the Hall opinion held that "before the Act of 
1 873 women were not eligible to be appointed law-agents, and that they 
are not made eligible by that Act.''68 With such language a judicial inter-
62. Hall, 3 Fr. at 1064. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1065. 
66. Id. 
67. 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.). 
68. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1065 (1901). 
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pretation of custom and usage overrode a statute intended to address the 
shortcomings of that custom and usage. 
Like �e Bebb judges after them, these judges felt it necessary to 
protect Parliament from what they considered to be the unintended ef­
fects of its legislation, due to the incautious use of the word "persons." 
Nevertheless, by 1 907 women were admitted to study law at one S cottish 
university, although they were not admitted to the profession until the 
passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act.69 However, the num­
ber of women admitted as solicitors did not reach thirty percent until 
1979.70 
2. Ireland 
Although it was still part of the Union in the early 1900s, Ireland 
offered women somewhat more latitude in participating in the legal pro­
fession than did England. "Women were entitled to appear in court and 
plead for themselves in cases in which they were concerned and some 
Irish women became well known for this in the latter half of the nine­
teenth century . . . .  "11 One woman even argued her own divorce appeal 
before the House of Lords.12 Meanwhile, the Irish legal profession 
watched and waited. 
Irish women had clearly been waiting for the opportunity to qualify 
for the bar.73 In January 1 920 , the King 's Inns admitted the first two 
women in Ireland to the study of law. One, Frances Kyle, distinguished 
herself by winning the leading scholarly prize for Irish law students then 
available.1• Both she and her colleague were admitted to the bar in No­
vember of 1921 ,n six months before the first Englishwoman was admit­
ted in England.16 Kyle was also the first woman admitted to the bar of 
Northern lreland.'1 By 1 920 a woman was a magistrate in Northern Ire­
land and by 1923 the Irish legal profession had welcomed its first female 
solicitor.78 In 192 1  an Irish woman sat on a Dublin jury.79 Generally 
69. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.); see also Alan 
A. Paterson, The Legal Profession in Scotland: An Endangered Species or a Problem Case For Market 
Theory, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIEIY 76, 93 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988). 
70. Paterson, supra note 69, at 1 13 tbl.3.12. 
71 .  DAIRE HOGAN, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN IRELAND, 1789-1922, at 147 (1986). 
72. Id. 
73. Hogan speculates that they participated actively but without recognition for some decades 
before admission. Id. This may well be true since Irish women quickly qualified for legal study and 
were admitted before English women, thus suggesting that they, like their English sisters, were not only 
"in the pipeline" but psychologically ready for admission. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See infra note 43 1 and accompanying text. 
77. HOGAN, supra note 7 1 ,  at 1 47. . 
78. Studies in the history of the Irish legal profession are still somewhat sparse. 1be ma.JOr 
bibliography on Irish law is PAUL O'HIGGINS, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATIJRE 
RF.LA TING TO IRISH LA w ( 1966), with subsequent supplementation; HooAN, supra note 7 1 ,  is a general 
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speaking, the situation of women barristers and solicitors in Ireland 
seems to parallel that of women lawyers in other countries. Women tend 
to make less money than men in the same position and with the same 
number of years of experience,80 tend to cluster in particular areas of 
work,81 and suffer the same kinds of discrimination, although it seems to 
occur less frequently in Ireland than in other countries. 
As to experience and perception of bias and sexist attitudes, whether 
from solicitors, clients, judges or colleagues, there was some, but lit­
tle, evidence of bias from all sources. Colleague bias was the most 
frequently mentioned, and it was particularly remarked that some 
older male barristers appear to have problems dealing with a female 
barrister. Also, a woman's attire might be commented on in a way 
which that of a man would not. There seems, however, to be little 
scope for individuality of dress. With the statutory exception of cer­
tain family law proceedings . . . the wearing of a wig and gown is 
obligatory in court. Indeed, this dress regime seems emblematic of an 
atmosphere in which there is great pressure to conform and censure of 
those who do not.82 
III. SIMil...ARITIES WITH THE PROFESSION IN OTHER COUN1RIES 
In general, women's admission to the bars of most European and 
Commonwealth countries took place between the 1 870s and the 1920s. 
Thus, the English movement to admit women was part of a multinational 
wave of discontent with the exclusion of women from political equality 
with men that also included demands for suffrage rights, child custody 
rights, property rights, and employment rights.83 The "persons" cases,84 in 
which British women repeatedly attempted to expand their political and 
civil rights, form a unified attack on male privilege and power. 
account Generally, the collection BREHONS, SERJEANTS AND ATIORNEYS (Daire Hogan & W.N. 
Osborough eds., 1991), contains nothing for the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, but W.N. 
Osborough, 1'he Regulation of the Admission of Attorneys and Solicitors in Ireland, 1600-1866, in 
BREHONS, SERJEANl'S AND ATTORNEYS, supra, at 101, is of some interest A good collection for 
general Irish legal history is THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN: EssAYS IN IRISH U!GAL HlsToRY (J.F. 
McEldowney & Paul O'Higgins eds., 1990), which has a useful bibliography beginning at page 231. 
79. HOGAN, supra note 7 1 ,  at 147. 
80. On women in the Irish legal profession, see Alpha Connelly & Betty Hilliard, 1'he Legal 
Professwn, in GENDER AND TIIE LAW IN IRELAND 212, 216-17 (Alpha Connelly ed., 1993). 
81.  See id. at 217. 
82. Id. at 219. 
83. The literature on each of these movements grows yearly. On the women's movement and the 
development of the recognition of women's rights in the U.S., see, for example, SARA M. Ev ANS, BORN 
FOR UBF.RTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA (1989). On custody rights, see PHvu.Js CHEsLER, 
MOIHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATILE FOR Cnn..DREN & CuSTODY (1986). On equal employment, see 
A1J:RE.D W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (1 993). 
84. See SACHS & WIT.SON, supra note 3, at 22-35. 
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A. Other Countries of the Commonwealth 
1 .  Canada 
The efforts to admit women to the Ontario Bar paralleled, to some 
extent, the battle in England. Clara Brett Martin requested admission to 
the BencherS,85 a group of senior attorneys appointed by Ontario' s "gate­
keeper" law society to enforce its regulations.86 In its decision of June 30, 
1891 ,  the Convocation of Benchers decided that it could not admit Miss 
Martin, based on its reading of applicable regulations.87 The govern­
ment's response was swift. The Prime Minister, Sir Oliver Mowat, asked 
the Ontario legislature to permit the Law Society of Upper Canada to 
admit womenaa as solicitors by affirmative language in an appropriate 
statute." Martin duly applied and was eventually called to the bar, but not 
without further obstacles.90 Her admission finally required two separate 
acts of the legislature,91 which finally admitted her as both a solicitor and 
barrister on February 2, 1 897, after the Ontario legislature passed further 
legislation enabling women to be barristers. 92 
An observer of the contemporary scene wrote: 
If I were to sum up in a sentence the results of the admissions of 
women to the practice of law from my experience and inquiry, I 
would say that it has done some good, and no harm, while all prophe­
cies of ill results have been falsified; that its effects on the profession 
and practice of law have been negligible, and that it is now regarded 
with indifference and as the normal and natural thing by Bench, Bar, 
and the community at large.93 
85. William Renwick Riddell, Women as Practitioners of law, 1 8  J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L LAW 
200, 201 (1918). On Martin's battle for admission, see Constance B. Backhouse, "To Open the Way 
For Others of My Sex"; Clara Breu Martin's Career as Canada's First Woman Lawyer, 1 CAN. J. 
WOMEN & L. I (1985), and on Canadian women lawyers of the early and mid-twentieth century, see 
Mary Kinnear, "That There Woman LAwyer": Women Lawyers in Manitoba 1915-1970, 5 CAN. J. 
WOMEN & L. 41 1 (1992). 
86. On the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Benchers, see Wll.LIAM RENwlCK RIDDELL, 
THE LEGAL PROFFSSION IN UPPER CANADA IN ITS EARLY PERIODS 133-42 (1916). Riddell, who 
documented Martin's fight for admission elsewhere does not mention it in this overview. 
87. Riddell, supra note 85, at 201 .  . . 
88. The Law Society may in its discretion make rules providing for the admiSSJon of women to 
practice as solicitors. 55 Vic., ch. 32 ( 1892) (Eng.). See also Riddell, supra note 85, at 201-02. 
89. Riddell, supra note 85, at 202. 
90. Id. at 202 n.3. 
91 . See JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE: A STIJDY OF LAWYERS' LIVES 7 
(1995). 
92. Riddell, supra note 85, at 202. 
93. Id. at 2()1). 
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Certainly English lawyers would have examined the Ontario statute. If 
women could be admitted in a part of the Commonwealth, why not in the 
Mother Country herself?94 
2. Australia 
Various territories of Australia a�mitted women to the legal profes­
sion long before their mother country did.95 G.F. Greig, identified by the 
Commonwealth Law Review as "the first woman lawyer to practise in the 
Commonwealth,"96 delivered cogent views on the difficulties of law 
practice for women. In her opinion, women ' s  fuller participation in all 
occupations, not just in law, contributed to public morality.91 "No sign yet 
appears of any approaching catastrophe, such as the wise men have pre­
dicted, and still predict.''9·8 A woman' s  ability to succeed in law simply 
repeats her ability to succeed in other professions, once given the chance. 
"The women who first determined to enter commercial life were those 
who were forced to immediately do something remunerative . . .  and then 
each year found a new inroad made into higher and still higher posi­
tions.'.w Once they had proven themselves in business, they attacked the 
centers of learning and made their names in science and medicine.100 
Yet law remained closed to Australian women far longer than it 
should have. "[T]o many, the main question is, are women capable of 
performing legal work? Well, why not? Personally I have never heard 
one rational reason against it, although I have listened to heaps of twad­
dle."101 As Greig points out, "[f]or many years now we have been accus­
tomed to see women figuring as exhibitioners and in the first class hon­
our lists of our University, and the Law school is not more difficult than 
any other."102 Greig pointed out the deficiencies of the male habit of ar-
94. I have not been able to ascertain whether any female solicitor or barrister, having been 
admitted in a constituent country of the Commonwealth, made a request to be admitted to the Bar in 
England. The result would certainly have been interesting, though probably negative. 
95. David Weisbrot, The Australian Legal Profession: From Provincial Family Finns to 
Multinationals, in 1 LAWYERS IN SocmrY, supra note 69, at 244, 270-71 (giving a short history of the 
admission of women and their subsequent success in the profession). 
Victoria removed the legal barrier in 1903, followed by Tasmania (1904), Queensland 
(1905), South Australia ( 191 1), New South Wales (1918), and Western Australia ( 1 923). 
In New South Wales, the first woman was admitted to practice in 1921 (she had been the 
first woman law graduate (1902); in Victoria, the first woman was admitted in 1923 (she 
was appointed Victoria's first and only woman Queen's Counsel in I 965) . . . .  
Id. at270. 
96. See Greig, supra note 16, at 146. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 146-47. 
ICKl. Id. at 147. 
101 .  Id. at 149. 
102. Id. 
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guing that women never had been lawyers, therefore were incapable of 
perfonning adequately in that profession. 
I notice that most men, when it comes to an argument as to what 
women could or could not do, generally argue "You have not, ergo 
you cannot." . . .  They will rarely make allowance for the fact that 
men for generations have been trained to do what women are doing 
now for the first time . . . .  Opportunity is everything with we medi­
ocrities . . . .  [A]ny man or woman of average ability, given the op­
portunity to thoroughly master any business, profession, or trade that 
he or she has some natural taste for, and he or she will become a ca­
pable mediocrity worthy of all respect. '°3 
Given the same abilities and the same training, women could, in 
Greig's opinion, be the equals of men in any branch of the law, not just 
those with which some felt women had a natural affinity. Barristers had 
the more consistently interesting practices,104 but the profession of so­
licitors offered steady work, and though some of it was tedious, some 
was rewarding and challenging, including the preparation of briefs for a 
barrister. 105 Ultimately, education could not take the place of experience 
and temperament. 
The most successful solicitor, then, is not always the most erudite, he 
is the one who has a good working knowledge of the law that is daily 
applicable and knows exactly where to find anything else that is 
likely to crop up. In a word, he requires exactly the same qualities 
which go to m ake the successful business man in any other path of 
commercial life. And as women have succeeded in other businesses, 
why not in thisi06 
However, by the 1 980s, women were still underrepresented in the profes­
sion.'°1 As in other countries they were "bunched" in certain areas of 
practice, primarily those concerned with family law, except for estate 
planning.108 
Id. 
103. Id. at 150-51. 
104. Id. at 151-52. 
105. Id. at 152-53. 
106. Id. at 154. 
107. Weisbrot, supra note 95, at 271. Weisbrot states: 
In New South Wales in 1984, women constituted only 3 .9 percent of partners in 
solicitors' finns and 8 percent of sole practitioners but 26.5 percent of employed 
solicitors. Stated another way, while 48.9 percent of male solicitors in private practice 
were partners and only 27.4 percent were employed, only 14.2 percent of women were 
partners and fully 70.8 percent were employed. According to figures supplied by the 
Women Lawyers Association of New South Wales, only about 78 of the 1,100 active 
barristers in that state in 1985 were women. 
108. Id. 
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3. New z.ealand 
Unlike other member states of the Commonwealth, New Zealand 
never prohibited women from practicing law ,'00 and the first woman to set 
up practice as an attorney in New Zealand was Ellen Melville in 1 909.1 10 
However, women felt discouraged from entering the profession, primar­
ily because of the attitude of male lawyers. A 1 98 1  study by the Auck­
land District Law Society found that women faced discrimination based 
on assumptions about their family responsibilities and interest in fur­
thering their careers! 1 1  
4. South Africa 
While the first attempt to admit a woman failed in 1912,1 1 2  the Cape 
Supreme Court determined that the word "person" did in fact include 
women, to the satisfaction of the plaintiff, Madeline W ookey. 1 13 A disap­
pointed Cape Law Society obtained a reversal of that court's decision in 
Incorporated Law Society v. Wookey, which contains language reminis­
cent of that in the Bebb decision. 
The second (of three) judge(s) . . .  said that ordinarily the term "per­
son" included women as well as men, but was often used to refer to 
one sex only. Looking at the statute in the context in which it was 
passed, it seemed inconceivable to him that if the Legislature had in­
tended to introduce so great a change and to throw open the doors of 
the profession to women, it would not have done so in clear and un­
ambiguous language, instead of leaving it as an inference to be drawn 
from the use of the word "person'', which might or might not include 
women as well as men}14 
B. France 
Generally speaking, the more virulent argument over the admission 
of women to the French legal profession took place after, not before ad­
mission.115 While some debate took place between 1888 (the date of pub­
lication of an influential book on the subjectY 16 and the denial of admis­
sion to Jeanne Chauvin in 1 897, that event shocked the incoming gov­
ernment to the point that it made the passage of enabling legislation in 
109. Georgina Murray, New Z.ealand Lawyers: From Colonial GPs to the Servants of Capital, in 1 
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 318, 329. 
1 10. Id. 
1 1 1 .  Id. at 329-30. 
1 12. See SACHS & WILSON, supra note 3, at 36. 
1 1 3 . Id. 
1 1 4. ld. at37. 
1 1 5  · See Corcos, supra note 37, at 437 (regarding the admission of women to the French Bar). 
1 1�. Loms FRANK, L� �MME-AVOCAT Au PoINT DE YUE DE LA SOCIOLOOIE (1 898). This book 
went mto �t least two ed1nons, the second appearing in 1 898. See also infra notes 141-42 and 
accompanymg text. 
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� 900. � priority . 1 11 After the admission of women, the profession engaged 
m spmted debate, but the possibility of expelling women once they were 
admitted, was very slight. 
' 
In England, the debate began at about the same period, but because 
of unified opposition in the profession as well as failure in the courts and 
in Parliament, women waited an additional twenty years for the right to 
practice law. Without the intervention of wartime necessities, it is likely 
that opposition to the notion of female solicitors and barristers would 
have continued for another ten or twenty years. 
Like their French sisters, English female solicitors made very little 
initial impact. 
The subsequent history of women as solicitors is rather an anti­
climax; the fear of competition proved quite unfounded. The first 
woman solicitor was admitted in 1922 and the event went unnoticed. 
Since then the numbers admitted each year have risen steadily but 
very slowly. Even now fewer than forty women are admitted each 
year. In 1 957 there were 560 women on the roll, of whom 337 held 
practising certificates. The solicitors' profession does not appear to 
attract women very much. Among practising solicitors the ratio of 
women to men is roughly one in fifty. A large number of these have 
family links with the profession, which no doubt exercised some in­
fluence upon their choice of career. At the Bar the ratio of women to 
men is nearer one in twenty-five, but this may be deceptive. It is 
likely that many of them have only been recently called to the Bar, 
and the proportion who become established is practice is probably 
much smaller. 1 18 
Similarly, when describing the French Bar in a short article, one 
commentator of the late twenties failed to note the presence of any 
women in the profession, demonstrating that women lawyers simply had 
not made much of an impression at the time. 
The Bar council still nails to the cross any man who makes the slight­
est attempt at advertising . . . .  No lawyer may bring an action for the 
payment of a fee unless he obtains the specific authorization of the 
Bar Council. . . .  Lawyers, when they appear in Court, wear a black 
gown somewhat similar to, but more formal than that adopted by the 
American bench. . . . They represent a professional elite of educated 
gentlemen who have high ideals and who live up to them. To be an 
avocat a la Cour d' Appel de Paris or of the most remote provincial 
center is to stand forth among one 's fellows . . . .  The French lawyer 
1 17. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 443-44. 
1 1 8. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 277-78 (reporting that the number of women lawyers, per hundred, 
in the U.S. as 2.48 in 195 1  and in England as 2.1 in 1957; then comparing these ratios with the number 
of women in the English medical profession (1  in 6)). 
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may be said to have taken Holy Orders. His sacerdotal office is as in­
divisible as that of any priest of the Gospel . 1 19 
Even though they obtained the same education and fulfilled the same 
requirements as men, French women lawyers were still constrained to 
some extent by tradition or by other existing legal handicaps. An Ameri­
can observer of the time noted that 
[t]he woman lawyer who is married, cannot practice law without the 
consent of her husband; and no woman is permitted to practice in the 
Court of Cassation (Court of Appeals). Should a woman lawyer have 
a case that would necessitate an appeal to the higher court, she is 
obliged to have a man bring the appeal for her. Queer, isn't  it, the 
handicaps men place on women, while so often admitting their effi­
ciency? In France, the country which writes in great letters of stone, 
"Equality, Fraternity, Liberty," over the gates of its capitol, we have 
men, when it comes to admitting the equality of the woman, only 
half-practising that which is their boast, and, like little Jack Homers, 
thinking they are great boys at that. 120 
English legal journals, however, followed the progress of French women 
lawyers with satisfaction and interest. As early as 1915 the Solicitors' 
Journal and Weekly Reporter noted the admission of the twenty-ninth 
female member of the profession.121 They chronicled the success of 
Jeanne Rospars, the first woman to be accepted to the Conference des 
Avocats,122 and observed that she might well become the batonnier (head) 
of the Paris Bar.123 The Law Times ridiculed the arguments of the oppo­
nents of female participation in the French legal profession. "They had 
discovered this formula, in the form of juridic axioms, which to-day 
makes one smile; for instance, Robe sur robe ne vaut. The profession of 
avocat was considered virile."124 It also reported on the question of dress 
for avocates. 
It was curious to see how she (Mme Petit, the first woman to be ad­
mitted to the French bar) bore her robe in the manner of one who had 
not expected to become an avocate to posses's a robe. She justified 
women wearing the gown: "Since the avocats dress themselves as 
women, the women should be allowed to dress themselves as avo­
cats."125 
1 19. Pierre Crabites, The French Bar From Within, 1 4  A.B.A. J. 369, 371 (1928). 
120. Macy M. Lilly, The French Women Lawyers, 21 CASE & COM. 431 ,  431 (1914). 
121.  Current Topics: The Admission of Women to the French Bar, 60 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 35, 
35-36 (1915). 
122. Occasional Notes, 1 54 LAWT!MEs 123, 124 ( 1922). 
123. See also id. (stating that Jeanne Rospars might as well be made blitonnier); The Legal 
Profession in France, 1 4  LAW NOTES 149, 149 (1910) (stating that the presiding officer is known as the 
Batonnier, which in Paris is a position of great dignity, held by one of the conceded leaders of the bar). 
124. Occasional Notes, supra note 122, at 124. 
125. Id. 
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The American legal journal the Green Bag noted with enthusiasm 
the professional debut of Helene Miropolosky, which, it felt, added some 
eclat to the female half of the profession. 
[IJt is said that she made a most pleasing appearance. She was attired 
in a simple black gown relieved by the conventional white barrister's 
bib. Her costume was further accentuated by the black toque which 
crowned her jet black hair. She appeared to every one an irresistible 
legal belle . . . .  If the ladies of the United States would more generally 
emulate the example of the charming Mlle. Miropolosky, the beauty 
of woman would vie with the dignity of man in raising the general 
f th s: • 126 tone o e pro1ess10n. 
However, neither English nor U.S. legal journals were unanimous in 
their support of the avocates, and some watched their progress with 
amused contempt. The Green Bag's acclaim of Miropolosky's admission 
to the Paris Bar occasioned this snippy response from A.H. Robbins in­
the Central Law Journal: 
While every lover of the fair sex, and they are legion, wish for them 
the highest possible places in our civilization, we do not think the 
editor of the Green Bag has in any degree helped them in that direc­
tion when he encourages them to "emulate the example of the 
charming Mlle. Miropolosky." Whether women should forsake, under 
no circumstances, the ideals of home life, might be a debatable ques­
tion. Surely many exigencies of her existence in these modem days 
often compel a woman to seek her living in gainful occupations, but 
neither the woman herself nor the world generally regards the situa­
tion as in any way elevating her. It is always a situation that calls for 
some apology. And of all the occupations usually performed by men 
which tend in some degree to embarrass a woman and detract greatly 
from her delightfully retiring and maidenly qualities, that of the legal 
profession probably heads the list.127 
For Robbins, both woman's innate lack of ability to "think like a lawyer" 
and her (sex-linked) weaknesses combined to demonstrate her incapacity 
to perform adequately as an advocate: 
Woman 's failure in this profession has been notorious and is due to 
several reasons. First, a woman 's emotional temperament utterly u�­
fits her for unprejudicial analytical investigation; second, her sensi­
tive disposition recoils and is shocked by the necessary rud�n�ss a_nd 
bitterness of contesting litigants; thirdly, her natural femmme m­
stincts often e mbarrass her in her relations with other members of the 
profession and with witnesses; fourthly, the peculiar .and fre�uent physical incapacity of women jeopardize their success m the tnal of 
126. The Call to Arms, 21 GREEN BAG 597, 597 (1909). g l909) 127· A.H.R[obbins], Jetsam and Flotsam: Women and the Law, 69 CENT. L.J. 39?, 3�-9 ( 
· 
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cases by makinf them unfit to meet the demands of the situation con­
fronting them.12 
The appeal to scientific bases to support his objection reveals itself in the 
writer's dispassionate references to female emotionalism and sensitivity 
and to her "peculiar and frequent physical incapacity." Objectionable 
traits are listed and classified as if they are the result of an objective 
study of the issue. The reference to menstruation lifts the argument above 
the accusation that Robbins is simply prejudiced against women lawyers: 
undeniably, human females undergo monthly biological changes for 
thirty to forty years of their lives.129 
Robbins also rejects the "moral uplift" argument by asserting that 
women are superior to men by virtue of their gentler natures. If they at­
tempt to compete with men at a professional level, they lose that superi­
ority. They distract their male opponents through feminine wiles or they 
force men to abandon their chivalrous instincts in order to do their duty. 
In either case, women cause a dislocation of the system. 
ff]o lawyers generally it is an occasion for much embarrassment to 
have to meet a lady as opposing counsel, and often, either of two 
things must result, to-wit, either the interests of their clients must suf­
fer by reason of their unwillingness to take advantage of their fair op­
ponent's mistakes, or they must crush their natural feelings and atti­
tude toward the weaker sex and treat her as any other opponent to a 
point which they must consider rude toward a woman, although not 
so as between man and man . . . .  The argument that woman's entrance 
would elevate the moral tone of the profession may, for the sake of 
the argument, be admitted, but such result could not possibly be 
reached without detracting to a large extent from the high standing 
women already enjoy. To a gentleman, a lady is an object, if not of 
worship, at least of the highest possible esteem. . . . For her to be­
come, not merely a competitor as in some lines of business, but his 
active antagonist as she must do when she assumes the role of a bar­
rister, is either to take advantage of her antagonist or to abdicate her 
throne. Either alternative degrades a woman in the estimation of the 
man she thus unfairly opposes.130 
128. Id. at 398. 
129. One Canadian law school dean blatantly stated his belief that women students were at a 
biological disadvantage. According to one law student 
[T]he old Dean really had a lot of reservations about women going into Law. He called 
me in for a little chat and explained that although he knew that I was quite cJever enough 
to do all these things it really wasn't suitable. I was baffled. He said, very embarrassed, 
"[W]ell, some times of the month you just might not be up to it." 
Kinnear, supra note 85, at 425. Male students also made clear their finn conviction that women pursued 
law degrees to get a husband. "One woman, married and a little older, perplexed the men. 'A couple of 
fellows couldn't figure out what I was doing there. One of them said to me (he was not a very smart 
fellow), "You've already got a husband. What are you doing here?""' Id. 
130. R[obbins], supra note 127, at 398. 
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�y tri�ializing women' s  desire to obtain civic and legal equality, Robbms falls to address their very real concerns. He evokes the most enduring of images of conflict between male and female and one of the m�st frightening for men.13 1  He suggests that the worn
�
 in competition 
�1th the �an �eate�s not only his ability to remain true to his profes­
sion (she is a d1stract1on) but to his natural code of honor (she tries his 
patience and his virtue).132 A real lady could not possibly wish to "abdi­
cate her throne," even through most women have sat on thrones through 
the ages only because of a particular relationship with men (marriage to a 
male sovereign) and not because of inheritance, and a real lady, he 
clucks, would not want to put a male adversary at the huge disadvantage 
of competing with her unchivalrously in order to win a case. Further, 
notice that Robbins sounds the familiar theme that women do not under­
stand the rules of competition. They would necessarily play .the game 
unfairly, as "active antagonists," while men are precluded by tradition 
and socialization from fighting back as they would with a male opponent. 
Too many accommodations would have to be made to allow a woman to 
compete at all in the legal area, much less to compete "fairly." 
[H]er success must necessarily be relatively small as she is not in 
mind or body predisposed to the kind of work, mental and physical, 
131. See FARRELL, supra note 15 (casting the entire male-female relationship in terms of a 
continuing battle based on misunderstandings and conflicting assumptions about male and female 
roles). For Farrell, the culture tends to encourage and value women. For Joan Shapiro, another popular 
commentator, the opposite is true. 
In our culture, boys . . .  learn a sense of entitlement. After all, men are the important 
people in the world . . . .  Because of this status, they learn that they are important. All we 
have to do is look around us, and especially on 1V and in newspapers and magazines, to 
know that the most "important" people are men. Boys may say that they want to be a 
fireman or a policeman when they grow up. They also say that they want to be President 
of the United States. They very often learn that they should get the things that they want, 
and very often from women. We as women need to recognize our participation in this as 
we try to understand why men react to us in the ways that they do. We are, like it or not, a 
part of the culture that elevates men and devalues women. We absorb our cultural roles as 
well as do men. After all, we are the ones who lead men to believe that shirts appear, as if 
by magic, cleaned, pressed, and in their drawers! By living up to our role as helpers, 
nurturers, as the ones who meet men's ordinary daily needs, we cripple them in a sense. 
We handle them so quickly they don't even know they have these needs. 
JOAN SHAPIRO, MEN: A TRANSLATION FOR WOMF.N 54 (1 992). If women relinquish this supportive 
role in order to "compete" with men in the arena in which they are the traditional leaders, men will 
naturally feel confused and betrayed. 
132. This attitude is painfully obvious throughout all of the arts. In particular, the familiar plot of 
the woman attempting to compete with a man is depicted in movies (from Susan Hayward as an oil 
prospector in TuLsA (Eagle-Lion 1 949) to Jane Fonda in COMES A HORSEMAN (MGM/UA Home 
Video 1997)), in fiction (Scarlett O'Hara as a mill owner in MARGARET MITcHElL, GoNE WI111 TIIE 
WIND (1936)), and in ballet (the cowgirl who ropes as well as a man in Agnes DeMille's ballet RODEO 
(1950) can't get a date for Saturday night (see Maggie Hall, "Rodeo" Hobbled by Sticking to Safe, Old 
Trail, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 30, 1997, at 4)). That women compete unfairly, usually by using sex as a 
weapon, is also a common message. The Demi Moore character in DISCLOSURE (Warner Bros. 1994) 
harrasses poor innocent employee Michael Douglas, and Carolyn Pohlhemus sleeps her way to the top 
in PRF.sUMED INNOCENT (Mirage Productions 1990), but she gets murdered for it. Michael Douglas 
catches hell again from a woman for sexual misconduct in FATAL ATIRAcnON (Paramount 1987) 
wherein the rabbit dies once more. 
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which a successful lawyer is often called upon to endure. . We 
have no intention by our position in this article to indicate any oppo­
sition to the right of women to earn a livelihood whenever it becomes 
necessary in any business to which she may be physically and men­
tally equal and where she does not become a direct personal antago­
nist to one of the opposite sex. Our only purpose is to hold out to her 
a fair warning that we see no possibility of her permanent success as 
an active practitioner of the law .133 
These arguments are remarkably similar to those advanced by French 
opponents of women's admission.134 
One contemporary commentator concluded that French women 
lawyers of the period took the initiative to defend women and children 
charged with crimes directly traceable to the effects of poverty and pow­
erlessness. m 
The woman lawyer is everywhere in the criminal courts of Paris. She 
is a charming figure as she floats smilingly through the halls and cor­
ridors of the Assises of the Palais de Justice; and truly is she an angel 
of mercy to the women and children brought to these courts charged 
with crime. She pleads for them without hope of remuneration, and 
rarely, if ever, receives a fee for her services. The men lawyers voted 
this field of the law entirely to her, and most enthusiastically does she 
fill it. With my American commercialism, I could not help speculat­
ing as to whether or not the men would have so gallantly accorded 
this distinctive place in the law courts to the women had there been 
any money in this particular field . . . .  This thought of helping women 
and children seemed to have been in the minds of all these French 
women lawyers, unorganized as they were; for with one accord, al­
most in one voice, they flung at me the question, "What are you 
women lawyers of the United States, with all your liberty, doing for 
the women and children of the United States, for," said they, "You 
lead, we follow."136 
133. R[obbins], supra note 127, at 398. Miropolosky herself seems to have been quite aware of 
her image. An American woman lawyer of the period noted "When I told her I had seen notices of her 
in the American papers, she replied; with an alluring smile �d the most delightful accent, 'Have I, then. 
so bad a reputation?"' Lilly, supra note 120, at 432. 
134. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 472; FERN AND CORCOS, LES AVOCA TES 163 ( 1926). 
135. Jeanne Chauvin, the woman whose attempt to be admitted to the Paris Bar in 1 897 ultimately 
fo� the i.ssue of female participation in the legal profession, made her debut as an attorney in a 
cnnunal action. See Occasional Notes, supra note 122. 136. Lilly, supra note 120, at 431 .  However some Canadian women attorneys of the period objected to their �tomatic inclusion in the ranks of family lawyers. "I did have to make a demand that I not do all the Famlly Work. I liked it no more than the men did and had to make that clear. Usually the women la.wyers were landed with all the Family Work and not much else." Kinnear, supra note 85, at 429 (quollllg an unnamed Canadian female attorney). 
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C. Belgium 
In 1882. Marie Popelin requested admission to the Brussels Bar.'37 
As could be expected. the Council of Discipline refused to allow her to take the required oath, and the Cour d' Appel and then the Cour de Cas­
sation upheld this decision. The court of appeals expressed itself in 
words that would be echoed in the debate over the admission of women 
to the English and French Bars and in the U. S. Supreme Court decision 
Muller v. Oregon.'38 
Seeing that the special nature of woman, the feebleness of her con­
stitution . the modesty inherent to her sex. the protection which is nec­
essary to her, her peculiar mission to humanity, the demands and the 
obligations of maternity, the training that she owes to her children, 
the control of the household and the domestic hearth entrusted to her 
efforts, place her in conditions little reconcilable with the duties of 
the profession of an advocate, and give her neither the necessary lei­
sure, strength, nor fitness for the strifes and labours of the Bar.139 
The Cour de Cassation reiterated this view. "Considering that under the 
old system conformably with the Roman law the profession of an advo­
cate was considered as a masculine office. that the restraint imposed by 
good manners on the woman does not permit her to fulfil. ... 40 
While Popelin failed in her attempt, she inspired other women, par­
ticularly in France, and one Belgian attorney was moved to write an im­
passioned defense of the woman• s right to practice law. Louis Frank's La. 
Femme-Avocat au Point de Vue de la Sociologie14' went into several edi­
tions and was studied by both sides in the debate over female admission, 
most particularly in the Chauvin case.'42 Belgium finally admitted women 
to the bar in 1 922.'43 
IV. THE CONTROVERSY OVER PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
With regard to the admission of women to the English Bar during 
the period, male solicitors and barristers exhibited a range of attitudes. '44 
Some believed that the profession in general should by right be opened to 
women, either because they had already proven themselves the intellec­
tual equals of men or because such proof was irrelevant to the question. 
137. Edward S. Cox-Sinclair, The Bar in Belgium, 24 LAW MAG. & REV. 17 (1909). 
138. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (holding that the state had an interest in regulating women's 
working conditions because of their physical inferiority). 
139. Cox-SincJair, supra note 137, at 263 (citing a Dec. 12, 1888, decision of the Cour d'Appel). 
140. Id. at 264. (citing a Nov. 1 1, 1889, decision of the Cour de Cassation). 
141. FRANK, supra note 1 16. 
142. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 443 n.51 and accompanying text 
143. See Luc Huyse, Legal Experts in Belgium, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 225, 
231. By contrast, Italy admitted its first woman lawyer, Lidia Poet, on August 9, 1 883, after passage of 
the General University Act of October 8, 1876. See Vittorio Olgiati & Valerio Pocar, The Italian Legal 
Profession: An Institutional Dilemma, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIE'IY, supra note 69, at 336, 338. 
144. See BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276-77. 
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Some held that women should be admitted, but directed to certain roles 
or encouraged to take up only certain types of law. And some were ada­
mantly opposed to the entrance of women into the profession at all be­
cause they thought that women were intellectually, physically, socially 
and emotionally ill-suited to the practice of law. 
In addition, because the profession was then, as it is now, somewhat 
overcrowded, some male solicitors feared that the admission of females 
to their ranks would make earning a living an even more precarious 
proposition.145 The admission of women to the legal profession was a 
contentious issue primarily because it meant that women were requesting 
admission to the very profession that created, interpreted and adminis­
tered society' s  official rules. 
For many Englishmen the attitude toward the entrance of women 
into the profession was as recounted in a story of the period. 
Mayor Baker (a contemporary Mayor of Cleveland, OH), lecturing at 
the law school, told a little story of an Englishman who was asked by 
an American, why the brass railings in the galleries of the House of 
Lords were not removed, as they obstruct the view of the Speaker. 
Horrified, the Englishman gazed at the American for a moment and 
then answered: "Why, they have always been there."146 
"Because it has always been so,, is an attitude quite understandable 
of the English lawyer, whose experience is primarily with the common 
law and with written law as expressed by the legislative branch. Lacking 
a written constitution for guidance, the English lawyer relies on the strict 
interpretation of Parliament's word as expressed by particular statutes, on 
the rules of interpretation set forth in the Interpretation Act, and on the 
presumed reluctance of judges to make law by inferring Parliamentary 
intent. At least, such is the common explanation of the workings of Eng-
lish law. · 
In the case of the admission of women to the twin English legal 
professions of solicitor and barrister, we have a prime example of the 
ability of English judges to make law without seeming to do so, and a 
reflection of the controversies that surround any legal issue consigned to 
statutory rather than constitutional regulation. The courts ' insistence on 
both positive and unambiguous expression by Parliament of the intent to 
enable women to join the profession led to much more acrimonious de­
bate and many more pieces of legislation than would have been the result 
had the courts been willing to find, for example, that legislation of 
145. "One correspondent wrote to the Solicitors' Journal complaining that 'a crowd of women arc 
to be I� loose further to cut up the profession'; another thought that such a proposal was 'sacrificing the 
profession on the present-day altar of 'sentimentality gone mad'." Id. at 276. 
146. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 133. 
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18771•1 and 1 �88148 ad�ssed the question of women's participation in the 
legal profession. C�rtaJnly th�y could have done so; just as certainly, 
English courts previously had interpreted statutes or common law to find 
other rights when they chose. In addition, in interpreting the act in ques­
tion to exclude women, the courts arguably may have failed to give 
proper effect to the Interpretation Act of 1889,149 as well. 
The desire to control female behavior through proscription (women 
shall not be lawyers) and through prescription (women shall be unpaid 
caregivers and h elpmeets to male attorneys) was part of the larger wave 
during that period of legislation intended to force women into particular 
avenues of activity, although it did not carry forward unquestioned. As 
early as 1 844, Lord Brougham demanded to know on the floor of the 
House of Lords why such protectionist and paternal legislation was nec­
essary. "Cannot a woman make a bargain? Cannot a woman look after 
her own interests? Is not a woman capable of understanding those inter­
ests, of saying whether or not she has stamina and strength to work?"150 
The writer Barbara Leigh Smith commented ten years later that while 
men's social and economic progress could be measured by the lessening 
of laws restricting their activities, the same could not be said for women, 
who 
more than other members of the community, suffer from over legisla­
tion. A woman of twenty-one becomes an independent human crea­
ture, capable of holding and administering property to any amount; 
or, if she can earn money, she may appropriate her earnings freely to 
any purpose she thinks good. Her father has no power over her or her 
property. But if she unites herself to a man, the law immediately steps 
in, and she finds herself legislated for, and her condition of life sud­
denly and entirely changed . . . . "In short," says Judge Hurlbut, "a 
woman is courted and wedded as an an?iel, and yet denied the dignity 
of rational and moral being ever after."1 1 
147. The Solicitors Act of 1 877 gave complete control to the Law Society of the preliminary 
examination for Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Judicature. The Solicitors Act of 18'.', � & 41 
Viet, ch. 25 (Eng.). It represented the cubnination of several attempts to exert some urufonm� � 
control over the profession of solicitor, beginning with the granting of a charter. to the Law 
Society m 
1831 and continuing through the Solicitors Act of 1 843, which allowed the. 
�d�es to re�late the 
administration of examinations. See Lord Hailsham of St Marylbone, Sol1c1tor s Profession and 
Qualifications, 44 HALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 7, 8 (4th ed. reissue 1995). f 148. The Solicitors Act of 1888, 51 & 52 Viet., ch. 65 (Eng.) (giving custody of the 
Role 0 
Solicitors to the Law Society). 
149. 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.). 
150. 84 PARI..  DEB. (3d ser.) 1315 (1 844). IMPORTANT l5 l .  BARBARA LEIGH SMITH A BRIEF SUMMARY IN PLAIN LANGUAGE OF rnE MOST 
LA.ws CONCERNING WOMEN TOG� wrrn A FEw OBSERVATIONS THEREON 1 3  <1854>· 
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A. Early Attempts by Women to Gain Admission to the English Bar 
1 .  Private Attempts 
In 1 876 the Law Society, the organization charged with regulation 
of the profession,152 denied membership to a woman candidate."� �uring 
the same period Lincoln's Inn denied ninety-two women perm1ss1on to 
attend its lectures. 154 As early as 1 879, a Society was founded "to promote 
knowledge of the law and to consider the abilities and disabilities of 
women as to the practice of the law in any of its branches. ,,m The argu­
ments for inclusion seem to have been based on the premise that the 
practice of law, at least as far as solicitors were concerned, was a private 
office since admission was regulated by private entities, albeit entities 
chartered by Parliament. 
Eventually rejected by the courts,156 this argument nevertheless fore­
shadowed the intercession of Parliament to recognize and regulate the 
law as a profession that had emerged as a particularly public function. 
That Parliament took this role eventually is ironic, since earlier it had 
rejected attempts by women to obtain civil equality, thus forcing their 
battle into the courts.151 
Other women who attempted unsuccessfully to obtain admission to 
the profession included the "suffragette" Christabel Pankhurst.158 Some­
time in the 1 890s, two women opened a legal practice in London, 
through which they provided some service to the bar, although they ap­
parently did not practice law.159 In 1 902, Gray' s  Inn accidentally admitted 
Bertha Cave; when it realized its error it deliberately expelled her. 160 She 
appealed, and lost, 161 for the learned judges led by the Lord Chancellor 
152. Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Viet, ch. 25 (Eng.). 
153. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276. 
1 54. In regard to a petition of 92 ladies praying to be admitted to attend law lectures, it was 
resolved "that in the opinion of this Bench it is not expedient that Women should be admitted to the 
Lectures of the Professors appointed by the Council of Legal Education." V THE BLACK BOOKS OF 
LINCOLN 's INN 178 (Ronald Roxburgh ed., 1968). 
1 55.  St. John-Stevas, supra note 18,  at 271-72. 
1 56. See Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.L.R. 634 (1913). See also infra notes 292-97 and 
accompanying text. 
1 57. St. John-Stevas, supra note 18, at 261-63. 
1 58. Helena Kennedy, Women at the Bar, in THE BAR ON 'fRlAL 148 (Robert Harell ed., 1978). 
See also St. John-Stevas, supra note 1 8, at 276-82. On Pankhurst's attempts to be admitted, see SACHS 
& WU.SON, supra note 3, at 172-73. 
1 59. See BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276 (identifying these women as Miss Orme and Miss 
Richardson and the location of their office as in Chancery Lane). 
160. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 148. 
161 . Id. (citing PENSION BOOK OF GRAY'S INN (RJ. Fletcher ed., 1 903)). However, the PENSION 
BooK index gives several citations to "women in chambers," but all refer either to wives of members or 
to women of "questionable virtue" and uniformly indicate that the governing body of the Inn directed 
that these women be removed, no matter what their claims to residency. But see FRANas COWPER, A 
PRosPF.CT OF GRAY'S INN (1951) ("In 1903 a committee of judges had dismissed an appeal by Miss 
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applied the same reasoning as did the trial court and Court of Appeals in 
the Bebb case ten years later. No woman had ever been an attorney in 
England, and Bertha Cave was not going to be the first. 
But Cave' s attempt did not go unnoticed. In 1910 the Solicitors' 
Journal and Weekly Reporter published part of a letter advocating the 
admission of women which summarized the other jurisdictions which 
had already admitted them and urged his colleagues in the Law Society 
"not to follow the example of the society's revered patres conscripti, 
who in 1903 , without assigning any reason, refused to entertain or listen 
to the application that was then made by Miss Cave to be allowed to en­
ter her name on the roll of students . . . . "162 Unpersuaded by the corre­
spondent's arguments from equity and example, the Journal advanced 
the objection that admission was neither socially nor economically rec­
ommendable. "We venture to doubt whether, in the present overcrowded 
condition of the profession, it will be considered desirable, either in the 
interests of women or present male solicitors, that the profession should 
be opened to the female sex."163 
2. Early Attempts in Parliament 
a. Support for Women Attorneys in the Profession 
Two years later, after the tentative letter to the Journal, that periodi­
cal reported on Edward A. Bell's 164 paper on the admission of women to 
the profession, written in support of a like-minded bill introduced into 
Parliament. That bill, introduced by Lord Wolmer and also favored by 
Lord Robert Cecil165 (who later took on the case of Gwyneth Bebb), 
would have permitted women to become both solicitors and barristers, 
but it failed to obtain the support of either the Law Society or a signifi­
cant portion of the practicing bar!66 Bell's paper foreshadowed the argu­
ments that would be raised in support of Gwyneth Bebb's application 
and addressed most of the issues that concerned opponents and those 
neutral on the subject. 
Bertha Cave, a young lady whose application for admission to Gray's Inn had been refused by the 
Benchers."). 
162. Our Learned Sister, 55 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 25, 25 (1910). 
163. Id. 
164. See &!ward A. Bell, Admission of Women, 56 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 814, 814 (1912) 
(indicating that Bell also agreed to take Gwyneth Bebb as a clerk). 
165. Neither party nor personal affiliations were an indication of a politician's stand on the issue 
of women's admission. Both Robert Cecil and David Lloyd George favored admission. On Lloyd 
George's role, see infra note 400 and accompanying text. On the politics of Robert Cecil (later Viscount 
Cecil of Chelwood), see LoRD ROBERT CEo:L, AI.L THE WAY (1949); LoRn ROBF.RT CEaL, A GREAT 
ExPERIMENT (1941); Jere Langdon Jackson, Lord Robert · Cecil: Apostk of the League, in 
PERSONALITIFS AND POLICIES: E.5sAYS ON ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN HISTORY 94 (E. Deanne Malpass 
ed., 1 977). 
166. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276. 
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First, Bell reported that other common law countries already admit­
ted women. "I have been infonned that there are no less than 20,000 
women carrying on the profession of attorneys at law in the United 
States. A great number of women . . .  also follow the vocation of notaries 
and, I believe, patent agents."167 He also pointed out that women already 
served as advocates in some courts, "with marked ability. ,,,63 He noted 
their abilities in the political arena and pointed out that some members of 
Parliament certainly favored the activities of women in the legal profes­
sion by stating that "quite recently the daughter of a present member of 
Parliament for a Welsh constituency acted as her father's ex officio Par­
liamentary agent, and gained the election for him. "169 
Bell directly addressed the question of statutory interpretation as 
well, criticizing in advance the ultimate decision of the court of appeals 
in the Bebb case. 
I find on reference to the Solicitors Act, 1843, . . . which Act controls 
all subsequent Solicitors Acts, that the Interpretation Clause of this 
Act of Parliament distinctly provides "that every word importing the 
masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well 
as a male." Now I venture to assert that in law the interpretation of 
this Act gives women sound legal grounds upon which to support 
their claim to be admitted upon the Roll of Solicitors. It is on record 
that a lady has applied to the Law Society to be allowed to qualify for 
such admission; her application, however, was refused. I do not think 
any appeal to the law courts was made in this particular case. If such 
an appeal were ever made in any other case it would be a matter 
which would require an exceedingly refined judicial power of inter­
pretation to read out of an Act of Parliament what I submit is a clear 
enactment enabling duly qualified women to be enrolled as 
solicitors. •m 
Bell clearly recognized the fear of competition as well as a genuine if 
somewhat hysterical anticipation of possible dilution of the quality of 
practitioners manifested by some of his colleagues. 
I would urge upon members of this Society that the Bill which this 
resolution purports to support does not enable any woman to get on 
the Rolls; they have to render themselves eligible by good character 
and education and competent by qualifying examinations . . . .  Fur­
ther, they have to present themselves for examination at the Law So­
ciety in London where . . .  their demeanour and deportment can be 
taken into consideration. If women who have qualified themselves for 
the unromantic, serious and responsible profession of a solicitor, 
calmly and decorously request the responsible authority of this hon-
167. Bell, supro note 164, at 814. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
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ourable Society to be allowed to become solicitors, why should that 
request be refused? . . .  Why should woman be prevented from devel­
oping her life along the lines for which her particular capabilities may 
fit her, and in which she is most interested . . .  ? I can hardly bring 
myself to believe that there is an underlying and unexpressed opin­
ion-a selfish and timid attitude to mind-that the profession is over­
crowded already. This could not be so when every man who is quali­
fied is allowed to become a member as "of course."171 
339 
Bell also pointed out that the dulce domum argument (that women were 
by nature fitted only for home and family)112 which had been used to pre­
vent women from pursuing other professions had been unsuccessful, and 
women had "taken up positions which, it is now admitted, they adorn and 
intensify by their ability."113 Concluding with a flourish, he stated, 
[T]he enfranchisement of the sex, the force of modern circumstances, 
the progress of public opinion, the example of other civilised com­
munities and the acknowledged average mental equality of women 
and men if they be trained for any particular calling, render the ad­
mission of women into the ranks of the legal profession a matter of 
time only. Granted these facts, I venture to assert on the ground not 
only of expediency, but of justice, that the Law Society, which has 
long been one of the pioneers of legal refonn, should through its Rep­
resentative Council support the Bill when it again comes before Par­
liament for the removal of the existing archaic and unjust restraint 
upon the admission of �ualified and competent women into the ranks 
of the legal profession.' 4 
That his arguments were persuasive seems evident from the inability of 
another solicitor present, identified as R. Ellett, to dispute them, but sim­
ply to repeat the arguments which Bell had addressed. Further, he in­
sisted that the admission of women was a parliamentary question, a point 
on which he and Bell agreed. 
If females were to be admitted to the profession, the step must be 
authorised by the Legislature, for the word "persons" in the Solicitors 
Act was interpreted to mean male persons. If ladies were to
. 
be �d­
mitted, it would be necessary for the council to support a Bill with 
that object. He asked if the proposition was in the interest of the pro­
fession. He had never heard that there was any lack of solicitors. The 
public could not be said to have demanded the change. And it was n�t 
in the interest of women themselves that they should enter so labon­
ous a profession. The president had already referred to the smallness 
of the incomes of solicitors, and pointed out that in many cases they 
l 71 . Id. On the fear of competition among French male attorneys towards women, sec Cor
cos, 
supra note 37, at 466-67. 
172. Bell. supra note 164. at 814. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
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were absolutely insufficient. If women were admitted it would obvi-
th 
. m 
ously tend to reduce e remuneration. 
Appealing to the popular conception of women as natural chatter­
boxes, he also asserted, "[t]heir great faculty of continuous speech would 
fit them better for the bar, and when the benchers had admitted them to 
that branch of the profession, it would be time to admit them as solici­
tors."116 Let the rival branch have these interfering females! Deliberately 
misunderstanding Bell ' s  reference to a pending bill, he said, "Mr. Bell 
spoke of a bill that was to be introduced into Parliament, and when that 
was done it would be time enough to consider whether it should be sup­
ported. "in Other speakers announced themselves for or against Bell 's 
position. C.E. Longmore made a practical argument in favor of admis­
sion: "Thousands of pounds were spent in educating women, and when 
the time came for them to put their exertions to some advantage they 
were shut out. He hoped they were not going to be afraid of the competi­
tion of women."111 
The temporary setbacks in obtaining support from the Law Society 
and Parliament turned women' s  attention to a less formal means to ob­
tain admission to the profession. Four women who had successfully 
completed the formal education required for solicitors agreed to request 
admission to the Law Society.'79 The Society ' s  eventual refusal, based on 
the claims of custom, resulted in the judgment in Bebb v. Law Society.'80 
But twenty years later, the same claim was rejected in a colonial court. In 
the British Mandate of Palestine, a woman requested admission to the 
bar. The Supreme Court of that jurisdiction held that since no regulation 
or statute prohibited the admission of women, she might be admitted. 
Custom was not a sufficient reason to exclude her.'81 
b. Objections Based on Custom and Existing Legislation 
Generally speaking, objections to the entry of women into the legal 
profession were based on arguments of custom, and as a fallback, on the 
intellectual and physicial inability or unsuitability of women to perform 
the duties of advocates. For many male opponents, a woman's intellec­
tual inferiority consisted largely of assumptions about her inability to 
understand legal ways of thinking, which essentially institutionalized the 
male world view, and male notions of dispute resolution. Because 
women had never been trained in these ways of thinking, and would not, 
175. Id. at 814-15 (citing remades of R. Ellett). 
176. Id. at 815. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. (citing remarlcs of C.E. Longmore). 
179. &e BIRKS, supra note 18, at 1:16 (identifying the four as Miss Bebb, Miss Costello, Miss 
Ingram and Miss Nettlefold, "all of whom had brilliant careers at either Oxford or Cambridge''). 
1 80. 29 T.L.R. 634 (1913). 
181.  F.M.G., Notes: Women at the Bar in Palestine, 13 J.  COMP. LEG. 128 (3d ser. 1931). 
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indeed, could not, develop them on their own, they could never demon­
strate an aptitude for the practice of law. Since they had never demon­
strated such an aptitude, it followed that they should not be admitted. 
Historically, women never had been admitted to the English Bar; there­
fore they should continue to be excluded. That these objections consti­
tuted a chicken-and-egg argument was not lost on supporters of the 
women' s  movement.182 
These arguments were not unique to the English opponents of 
women's  admission. Indeed they were shared by opponents in other 
common-law jurisdictions. The American attorney Mary Bartelme an­
grily pointed out their hypocrisy and self-serving nature in a 1 9 1 1 ad­
dress to the Illinois State Bar Association. What is interesting in her talk 
is that she speaks briefly but eloquently to each of the misapprehensions, 
objections, and mistaken assumptions that govern male resistance to 
women in the professions. 
I am well aware of the many prejudices that exist against women en­
tering different professions and fields of occupations, and also am 
aware that they exist largely among persons who have not given the 
matter serious consideration and whose sentimental opinions are 
based upon conditions that existed in the good old time of their fore­
fathers, to which they would not return if they could. They are still 
bound by the tyranny of tradition.183 
Further, she noted that one of the reasons that women were de­
manding the right to enter into traditionally male occupations was the 
result of male intrusion into occupations that had previously been pri­
marily female, and that had provided most if not all of the paltry income 
that women were allowed to earn for themselves. This tit-for-tat argu­
ment is quite aggressive given the prevailing submissiveness of women 
even in the early twentieth century. 
Not many years ago addresses were made and articles written advo­
cating the prohibition of women in industrial and professional fields 
because they were trespassing upon the domain of men. They com­
plained that women were out of their sphere, and yet many of the men 
182. This attitude still permeates some legal thinking. See, for example, Raines v. Byrd, 1 17 S. Ct. 
2312 (1997) (holding that members of Congress had no standing to challenge the line item veto), in 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that "several episodes in our history show that in analogous 
confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch, no suit was brought 
on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power." Id. at 2321. If appellees' claim was 
sustained, presumably several presidents would have had standing to challenge the Tenure of Office 
Act, which prevented the removal of a presidential appointee without Congress' consent Id. at 2321-22. 
But see the often repeated comment by Justice Holmes that . . . 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so _it �as l:ud �own m 
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon_ w
�1c� 1t was lcud down 
have vanished Jong since, and the rule simply persists from bhnd nmtall.on of the past. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes The Path of the Law, IO HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1 897). 
183. Mary M. B�lme, A Woman's Place at the Bar, Address Before the Il
linois State Bar 
Association, 43 Cm. LEGAL NEWS 370, 370 ( 191 1). 
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who were advocating such measures and defining women's sphe�
, 
were opening mills and factories, dairies, bak���s and cannenes 
which were taking out of the home the many act1v1ttes that had been 
woman's contribution to the family household, and as a matter of 
economy and good business management will never be returned to 
the home. The spinning, weaving, knitting, making of butter, and to a 
large extent, the sewing, baking and canning are no lo:°ger do�e in the 
home . . .  and women necessarily have followed therr work m order 
that they may contribute their part to the maintenance of the family, 
and it is not because of their whims or wishes, their desire for feathers 
and frills and their loss or lack of love for home ties and family life, 
but because economic conditions have changed and they are forced to 
d th . 184 o err part . . . .  
The argument from equity is particularly powerful. B artelme further ac­
cuses her audience of hypocrisy in suggesting that they listen closely to 
arguments of any sort only when they believe they are being espoused by 
men. Men in any occupation, she asserts, fear competition. 
The question of competition is another factor that places barriers in 
the entrance of women to the professions or vocations heretofore 
wholly occupied by men. As an illustration . . .  let me cite the experi­
ence of a woman teacher who wished the opinion of some experts on 
her theory pertaining to the treatment of certain scientific subjects. 
Her first requests were signed with her full n ame, and the replies to 
them were courteous but empty. She then wrote a letter signed with 
her initials, which brought forth this reply: "Dear Mr. A: I am tre­
mendously interested in the question and consider it the most vital 
and important with reference to-education now before the teachers of 
the country. You will have a hard fight for your position . . . .  So 
many women teachers who ought to be tatting or doing other fancy 
work, are wedded to their pretty little courses in-, and they will fight 
for them like cats. I hope you will get your paper printed. Could I not 
help you?"185 
Helena Normanton, a law graduate and supporter of women's  ad­
mission, would make substantially the same arguments eight years 
later .186 For Bartelme, female participation in professional and technical 
occupations promises more happiness for everyone in society, even 
though traditional social constructs may become less numerous. 
The question, "Will women lose interest in wifehood and motherhood 
through entering these broader fields," may be answered. Yes. From 
the standpoint of marriage for shelter and support, or to escape the 
opprobrium of being an old maid, she may, but from the basis of mar­
riage for wholesome companionship and love, I believe that in the ul-
1 84. Id. 
185. Id. (dashes in original). 
1 86. Admission of Women to the Profession, 146 LA w TIMEs 428 (1919) [hereinafter Admission of 
Women]. 
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not desire to see women in it merely because they were women. She 
desired to see them in it, and successful in it, because the work was of 
so great importance that the whole of human ability should be an 
open field from which the lawyer should be chosen. 224 
353 
Nonnanton • s abilities as a debater must have surprised her opponents. 
Traditionally upper-middle- and upper-class men, but not their socio­
economically middle- and lower-class sisters,ru received the kind of edu­
cation that permitted them both to formulate and to express powerful 
argument. 226 
Nonnanton' s  most vocal opponent at the debate was Mr. J.A. Sym­
monds, a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, who suggested that she did not 
fully understand the nature of legal practice, an argument that she was at 
a disadvantage to refute since neither she nor any other woman was a 
member of the bar. 
[W]omen had not the judgment that was necessary for practising as 
lawyers. It was the man-in-the-street's, and . . .  perhaps, the woman-
224. Id. At least some of the encouragement may have been due to the traditional animosity of 
journalists toward lawyers. 
225. But see SUSAN J. LEoNARDI, DANGEROUS BY DEGREES: WOMEN AT OXFORD AND THE 
SoMF.RVlll.E COI.J..F.GE NOVELISTS (1989) (discussing a study of upper middle class women during the 
period between the world wars and their record of accomplishment). 
226. In her examination of the observable differences between U. S. men and women's scores on 
standardized tests, Beryl Lieff Benderly suggests that a great deal of it is attributable to the lack of 
emphasis which American education and culture generally place on verbal skills for men, as opposed to 
the importance they have for the run of the mill Englishman. See BERYL LIBFF BENDERL Y, IlIB MYTH 
OF Two MINDs: WHAT GENDER MEANS AND DoESN'T MEAN (1987). 
[I]n England and Scotland, grown men play word games on the radio; limericks and 
anagrams rank as national pastimes; the witty Ronald Coleman, not the stolid Gary 
Cooper, molded the notion of celluloid sex appeal. Schoolmaster-the admirable Mr. 
Chips-remains an honorable masculine calling, immune to the scorn Americans heap on 
ineffectual buffoons like the comic strips' Mr. Weatherbee or television's Mr. Peepers or 
Mr. Conklin. British culture has traditionally tied social power and literary skill into a 
single urbane, upper-middle-class package. It trains young politicians in the crackling 
debates of the Oxford Union. It signals class and caste by subtleties of sttess and syntax. 
That highly verbal culture-not surprisingly-produces males who do as well as females 
on verbal tests. But so do Nigeria, where British educational traditions continue, and 
West Gennany, where men often teach in the primary grades. 
Id. at 216-17. In spite of attempts to glamorize the teaching profession for young American boys 
through television series like Room 222 (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1969 to Jan. 1 1 ,  1974) and 
Lucas Tanner (NBC television broadcast, Sept 1 1 ,  1974 to Aug. 20, 1 975), and films like STAND AND 
DELlvER (American Playhouse 1988), they still prefer "active" occupations like policeman or fireman, 
or if they are interested in teaching, college rather than elementary school teaching, as shown in their 
reactions to these characters on television. See Tom Dorsey, Girls Searching for Role Models Gel Little 
Help from Television, COURIER-I., July 22, 1996, at 3D. Further, men who evince an interest in 
spending time with small children (as in child care) are automatically suspect Men still outnumber 
women in the legal profession, however, because of its high status, showing that they can acquire verbal 
skills when they see a payoff in status or salary, preferably both. The challenge that "overeducated" 
American women posed to the traditional dominance of the privileged males who earned the 
"gentlemen's C's" and went on to law school remains to be examined; however, it is certainly 
considerable. When I started law school, one male professor warned me not to expect more than a 
"gentleman's C", which he described as an acceptable grade. Whether he meant "in general" or "for a 
woman" I never knew. 
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law schools and pass the bar.191 At the least, this success demonstrates the 
equality of the female intellect; at the most, its superiority. 
Bartelme does accept the notion that women will prefer a civil prac­
tice to a criminal one, and within the civil law, areas such as real estate, 
probate and family law .192 She assures her listeners �at thos� ?Iale la�­
yers and legislators who take an interest in the working and hvmg �ond1-
tions of the less fortunate, including an alarming number of children, 
would find nothing but assistance and admiration from their female col­
leagues.193 But for this American attorney, as for her sisters in England, 
who were attempting to enter the profession, traditional views of the fe­
male intellect and female ability must necessarily give way to the natural 
urges of women to better themselves as well as to interest themselves in 
the world around them and to make some positive change in the social 
and economic conditions to which they objected. 
In 1982, two English sociologists noted that the inequities of which 
Bartelme spoke still existed: 
When women enter a male-dominated profession they operate in an 
opportunity structure and in an internal labour market which is differ­
ent to that of men. Coser has noted how women at work experience a 
"deficit in rewards" compared with men, and how the presence of 
women in an occupation or profession is inversely related to the re­
wards available. Women tend to be paid less and their opportunities 
for promotion are more restricted than those of men. They are un­
likely to be permitted to do similar work to men of the same (or even 
inferior) education and status. The lower financial rewards of women 
in male-dominated professions are partly the result of their concen­
tration in low-reward segments and partly the result of women's un­
der-representation in the higher rank of such professions. The average 
income of barristers illustrates this. A survey carried out for the Royal 
Commission on Legal Services showed that the average income of 
women juniors in 1976177 was £3,908 compared with £6,700 for 
�en. For all barristers the figures were £4,1 37 and £8,039 respec­
tively. Even when men and women barristers doing similar work 
were compared in the same survey, the average earnings of women 
were only 50-60% of those of men.194 
The assumed lack of intellectual ability justified the continued ex­
clusion of women from the profession, and the continued exclusion as­
sured that the argument over lack of intellectual ability could never be 
addressed, much less put to rest. How, then, was the problem to be re­
solved? 
1 9 1 .  Id. She also notes that at that time a woman had achieved the highest grade point average yet 
at the University of Chicago Law School. Id. 
192. Bartelme, supra note 183, at 370. 
193. Id. 
1 94. Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted). 
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For some male attorneys, the fact that women never had been for­
mally accepted into the bar was enough reason to continue to exclude 
them, even though they might make inroads into other professions, such 
as medicine. Proponents of the admission of women retorted that "[t]here 
were women lawyers in ancient Rome, and there was quite a chain of 
women lecturers and teachers of law in this country throughout the Mid­
dle Ages."195 One American lawyer made reference to "one Spanish 
woman receiving the degree of doctor of laws at the age of twenty­
one."196 Nevertheless, as we shall see, when Gwyneth Bebb made this 
"historical" argument before the English courts, they found it unpersua­
sive. 
The argument that women should not be allowed to practice law 
because they did not participate fully in military service was also a com­
mon one, and at first glance it looks fairly persuasive.191 However, one of 
the major functions of the military is to settle disputes which have gone 
beyond words, that is, beyond the capacity of a specific dispute resolu­
tion system. To suggest that because women have not, cannot, or should 
not impose a solution through physical force they ought not to participate 
in finding solutions through argumentation or persuasion is extremely 
tortured logic. Yet because so many analogies and thought processes in 
the common law are drawn from the language of war or sports 198 (mock 
195. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428. 1be reference seems to be to three women in 
particular. Paul Fuller, The French Bar II, 23 YALE LJ. 248 (1914). 
I find in an old volume, which I presume reliable, that long before the Theodosian Code 
(in the fourteenth century) women were accepted as lawyers in Rome, and that two of 
these, Arnasia and Hortensia, acquitted themselves with great credit, while a third, 
Afrasia, was usually herself the litigant and so scandalized the judges by her loquacity, 
her effrontery and her outbursts of passion, that she was forbidden to speak in pubic [sic], 
a prohibition later extended to all women, and only modified by Theodosius to the extent 
of permitting them to speak in their own defense. Whether Afrasia is an argument against 
the new proposition or whether Amasia and Hortensia are a preponderating argument in 
its favor, I leave to your ·own judgment. 
Id. at262. 
See also Nicolaus Benke, Women in the Courts: An Old Thom in Men's Sides, 3 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 195, 203 (1995) (identifying the offending female as Carfania). Benke uses Carfania's 
case as a method of investigating traditional male and patriarchal objections to women's exercise of 
legal power, particularly as advocates. Id. at 203-40. 
1 96. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 133. 
1 97. We can, however, speculate on the effect of "male attitudes" on women in predominantly 
male professions. Pilots are notorious for their sexual escapades, for example. One expert on military 
law suggests that some female military pilots may deliberately engage in sexually aggressive behavior 
in order to seem more like "one of the guys." Conversation with Kenneth Murchison, in Baton Rouge, 
La. (July 3, 1997). On one female pilot's legal problems and subsequent discharge, see Ron Martz, 
Military Justice: An Elite Career in Ashes; 1st Lt. Kelly Flinn Has Escaped a Possible Prison Term 
With a Plea Bargain, But Others Say They'll Keep Fighting on Her Behalf. ATI.ANTA J. & CONST., 
May 23, 1997,at 18A. 
198. On the use of sports metaphors in law school and legal communication, see Catherine Weiss 
& Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988) (the issue 
was devoted to gender and Jaw). "Men presume that everyone understands a sports analogy. I would 
never presume to use a knitting analogy." Id. at 1337. Consider also the use of sports analogies in 
discussing substantive law, such as the "level playing field" in anti-discrimination cases. 
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war) such a comparison made sense to those opposed to the participation 
of women in the legal profession. 
Technically, "adversary system" merely means th�t "neuo:al and pas­
sive factfinders . . . resolve lawsuits on the basis of evidence pre­
sented by contending litigants during formal a�judicatory_ 
proceed­
ings." The phrase connotes more than its technical defimt1on, how­
ever. A complex web of metaphor pervades the i�ea of the adversary 
system in a way that captures the hearts and mmds of
. 
the
. 
lawyers 
who function within that system. In case law, academic hterature, 
professional literature, and in popular culture, a trial is a battle and 
the lawyer the client's champion; a trial is a sports contest and the 
lawyer the client-team's winning coach or star player. M�taphors 
transform the trial lawyer from a mere person who presents mforma­
tion favorable to his client to a triumphant hero and change the other 
party to the dispute into the enemy.199 
Some commentators are unwilling to accept as settled the premise that 
women are naturally less combative than men, but acknowledge that 
inability to engage in ritualistic verbal combat puts female attorneys at a 
disadvantage. 
The premise behind this contentious system is that ardent, strident 
representation of both sides to a dispute is the best mechanism for un­
earthing all the relevant facts and defining all the relevant law while 
still respecting the rights of the individuals involved. And the further 
premise is that with the best case for both sides out on the table, 
whether in a congressional hearing room, or in a court before a judge, 
or in direct negotiations between opposing lawyers, the side with the 
greatest merit prevails. Therefore, in the interest of ultimate fairness, 
lawyers compete with all the skill, energy, and creativity at their 
command. Like football . players or armed warriors, they are licensed 
to compete with the serious aim of defeating the opposing side. 200 
The similarities between this description of the ideal functioning of 
the adversary system and the ideal functioning of the traditional "trial by 
battle" in which one or both sides hired a "champion" to fight for him is 
obvious. 201 While the operating assumption was that God was on the side 
of right and justice, still each side hoped to increase the possibility of 
1 99. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Spons, and Sex Shape thL 
Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 225, 225 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (quoting S1EPHAN 
LANDsMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO AoruDICA TION 1 
(1988)). Consider as well the use of sports analogies to describe the behavior of OJ. Simpson's criminal 
defense lawyers. Robert Shapiro and F. Lee Bailey, among others, were the defendant's "dream team." 
�wrence Schiller notes that during their conferences with him, the attorneys frequently communicated with th� fonner football player in sports terms, which enabled him to take active charge of his defense. Joumahsts also translated analyses of defense strategy into sports talk. See LAWRENCE SCllil.LER & ]AMES WllLWERTif, AMERICAN TRAGEDY 381-82 (1997). 
200. MONA IIARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REwRrriNG THE RUI.ES 1 29 (1994). 201 .  On trial by battle, see GEORGE NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT ( 1 890). 
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victory •
. 
recognizing the truth of the often-repeated dictum that God was 
on the side of the strongest battalions. 202 
[M]any women, drawn to the law by its promise of fairness shun 
chronic engagement in battle. Bearing out the stereotyped im�ge of 
woman as pe�cemaker, .
not warrior, they tend to shy away from the 
most adversanal arenas m the law and to gravitate toward those forms 
of practice that are most consultative and conciliatory, or those that 
are bound by hannonizing rules. This last includes fields such as se­
curities, antitrust, bankruptcy, and tax, in which doing the work is 
like solving a puzzle. 
Many women in big firms opt for a corporate law practice be­
cause it allows them to work cooperatively with groups of people 
who have conflicting interests but also a common interest in putting 
together a particular deal or solving a common problem. 
But the more aggressively hard-edged the practice, with trial 
work at the extreme, the fewer women are involved. This is a fact, but 
the question is, Why. Has nature programmed men hormonally to do 
battle and women to avoid it? Or do women shun competition be­
cause the larger culture socializes them to dislike it, teaches them the 
their virtue lies in sympathy, understanding, patience, cooperation, 
and peacemaking rather than in combat? Or is it mainly a lack of 
practice? Would women feel more comfortable as competitors if their 
families and schools and communities placed girls in the same 
gladiatorial roles that boys assume from early childhood onward? Or 
is it that women, entering the legal profession with more social train­
ing than men in quiet dispute-settling, see the lawyer's reliance on 
adversarial procedures as excessive? Are women rejecting, as a mat­
ter of consci01,1sly formed critical judgment, the degree of competition 
they find in the law?203 
202. "J 'ai toujours vu Dieu de cote des gros battailons" ("I have always seen God on the side of 
the strong battalions''). Statement of Marechal de la Ferte-Senneterre to Anne of Austria (Queen of 
Louis XIII of France), cited in BOURSAULT, lEITRES NOUVELLES DE MONSIEUR BOURSAULT 384 
(1698). lbis statement is also often attributed to Napoleon, among others. 
203. HARRINGTON, supra note 200, at 129-30. The author quotes two particularly telling 
comments from successful women attorneys on the similarities between law practice and sports or war. 
[A] state court judge who graduated from law schools in the 1950s remarked, "I think 
doing trials isn't comfortable for women, as a trial draws on a playing-field mentality. 
Women prefer to settle. They don't like the winner-take-all philosophy-and, I think, 
rightly so . . . .  " A fonner Jaw-review editor . . .  doing civil litigation in a large, well­
known firm . . . questioned the good sense of settling business disputes through 
adversarial procedures. "Litigation is strange," she said. "It's a strange way to settle 
problems. It's war. It's a game. I mean, there're these little battlefields and this is the way 
you're supposed to shoot the other person. It's just absurd . . .  I'm good at it Probably 
it's what I'm best at in the world, but it is sort of silly . . .  and it's incredibly wasteful." 
Id. at 132. 
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Deborah Tannen also points out that oral "ritual opposition" occurs 
today both in business and in law. 
A modem-day equivalent of the bonding that results from ritual op­
position can be found in business, where indiv�duals may com�te, 
argue, or even fight for their view w.
itho�t f�e�mg
. 
pe�son� enmity. 
Opposition as a ritualized format for mqmry 1s mstitutionahz�d m�st 
formally in the legal profession, and it is expected that each side will 
do its best to attack the other and retain friendly relations when the 
case is closed. 204 
We should not be surprised that male lawyers therefore expect this kind 
of relationship, and feel uncomfortable when it is not forthcoming, 
whereas for women lawyers verbal sparring is not only foreign but con-
sidered antithetical to "real womanhood." 
B.  Arguments For and Against the Admission of Women to the Profes­
sion 
As we can see, the debate over the admission of women to the bar 
had started long before Bebb stated her case and continued more viru­
lently afterward. Just as in France and the United States, the arguments 
centered on two issues: ( 1 )  the f aimess of refusing women admission to 
the bar while allowing them to pursue other professional avenues, par­
ticularly given their willingness to share the burdens of political and so­
cial life with men; and (2) the question of women 's ability to meet the 
traditional standards of the profession (physical, psychological and in­
tellectual). 
That the contributions of Englishwomen to the war effort were 
taken as a demonstration of their intellectual and physical equality with 
men was clear as early as 1915 (the second year of the First World 
War).205 One journal suggested that women ought by right to be admitted 
to the profession of solicitor if they were qualified by education and 
ability. 
If women who have qualified themselves for the unromantic, serious, 
and responsible profession of a solicitor calmly and decorously re­
quest to be allowed to become solicitors, why should that request be 
refused? So far as the profession is concerned, there is nothing im­
proper or inexpedient in allowing competent women to become so­
licitors. Why should woman be prevented from developing her life 
along the lines for which her particular capabilities may fit her and in 
which she is most interested, thus depriving the state of her services 
204. DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 ro 5: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S CONVERSATIONAL 
STYLES AFFECT WHO GETS HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT GETS DoNE AT WORK 237 
(1994). 
�05. � same j�stific�tion was advanced in support of the admission of U.S. women, in an essay 
which also �sapprovmgly cited the results in Hall, Cave and Bebb. See Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, A 
Recent English Case on Women and the Legal Profession, 23 J. POL. EcoN. 64, 67-70 (1915). 
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in any J!rofession in which she may be fitted by nature or education to 
excel? 
349 
The intellectual equality of women was also very much at issue 
during this period, not only in England but in other countries wrestling 
with the idea of integrating traditionally male professions. Critics ad­
vanced both attempts at serious study and anecdotal evidence to support 
their views. In France, for example, some of the debate concerned the 
supposed lack of intellectual capacity that theoretically accompanied 
women's smaller brain sizes. 201 
In the United States, female physicians and lawyers already worked 
actively and publicly to champion the cause of women, and their work 
was documented in the legal journals of the period. 
For the first time in history a jury composed of women physi­
cians recently sat as judges of the court for the insane at the Detention 
Hospital in Chicago. This jury saved two women from being com­
mitted to the insane asylum by their husbands. Women lawyers all 
over the country are hoping that the example of this Chicago jury 
may be followed in other cities, especially in cases in which the san­
ity of women in concerned. Sixty women lawyers of Chicago have 
placed their services at the disposal of Judge Heap of the municipal 
court, who is privileged to call any of them to defend girls brought 
before him. The women lawyers have organized the Public Defenders 
League for destitute girls, and they plan to appear for penniless 
women who are arrested and brought into the morals court.208 
Another writer documented the work of women professionals, pri­
marily judges and lawyers, in many special courts in cities such as New 
York and Philadelphia, for a meeting of the New Constitutional Society 
for Women's Suffrage.209 Law reviews and other periodicals eagerly re-
206. Flotsam and Jetsam: Women as Lawyers-Modern View, 51 CAN. L.J. 79, 79 (1915) 
(quoting the LoNDON L.J.). 
207. See FRANK, supra note 1 16, at 158. On the arguments for and against women lawyers 
generally, see Corcos, supra note 37, at 449-63. 
208. Editorial Comment: Women Physicians and Lawyers Set Good Example, 22 CASE & COM. 
63, 65 (1915). Husbands and fathers of women considered "insane," whether because of actual 
mental disability or because they objected to the behavior of men in their families, traditionally 
turned to the courts for permission to incarcerate these women. See HELEN SMALL, LoVE's 
MADNESS: MEDICINE, TIIE NOVEL, AND FEMALE INSANITY 1800-1865, at 184-92 (1996) (discussing 
famous cases and social reaction to wrongful incarceration of wives during the late 1 850s in 
England). The theme of non-conformist behavior as insanity runs through the literature of the 
nineteenth century. See SANDRA Gn...BERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE Arne (1 979) 
(discussing nonconforming behavior as portrayed in nineteenth century poetry and fiction); SMALL, 
supra (tracing the treatment during this period in medicine and literature of women who had gone 
mad due to abandonment by loved ones). On the English judiciary's attitude toward insanity, see 
JOEL PETER EIGEN, WITNESSING INSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD-DocrORS IN TIIE ENGLISH COURT 
(1 995). 
209. See G. Hopkins (Mrs. Herbert Musgrave), Women's Work in the Courts in the United States, 
1 5  J. COMP. LEG1s. 198 (1915). French women attorneys apparently also attempted to set up a 
children's court before the First World War. See Lilly, supra note 1 20, at 433. G. Hopkins later visited 
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ported the establishment and progress of law schools that a�tted 
women.210 However, some observers objected to the segregation of 
women into a special school, such as the Cambridge Law School for 
Women even if it were "as nearly a replica of the Harvard Law School 
as it is �ossible to make it."2 1 1  Said Mary Agnes Mahan, ex-president of 
the Massachusetts Association of Women Lawyers, 
Personally, I feel that women should have been admitted to th
_
e 
Harvard Law School. There was no necessity for a separate orgam­
zation . . . .  The phrase "First graduate law school in America exclu­
sively for women" has no charms for me. The students will lose the 
benefit of contact with men ' s  views and opinions, and that benefit, 
under the circumstances, is inestimable. There have been generations 
of men lawyers; it's a new field for women, in a way. There have 
been few Portias through the ages. I think coeducation in a graduate 
law course is almost an essential.212 
Even though women were firmly established in the U.S. legal pro­
fession, the old debate over their aptitude continued, demonstrating that 
at least for some male attorneys, familiarity continued to breed contempt. 
In some cases women lawyers contributed opinions that smacked of spe­
cial pleading. In the late 1 800s, members of the Equity Club regularly 
received advice about safeguarding their health. One attorney believed 
that overwork had partly contributed to the death of her law partner,213 
echoing the theories of Edward H. Clarke in his widely read Sex in Edu­
cation: Or, a Fair Chance for the Girls,214 which 
explained the supposed weaknesses of female physiology to the gen­
eral reader. Wrapped in the banner of medical authority, Sex in Edu­
cation was an assault on the new phenomenon of coeducation. Clarke 
warned that women 's reproductive physiology made it unsafe for 
them to undertake any intellectual activity with the same rigor as 
men. Excessive study, he explained, diverted energy from the female 
England and spoke of the work of the "women's courts" to interested members of the New 
Constitutional Society for Women's Suffrage in Knightsbridge. See Courts for Women, 59 SOuc. J. & 
WKLY. REP. 274, 274 (1915). 
210. See Graduate Law School for Women, in 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 54 (1918). Among them 
were the Washington College of Law, whose motto "F.qual Opportunities for Men and Women" 
�fleeted its origin as an institution of higher education "founded primarily for women." Its faculty 
included both male and female professors. Id. The Portia School of Law was in its seventh year of 
operation in the fall of 1915. Its dean, Arthur W. Macl..ean, pointed out to the eager entering class, 
61 strong, the "advantages to women of the modem tendency against coeducation of the sexes, and 
toward the establishment of separate schools for men and women in all lines of intellectual 
endeavor." Id. at 54-55. Apparently the advantages did not extend to an all-female faculty and 
administration. 
2 1 1 .  Id. at 54. 
212. Id. (quoting Mary Agnes Mahan). 
213. See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS AND 1lffi ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL ID� � AMERICA: THE LETI'ERS OF EQUITY CLUB, 1 887 TO 1 890, at 33 (19'J3) (construing Ellen A. Mamn in reference to the death of Mary Frederika Perry). 
2 1 4. Eow ARD H. CLARK, SEX JN EDUCATION: OR, .A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE GIRLS (1873). 
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reproductive organs to the brain, causing a breakdown in women's 
health and threatening the health of future generations.215 
Additionally, 
[t]he women lawyers of the Equity Club understood all too well that 
the warnings to Clarke and other physicians threatened their desires 
for professional careers. But, within the privacy of the Equity Club, 
where they could openly discuss their concerns about health, Equity 
Club members did not unanimously reject Clarke' s  ideas. Ellen Mar­
tin first brought the issue into the open in her letter to the Equity Club 
in 1888 when she warned her fellow club members about the delicacy 
of the female reproductive system. Sharing Clarke' s  view, she wrote: 
"I refer to the close relation between the brain and the organs peculiar 
to women, and to the fact that any trouble with those organs (and a 
celebrated anatomist says they seem made to �et out of order) seri­
ously affects the brain and the nervous system." 16 
35 1 
Thirty years later, a 1915 address by attorney Selma Klein George 
of New Orleans, Louisiana, encapsulated many of the arguments con­
cerning the necessity of women's  participation in political and profes­
sional life. 
If a moving picture could be made of the real influence exerted 
by woman in love, politics and the home, man would come better to 
understand the part she plays in the law. The far-reaching force and 
effect of woman 's influence in every sphere of life cannot be over­
rated . . . .  Undoubtedly woman exercises a greater influence in the 
making of laws which are calculated for the betterment of society 
than the law-maker himself. She is the power behind the throne. And 
if this be so as to the creation of law, why should she not play an im­
portant part in the interpretation of, and the carrying into effect of its 
mandates?211 
George was adamant that accusations that women were not the intellec­
tual equals of men were the direct result of fear. Like Helena 
Normanton,218 she identified much of the antagonism against women 
lawyers as an unreasonable fear of competition in general or as fear that 
men who are conscious of their social responsibilities toward the weaker 
sex would be put at a disadvantage in the courtroom.219 
215. DRACHMAN, supra note 213, at 31. 
216. Id. at 33. For more on the debate, see id. at 34-37. French male opponents of women's 
participation in the legal profession made similar arguments. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 47 1;  
CORCOS, supra note 134, at 162. 
217. Selma Klein George, Woman and the Law, 8 LAW. & BANK. 1 1 8, 1 1 8  (1915). The 
reference to "moving pictures" is an interesting one, given the novelty of this medium and indicates 
that it had already been recognized as a very powerful opinion-maker in early twentieth-century 
culture, even among the professional elite. 
2 1 8. See Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428 (discussing Helena Normanton's view 
that men feared competition with women in the legal profession). 
219. Id. 
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In those states where woman is forbidden to practice law, about 
the only reason given by man is that they would persuade without ar­
gument. . . .  Woman is in every sense the equal of man. The books 
with which our libraries are filled, the arts, the academies, show that 
their intelligence and learning nourishes all the world . . . .  The law is 
supposed to be founded on common sense. If it has that for a basis, 
then it goes without saying that woman is equally as well prepared to . fi th l 220 mterpret or to en orce e aw as man. 
In fact, George went so far as to say that because women inspired so 
much of the "unwritten law," the custom, of the time, they 
might have a like part in all that concerns the statute or written law . . .  
. Any real rivalry of the sexes even in the practice of law, is the 
sheerest folly and most unnatural nonsense. The genius of woman is 
not alone in her heart; it is equally in her head. . . . Woman truly 
commands. Contact with one that is highminded is acknowledged to 
be good for the life of any man. . . . I submit in conclusion that you 
must agree with me that in-sofar as the professions of life as con­
cerned, woman is the "better half."221 
The content of the debate in England was remarkably similar. Dur­
ing one particular open debate in London three years before Ivy Wil­
liams's admission, Helena Normanton argued that 
if women were unfitted to enter the profession of the law they must 
be equally unfitted to enter the medical profession as doctors, for the 
mistakes of the doctor were very much more likely to be serious than 
those of the lawyer. If women were by temperament incapable of pre­
cision, care, judgment, observation, all these were faculties which a 
doctor needed. It came with a very ill grace from a lawyer to demand 
that his profession should be closed to women, when it was remem­
bered that so many of the occupations which had been thrown open to 
women had been so opened by lawyers.222 
Normanton charged that such reluctance on the part of the male attorney 
suggested that he "feared the competition of women" and maintained that 
such opposition was unknown outside the legal profession itself. 223 
[S]he could quite honestly say that she had never met anybody out­
side the legal profession who had in any way condemned her for 
wishing to become a lawyer. On the contrary she had been most per­
sistently encouraged by a class of men whose opinion was impor­
tant-the law reporters of the newspapers. She could not tell how 
many had urged her to persevere. They said they had seen many cases 
in the courts where a woman lawyer would have been extremely use­
ful. . . .  She took the profession of the law so seriously that she did 
220. See George, supra note 217, at 1 1 8-19. 
221. See id. at 1 20. 
222. Admission o/Women, supra note 186, at 428. 
223. Id. 
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not desire to see women in it merely because they were women. She 
desired to see them in it, and successful in it, because the work was of 
so great importance that the whole of human ability should be an 
open field from which the lawyer should be chosen.224 
353 
Normanton' s abilities as a debater must have surprised her opponents. 
Traditionally upper-middle- and upper-class men, but not their socio­
economically middle- and lower-class sisters,225 received the kind of edu­
cation that permitted them both to formulate and to express powerful 
argument. 226 
Normanton' s  most vocal opponent at the debate was Mr. J.A. Sym­
monds, a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, who suggested that she did not 
fully understand the nature of legal practice, an argument that she was at 
a disadvantage to refute since neither she nor any other woman was a 
member of the bar. 
[W]omen had not the judgment that was necessary for practising as 
lawyers. It was the man-in-the-street's, and . . .  perhaps, the woman-
224. Id. At least some of the encouragement may have been due to the traditional animosity of 
journalists toward lawyers. 
225. Bui see SUSAN 1. LEONARDI, DANGEROUS BY Df.GRF.ES: WOMEN AT OXFORD AND TifE 
SOMERVILLE COUEGE NOVELISTS (1989) (discussing a study of upper middle class women during the 
period between the world wars and their record of accomplishment). 
226. In her examination of the observable differences between U. S. men and women's scores on 
standardii.ed tests, Beryl Lieff Benderly suggests that a great deal of it is attributable to the lack of 
emphasis which American education and culture generally place on verbal skills for men, as opposed to 
the importance they have for the run of the mill Englishman. See BERYL LIEFF BENDERL Y, THE MYTH 
Of Two MlNos: WHAT GENDER MEANS AND DoF.SN'T MEAN (1987). 
[l)n England and Scotland, grown men play word games on the radio; limericks and 
anagrams rank as national pastimes; the witty Ronald Coleman, not the stolid Gary 
Cooper, molded the notion of celluloid sex appeal. Schoolmaster-the admirable Mr. 
Chips-remains an honorable masculine calling, immune to the scorn Americans heap on 
ineffectual buffoons like the comic strips' Mr. Weatherbee or television's Mr. Peepers or 
Mr. Conklin. British culture has traditionally tied social power and literary skill into a 
single urbane, upper-middle-class package. It trains young politicians in the crackling 
debates of the Oxford Union. It signals class and caste by subtleties of stress and syntax. 
That highly verbal culture-not surprisingly-produces males who do as well as females 
on verbal tests. But so do Nigeria, where British educational traditions continue, and 
West Germany, where men often teach in the primary grades. 
Id. at 216-17. In spite of attempts to glamorize the teaching profession for young American boys 
through television series like Room 222 (ABC television broadcast, Sept 17, 1969 to Jan. 11 ,  1974) and 
Lucas Tanner (NBC television broadcast, Sept 1 1 ,  1974 to Aug. 20, 1975), and films like STAND AND 
DELIVER (American Playhouse 1988), they still prefer "active" occupations like policeman or �m�, 
or if they are interested in teaching, college rather than elementary school teaching, as shown 10 tJ_ieir 
reactions to these characters on television. See Tom Dorsey, Girls Searching for Role Models Get Litt� 
Help from Television, COURIER-I., July 22, 1996, at 30. Further, men who evince � interest m 
s
pending time with small children (as in child care) are automatically suspect. Men still �tnumber 
w�men in the legal profession, however, because of its high status, showing that they c:ai:. acqwre ve�� skills when they see a payoff in status or salary, preferably both. The challenge that overeducated 
;;merican women posed to the traditional dominance of the privileged males wh� .earned . the 
gentlemen's C's" and went on to law school remains to be examined; however, it is certainly 
considerable. When I started law school one male professor warned me not to expect more than a 
"gentleman's C", which he described as � acceptable grade. Whether he meant "in general" or "for a 
woman" I never knew. 
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in-the-street's, idea of law that it consisted in a man standing up in 
court and pleading. Every lawyer present would know that the most 
important part of a practising barrister's work was done long before 
he got into court. He had advised what should be done and how it 
should be done. . . . It was he who said to a client what a woman 
would not say. He would ask: "What do you want in this case?" The 
client would not have thought of that. Then, when the l awyer found 
that out it was often just what the other side wanted, and the case was 
settled without further trouble. That would never happen with one 
woman in the case, still less when there were two.227 
He failed to state that knowledge of a barrister's "real" work is acquired 
through education and practice; men are not born with it. Even a law­
yer's child would be likely to have only an imperfect knowledge of the 
actual content of a barrister's daily experiences. 
Symmonds objected to what he considered to be a lack of under­
standing on the part of women of the shared background and experiences 
of the barrister class, learned as the aristocracy might say, "on the play­
ing fields of Eton. ,,ns 
2'2:1. &e Admission o/Women, supra note 186, at 428-29. 
228. Popular commentators have identified men's shared experiences and expectations as a 
continuing barrier to male empathy with female demands for equality. As one writer noted: 
My brother, my father, and I were going for a walk . . . .  My brother was asking my father 
questions about joining the army. Would he have to go'l How old would he be'l Would 
there be a war'l Would he have to fight'l I remember feeling very far away emotionally. 
As they talked, I knew that their conversation would not ever include me. For the first 
time, I was glad. I didn't want to be drafted and go to war, and I knew I would never have 
to . . . .  My brother would never be able to have that same kind of relief. . . .  Men are 
expected to be like soldiers all the time, and they come to expect this of themselves. They 
act brave and take charge even if others, including we women, don't overtly ask them to 
do so . . . .  Understanding the metaphor of the soldier goes far in helping you understand 
men. That they are the ones who go to war is invisibly woven into the fabric of men's 
lives. 
SHAPIRO, supra note 131, at 16-17. Similarly, in the area of sports, men share both language and 
experience. 
11iey're (sports analogies) everywhere, and, I believe, men love to use them. 1bey 
know they understand each other, a little bit like a secret code, although it's not so secret. 
We are all becoming familiar with things like, "We'll keep going till we score," or "The 
best defense is a good offense." These analogies are pervasive in all arenas. They are so 
much a part of the language of business that we don't even recognize them as such. 
Women in business soon learn to recognize them and use them. Men talk about 
touchdowns, time-outs, fouls, and how about plain old win and lose! And in government, 
there's always talk of being on the president's team or being a team player. 
Id. at 21 1. Men use sports analogies as a traditional and effective way of keeping most women out of 
the conversation. Graham and Maschio point out the number of times that sports references in the film 
THE ACCUSED (Paramount 1988) exclude or marginalize women. Graham & Maschio, supra note 12, at 
1042. 
Note also the analogy between sports and war in the "best defense is a good offense" remarlc. As 
Marechal Foch wrote in a report to Marechal Joffre after the first battle of the Marne, July 1914: "M�n 
centre cede, ma droite recule, situation excellente, j'attaque" ("My center is crumbling, my right is 
retreating, situation excellent, I attack!''). It is difficult to imagine a woman making such a bold 
statement; it ranks with the often-<Juoted remark about winning a case: "If the law is against you, argue 
the facts. If the facts are against you, argue the law. If both the facts and the law are against you, bang 
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Far was it from him to say that women were not conscientious. They 
had a deeper sense of conscience than the average man. It was more 
tender, more easily aroused, there was sympathy for right and justice. 
But he did say that women were wanting in that kind of honour 
which, speaking before many experts as he did, he ventured to call 
the honour of the profession. It was a thing to be learned. It was a 
thing learned on the playing-fields largely, on the cricket and football 
grounds of the public schools and elsewhere. It was a thing that 
women were greatly wanting in. She would do nothing that she 
thought wrong intentionally, but she would not know when she was 
doing that which was not quite right to do in the Profession. It was a 
profession in which one had to fight, to take advantage of his oppo­
nent if he could, to resort to what might be called tricks and dodges 
up to a certain point which was admissible, but there was a limit.229 
355 
Here Symmonds turned the "moral uplift" argument against women. 
Their sense of justice, their innate tenderness, was misplaced as applied 
to law. Because, as a practical matter, lawyers were not as concerned 
with compassion and equity as they were with promoting the "business 
of England" and with winning cases no matter what the rightness of the 
opponent's  cause, Symmonds was perfectly willing to concede women's 
superiority in those areas.210 Women's innate tendency to care for every­
one concerned and to look for alternative solutions231 would necessarily 
impair the proper workings of the system. 232 
While he did not specify it, he was also clearly concerned about a 
woman's ability to "shift gears," to pursue a particular argument for the 
good of the client without allowing it to carry over into the social or pro­
fessional sphere outside the courtroom. The ability to "play a part" is one 
that male common law attorneys tend to learn relatively quickly, if only 
to grease the wheels of professional practice. The aggressive, unforgiv­
ing lawyer does not get far when the time comes for negotiation or for 
the granting of favors. "Playing a part" on a team is also part of the good 
sportsmanship that boys learn early; it has not necessarily been part of 
women's shared culture since until relatively recently girls have not par­
ticipated in team sports to the extent that boys do. Thus, although he 
would not have identified it as such, Symmonds' fear that women would 
not understand the unwritten rules of competition as practiced in law and 
modelled on sports and war was based in an unarticulated but under­
standable appraisal of deficiencies in women's socialization. 
on the table and yell like hell." See David L. Ratner, A Brief Word in Response, 16 CARDOZO
 L. REV. 
1793 (1995). 
229. Admission o/Women, supra note 186, at 429 (quoting remarks by J.A. Symmonds). 
230. Id. 
231. The classic statement of this quality is given in CAROL Gn.LIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 28
-
31 (1982). 
232 29 (ill tratin the failure of the settlement 
· See Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428- us � . 
Process that would take place if women lawyers were involved in the negotJations). 
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Note that the assumptions about women's habits of thought211 are 
linked to the particular characteristics of the English common law. While 
opponents of the admission of women to the French Bar made the same 
argument, that women would not be "tough enough" or intellectually 
agile enough to make effective legal arguments on behalf of their clients, 
they could not make the arguments that advocacy was of paramount im­
portance. Instead, they suggested that women's ability to think "ration­
ally" was less than men's, therefore they could not apply the principles 
of French law adequately to defend their clients' interests.234 They would 
instead fall back on traditional feminine wiles in order to influence 
judges.235 Symmonds continued that he was not suggesting that 
the woman's sense of honour in the ordinary affairs of life would not 
be as high as man's, but that honour which dealt with and related to 
the honour of the profession he thought she would be wanting in. It 
was for those who were in the profession to warn those who wished 
for this change of the danger of the course they were pursuing. 236 
But he objected to what he considered to be the lack of understanding 
women had of the supremacy of the law. 
Miss Nonnanton had not said a word about the common law of Eng­
land, which was the admiration of the whole world . . . .  Another ob­
jection was that women were not law-abiding-that was of the deep­
est importance. There was no hope for the civilisation of the world 
surviving without deep respect of the law of the country-surviving 
the storms of world revolution which were sweeping from the East 
and threatening to overwhelm us. In this country the man had a deep 
reverence for the law, and was by nature a law-abiding creature. But 
the woman did not respect the law simply because it was the law. She 
showed this, it might be, by slapping a policeman's face. In his opin­
ion it would be endangering this wonderful system of ours if the 
touch which was not law-abiding and not full of judgment should be 
permitted to interfere with the Ark of the Covenant.237 
In this passage one sees not only a failure on the part of the speaker 
to recognize that the law involved has traditionally disenfranchised 
women while presuming to legislate their rights and conduct, but also an 
attempt to justify it on the grounds of secular legitimacy, on the grounds 
of tradition, on the grounds of natural law, on the grounds of political 
necessity and national security, and on the grounds of religion. It is a 
233. The question of real differences between male and female brains is still under discussion. Set 
BF.NDERLY, supra note 226, at 3, 6, 7, 217; ROBERT NADEAU, S/HE BRAIN: SCIENCE, SEXUAL 
POL.mes, AND nlE MYTIIS OF FEMINISM (1996). 
234.
. 
See Corcos, supra note 37, at 445 (discussing arguments to justify women's participation in 
professions generally}. 
235. Id. at 472. 
236. Admission o/Women, supra note 186, at 429. 
237. Id. 
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masterful (no pun intended) use of language to evade the very real ob­
jections. that women of the period had to the existing system of law. His suggestion that women would react with violence to the legitimate exer­
cise of authority ("slapping a policeman' s  face") might well be a reflec­
tion of his own actual experience as a police magistrate, possibly arising 
from a notorious 1906 case, 238 but it failed to acknowledge the very real 
possibility that a woman' s  sole defense against an unjust situation might 
well be physical resistance. The slap, indeed, represents the woman' s  
traditional response t o  objectionable male (usually sexual) behavior. For 
Symmonds, however, it signals an inappropriate, therefore illegal, use of 
violence, as opposed to men's self-defining, therefore legitimate, use of 
violence (restraint of the woman who slaps the police officer, for exam­
ple, even though he may be enforcing a law that disempowers women). 
Symmonds went on to suggest that while women could serve per­
fectly well on the bench (thus addressing Normanton's suggestion that he 
feared competition), they mistakenly assumed that participation in the 
profession would benefit them. Nothing, he asserted, could be further 
from the truth. Indeed, the practice of law might be injurious to their 
financial and emotional health. 
On the bench he did not dread woman, it was as a practising lawyer, 
advising clients, that he feared her. Miss Nonnanton asked if it would 
be good for the community and for the Profession that women should 
be allowed to enter the Profession. He would ask whether it was good 
for the woman. The profession of the Bar was the hardest apprentice­
ship of any profession in the world. Women desirous of entering it 
were thinking of the successes they saw, he was thinking of the fail­
ures-not of the incompetent and unlearned, but of the men of ability, 
men of the greatest intelligence, who had hung on for years and had 
never attained the success they deserved, or even reached in many 
cases, a merited competence. And this failure was due merely to ill­
luck, to having selected the wrong chambers, the wrong circuit, or 
from a dozen such causes. He did not want to see the young women 
of 19 to 27, 28, or 30 doing as he had seen the young fellows. They 
were better able to bear it than the young women.239 
His protestations are hard to take seriously, since judges need even 
more common sense than practicing attorneys. It is difficult to see how a 
woman, lacking the judgment necessary to counsel clients, could have 
the judgment necessary to serve on the bench. Furthermore, it is a strange 
238. Miss Billington wished an interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer; when a policeman 
intervened, she "slapped and kicked him." See Miss Billington's Case, 159 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 648-
49 (1906), cited in 5 A HlsrORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL l.AW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 
441 n.37 (Uon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood eds., 1968). 
239. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429. Symmonds may, however, have meant that as a 
judge he did not fear women advocates. This interpretation, which bespeaks a patronizing attitude as 
well, is not, on the whole, much more satisfactory. 
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concession, since judges generally have much more power in the court­
room, and in the day-to-day control of the law, than attomeys.240 
To counteract these arguments, Normanton responded that the sup­
posed lack of honor among women was purely theoretical and specula­
tive. What she did not point out was, of course, that a male notion of 
"honor" is considered. It was extremely hypothetical to say what people 
would lack in circumstances not known for long centuries.241 As for the 
objection that women were not "law-abiding," although she did not quote 
Shakespeare's famous line, "First thing we do, let's  kill all the 
lawyers,"242 she made an analogous argument. Citing the chaos of con­
temporary Russia, she pointed out that "the first thing the Bolsheviks did 
when they got power in Russia was to hang every lawyer, man and 
woman."243 Giving women a stake in maintaining the legitimacy of the 
legal order was a much more intelligent course than banning them alto­
gether. 
She would suggest that women lawyers would be a strength to soci­
ety. If women once got these doctrines of anarchy into their heads and 
hearts, it would be a thousand times worse than when they were con­
fined to the men. The more women were interested in the law the 
better for society and for themselves.244 
As for Symmonds' thoughtful concern for the well-being of women: 
[W]hat happened to a woman who failed in any profession? If a man 
failed in any capacity he had to go to the wall. That was the inexora­
ble law, and it held good of the woman. Let every one be given any 
equal chance. It had been said that the profession of the law would 
take a great deal out of a woman. So did every profession-nursing 
soldiers at the front, and in many other instances. When she (Miss 
Normanton) made her application last year to the Middle Temple, it 
was refused with unanimity, but immediately the largest organisation 
of women in the country protested. That was an organisation which 
numbered two and a half million members, the National Council of 
Women Workers. There was a very large demand indeed amongst 
women for women lawyers. The serious opposition, such as there had 
been, had practically melted away, and she would like to leave the 
question-and it was a great question-in the long run to the consid­
eration that it was for the good of the country as a whole and to the 
highest service of the community that, if proper service was ready to 
240. See, e.g., Delfs, supra note 15, at 322 n.169 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
sexist behavior by male judges in contemporary courtrooms). 
241. Admission of Women, supra note 1 86, at 429. 
242. WilLIAM SHAKESPEARE, lHE SECOND PART OF KING llENRY THE SIXfH act 4, SC. 2; see also 
New York County Lawyers Association Honors Chief Judge John C. Knox, 39 AB.A J. 424 (1953) 
(quoting the remarks of Edwin M. Ottenbourg which provide the real meaning and frequent 
misinterpretation of these lines). 
243. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429. 
244. Id. 
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be rendered to the State by any individual of any kind, the State 
should hesitate long and seriously before rejecting that proper 
• 24S service . 
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Like other supporters, Normanton was clearly offended by the sug­
gestion that women would be reduced to tears if they lost a case or faced 
real opposition in the courtroom.246 Her words, and those of Miss Oon­
desley Brereton and others attending, ultimately persuaded the listeners 
to the debate.247 
Among additional arguments advanced against both the right and 
the advisability of women becoming attorneys was that of the likelihood 
of marriage, which immediately conferred both a legal and social dis­
ability on the woman.248 The small number of women likely to be inter­
ested in becoming attorneys, based on the number of impediments pre­
sented, itself became an argument against the admission of women to the 
bar. Opponents argued that so few women would be affected that the 
question was hardly worth addressing.249 Even the supporters of female 
membership in the bar acknowledged that their numbers were so few 
that, as one Canadian commentator acknowledged: 
I do not think that the most fervent advocate of women 's rights could 
claim that the admission of women to the practice of law has had any 
appreciable effect on the bar, the practice of law, the bench, or the 
people. It is claimed that it was a measure of justice and fair play, that 
245. Id. 
246. French opponents of admission advanced a similar argument See Corcos, supra note 37, at 
469 (listing complaints related to the question of women's physical and mental fitness for the bar). 
247. "The motion was carried, 35 votes being given in its favour and 28 against" Admission of 
Women, supra note 186, at 429. 
248. Marriage was viewed as an impediment to other professions as well. When the Inter­
Departmental Committee of the British Foreign Service examined the question of the admission of 
women to the service, it considered both the traditional prejudices against women in those positions, 
which it deemed unfortunate, and the very real obstacles that marriage might present to those women. 
[E)ven if governmental regulations place no bar in the way of employing married women, 
a normal attractive young woman who wishes to marry may, nevertheless, find herself in 
the unfortunate predicament of being obligated to resign from the Service or to give up 
the man of her choice. The consequence of placing its foreign service officer in this 
dilemma is likely to result in a loss of efficiency for the Government, whether it be 
because of the resignation of an experienced officer or because she may be handicapped 
by the canker of a serious constraint, consequent upon her renunciation. 
Ellery C. Stowell, Editorial Comment: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service, 30 AM. 
J. INT'LL. 499, 500 (1936). 
249. Likewise, the report of the Inter-Departmental Committee of the British Foreign Service 
recommended against the admission of women. 
Finally, His Majesty's Government do not consider that any injustice is being done 
to women by their continued exclusion from the Diplomatic Service. It is, to say the least, 
doubtful whether women are suited to this Service owing to the conditions prevailing; it 
is equally doubtful whether the admission of women would contribute any special 
advantage to the State; lastly, the size of the Service is so small that the general question 
of the employment of women is in any event hardly affected. 
Id. at 501 (quoting the government's official pronouncement). French opponents of women's admission 
expressed the concern that only unattractive women would pursue a long-tenn career in the law, 
apparently an outcome too dreadful to be contemplated. Corcos, supra note 37, at 468. 
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it removed a grievance and has had no countervailing disadv�ta�e. 
That claim may be fairly be allowed; in other respects, the adm1ss1on 
of women is regarded with complete indifference by all but those 
immediately concerned. :zso 
Even the most committed supporter of women's  rights must have 
wondered how women raised in an intellectual, social and political ambi­
ance so different from men could adequately adjust to the standards of 
behavior inculcated in the class of men who traditionally became mem­
bers of the English Bar. Women for whom the public school was foreign 
territory, and the training grounds of the British armed forces, the City, 
and the Houses of Parliament were complete mysteries, might very well 
fail to understand those unspoken mores that formed the shared environ­
ment in which English lawyers operated. In addition, the legal profession 
was anxious to maintain the status that it had spent centuries in acquiring 
through an emphasis on its connection with the traditional medieval uni­
versity curriculum as well as the habits and fortunes of the landed gentry 
and the aristocracy .251 Given that women's rights to hold land and titles 
were circumscribed to various extents, contemporary male attorneys 
were likely to accept intuitively that they should also be excluded from 
the professions, particularly law. 
To allow individuals who had traditionally had no part in formally 
shaping that law to take part in its application and future development 
was certainly a leap of faith for even the most fervent male advocates of 
the equality of the fairer sex. The changes that these men anticipated 
included the traditional expectation of "moral uplift": women would 
bring a sense of moral purpose to the law, interesting themselves in 
"women's issues" such as marriage and probate, the care of children, 
domestic violence, prostitution, and education. Some women attorneys 
found this interest natural as well. 
To-day men and women alike rejoice in the record of scientific 
achievements, in the progress made along educational lines . . . .  But 
women at the same time are "wondering why" about many things. 
My point is this-that just as they, true to woman nature, have 
worked in the past, indirectly, to mitigate the overshadowing evils 
that have accompanied our advance every step of the way-so will 
they, under new conditions-working without any handicap, in the 
fu
_
ture and holdin� high positions in the state--concentrate upon cer­
tam problems which from their very nature appeal to womankind and 
which the rank and file of men deplore half-heartedly . . . .  [I]t i� but 
natural that our sex should be acutely conscious to-day of the burdens 
250. Riddell, supra note 85, at 206. 
S 
25 1.  See Wilfr� Prest, Why the History of the Professions is Not Written, in LAW, EcONOMY AND OCIE.TY, 1750-1914. FssAYS � TIIE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 300, 3 15-16 (G.R. Rubin & David Sugarman eds., 1984) (elaborattng on the meaning of the word "profession" to the lawyer). 
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that rest most heavily upon women and little children. Because of 
this, the evils of the industrial system loom up largely.252 
361 
Most men, however, did not recognize, or did not articulate, the possibil­
ity that women might actually refocus the attention of the law on other 
issues, or force a change in the debate that contemplated as yet unfor­
mulated solutions to traditional problems. Such approaches might bring 
about fundamental changes in the nature of the English common law; the 
men who supported the entrance of women into the English legal profes­
sion would have had difficulty anticipating them. 
C. Existing Legislation and Its Interpretation 
1 .  Attempts to Obtain Admission Through the Courts 
Finally, one Englishwoman who had completed the appropriate 
education for the profession of solicitor and had been accepted as a clerk 
in accordance with the requirement of the Law Society (the certifying 
body for the profession),253 requested admittance by taking her case to 
court, initially to the Supreme Court of Judicature. Her attempt, like that 
of Jeanne Chauvin in France,254 Myra Bradwell in the United States (Illi­
nois),255 and Clara Brett Martin in Canada (Ontario),256 forced the courts to 
252. Giles, supra note 6, at 356. 
253. See EDMUND BROWN VINEY CHR.iSITAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS 177 (1896) 
(providing a history of the Law Society). 
254. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 447. 
255. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). See ROBERT SlEVENS, LA.w SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1 850s TO Tiffi 1980s, at 81 -84 (1983). Joan Hoff gives a fuller 
account of Mansfield's admission in LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HlsTORY OF U.S. 
WOMEN 162-63 (1991). Hoff also rehearses the story of Ada H. Keply, the first American woman to 
graduate from an accredited law school and the objections to Bradwell's admission, namely that she 
was married. Id. at 163-70. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Slwrtridge Foltz: "First Woman", 28 
VAL U. L REv. 1231 (1994) (discussing the first woman admitted in California). 
For other U.S. cases in which the bar denied admission to a womam admitted in another state, 
see In re Maddox, 50 A. 487 (Md. 1901); In re Leonard, 6 P. 426 (Or. 1 885). But see In re Application 
for License, 55 S.E. 635 (1906) (intimating that judges who deny qualified women admission to the bar 
are lacking in common sense). See also Admission of Women, supra note 186; Some Judicial Views of 
Woman's Sphere, 15 LAW NOTES 103 (1911); Women Lawyers and the Law, 16 LA.w NOTES 1 41 
(1912). By July 1915, Law Notes was suggesting to the Georgia legal profession that it was much too 
late to deny women the right to enter the practice of law, no matter what its intentions. Right of Women 
to Practice Law, 19 LAw NO'I'ES 62 (1915); see also Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the 
Quest for Professional Identity in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 88 MICH. L REV. 2414 (1990) 
(discussing attempts to create a gendered, professional identity). French opponents of women's 
admission also objected that married women were barred from acting as attorneys, since their freedom 
of action was subordinate to their husbands' will. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 462. 
As early as 1886, however, some male attorneys were considering the possible impact of women 
on the profession. In that year Mr. Charles C. Moore published a piece of overheated Victorian prose 
called The Female Lawyer, in which he speculated on the arrival in the town of Litchfield (home of the 
first U.S. law school) of a female attorney named Miss Mary Padelford, who, denied entrance to the 
Massachusetts Bar, obtains her license in Connecticut Miss Padelford is painted as a very competent 
member of the profession, particularly in the area of "consultations, drawing deeds, bonds, will and 
other legal documents," but is unfortunately done in by the unchivalrous behavior of an adversary. After 
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consider whether admission to the practice of law is a public, not a pri­
vate function, and as such whether it may be regulated by the appropriate 
jurisdiction. While the women requesting admission by court degree 
were uniformly unsuccessful,231 their requests forced the various govern­
ments involved to acknowledge the end of an era in which the right to 
make law could no longer be determined simply by members of a very 
select and self-selecting group.258 
2. Bebb v. Law Society: The Trial Court Case 
After attending school in London and at Oxford University, where 
she earned honors in jurisprudence,v9 Gwyneth Marjorie Bebb decided to 
attempt to qualify as a solicitor. In order to do so, she needed the spon­
sorship of a practicing solicitor, who would accept her as a clerk for a 
a bout with brain fever, she returns to Litchfield to marry a colleague, join him in his practice and live 
happily ever after. In deference to her feminine disabilities, however, the practice is divided up 
"between the partners to the entire satisfaction of both." Charles C. Moore, The Female lawyer, 26 
GREEN BAG 525 (1914) (citing the DAil..Y TIMEs (Hartford), May 17, 1886). Virginia Drachrnan talces a 
rather sour view of this story, emphasizing Moore's assumptions about the woman lawyer's natural 
physical frailty and the appropriateness of her limited practice after her marriage. See DRACHMAN, 
supra note 213, at 32-33. While to late twentieth-century eyes the style of the story does seem outdated 
and the sentiments somewhat patronizing, Moore's willingness to allow his protagonist hero, a 
successful lawyer, to fall in love with and encourage the aspirations of the woman attorney in the story 
is refreshing. Indeed, given the continuing prejudices against women attorneys documented in works by 
Podmore & Spencer, supra notes 17, 19; SACHS & WR.SON, supra note 3; and Kennedy, supra note 
158; Moore may be more somewhat more progressive than he seems at first. But see D. Kelly 
Weisberg, Barred From the Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United States 1870-1890, 28 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1977) (addressing women's struggle to gain entry into the legal profession). Further. 
the career path chosen by Miss Padelford is quite similar to those chosen by some Canadian women 
lawyers up to the 1970s. See Kinnear, supra note 85, at 428-29. 
256. See supra Part ID.Al. 
257. It is significant that these women thought the courts might be sympathetic to their claims, 
since it suggests that they believed that their rights were at least as strong as those of men similarly 
situated. On the realization of the ability of courts to empower women with civil rights previously 
denied, see MICHAEL GROSSBF.RG, A JUDGMENT FOR SOLOMON: THE D'HAlITEVILLE CASE AND 
LEGAL ExPERIENCE IN ANTEBElLUM AMERICA 155-67 (1996) (describing the attempt of a nineteerith­
century Philadelphia divorcee to obtain custody of her children from her Swiss ex-husband). 
258. On the history and regulation of French lawyers, see MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS, THE 
PARISIAN ORDER o: BARRISTERS AND nm FRENCH REVOLUTION (1987); LUCIEN KARJ'IK, Im 
AVOCATS: ENTREL'ETAT, LEPuBUCETLE MARCllE XXIIIE-XXESIECLE(l995). On U.S. lawyers, see 
ANTON-HERMANN DIR.OUST, THE RISE OF THE l.EGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA (1965); THE 1.EGAL 
PROFESSION: MAJOR HlsroRICAL INTERPRETATIONS (Kermit L Hall ed., 1987); 1llE NEW HIGH 
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN PoST-CIVIL WAR. AMERICA (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1 984). A comprehensive 
history of the Canadian legal profession has yet to be written; however, see Harry W. Arthurs et al., 
Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 123-77. 
On English lawyers, see 15 HOIDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 14, at 223-47; 
Richard L Abel, England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and 
Solicitors, in 1 LAWYERS IN SocIETY, supra note 69, at 23-75. 
259. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.LR. 634, 635 (Ch. 1913). Tue case was ttied in the Supre�e 
Court of Judicature, Chancery Division, on July 2, 1913, and appealed to the court of appeal. which 
heard the case on December 9 and 10, 1913, and delivered its opinion on December 13, 1913. Bebb v. 
I.aw Society, 30 T.LR. 179 (C.A 1913). 
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stated period of tirne.260 Ultimately, she also needed some kind of official 
recognition from the Law Society that she would be admitted, once she 
completed all the requirements satisfactorily as defined by the Solicitors 
Act of 1843,261 which established the requirements of membership in the 
English Bar, including minimum qualifications for training and member­
ship.262 Section 3 required would-be solicitors to have been "bound as a 
clerk to a solicitor."263 
She understood that there were firms of solicitors who were willing to 
take her as an articled clerk . . . .  Mr. E.A. Bell, examined by Mr. 
Wright, said that he practised in the City as a solicitor, and that he 
belonged to the finn of Carter and Bell. He was willing to accept the 
plaintiff as his clerk.264 
Section 2 of the Act required such work experience: 
[N]o person shall act as an attorney or solicitor, or as such attorney or 
solicitor sue out any writ or process, or commence, carry on, solicit, 
or defend any action, suit, or other proceeding, in the name of any 
other person or in his own name . . . unless such person shall have 
previously to the passing of this Act admitted and inrolled and other­
wise duly qualified to act as an attorney or solicitor under or by virtue 
of the laws now in force, or unless such person shall after the passing 
of this Act be admitted and inrolled and otherwise duly qualified to 
act as an attorney or solicitor, pursuant to the directions and regula­
tions of this Act, and unless such person shall continue to be so duly 
qualified and on the roll at the time of his acting in the capacity of an 
attorney or solicitor as aforesaid.265 
Nothing in this section, or indeed in the rest of the Act, stated that 
only men could become clerks. If a woman could complete the require­
ments laid out in the Act, she should theoretically be allowed to practice. 
260. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634. 
261. 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 7 3, §§ 2, 3 (Eng.). 
262. Id. 
263. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 634. 
264. Id. at 635. Bell's willingness to assist Bebb would still have been unusual in the England of 
the early 1980s. 
A male sponsor will have mixed feelings about accepting a woman as protege or as 
presenting her to his colleagues as a good proposition in the long term for a law 
partnership to take on. He will he unlikely to identify a woman as a potential partner or 
successor and will tend to prefer a male protege who is assumed to be more committed to 
a career. Sponsors (like selectors everywhere) tend to pick proteges "in their own image", 
[sic] which automatically reduces the chances of women. Moreover, a woman protege is 
assumed to be potential "trouble" in other ways and the ideal type close relationship 
between sponsor and prorege may be less easy to maintain between members of the 
opposite sex, particularly when the views of the respective marital partners are taken into 
account. 
Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 29 (footnote omitted). John Mortimer's short stories Rumpolt! 
and the Female of the Species, in THE SECOND RUM POLE OMNIBUS 324 ( 1 987) and Rumpok and thL 
Miscarriage of Justice, in RUMPOLE ON TRIAL 79 (1992), detail the difficulties of women in the 
profession. 
265. Solicitors Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 73, § 2 (Eng.). 
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According to Bebb's attorneys, Messrs. Stanley B uckrnaster266 and 
R.A. Wright, the Law Society 's difficulty stemmed from the admittance 
of women to clerkships. If a woman could be admitted to a clerkship, 
then, assuming she completed her training satisfactorily, nothing pre­
vented her from being admitted to the profession of solicitor. 261 They ad­
dressed the traditional objections to allowing women into the profession, 
specifically custom and statutory language.m Common law provided no 
support for the contention that women were excluded from the profes­
sion. Prior to the reign of Edward II, women could, and did, appear as 
advocates.269 Apart from the Act of  1 888, the only prohibitions against 
women entering the profession were inferred from tradition, and based 
on no required denial of the right. 
The only Act which was in mandatory form was the Act of 1888. By 
section 10  of that Act the Master of the Rolls was bound to admit the 
plaintiff if she presented a certificate. That being the position, then, 
unless the Law Society could refuse to let her sit for the examination, 
there was nothing to prevent her from being admitted as a solicitor. 
The only right to inquire into the character and capacity of an appli­
cant was the right given at the time of the final examination.210 
Since Bebb was not requesting the right to exercise a public office, from 
which women were disqualified, 
266. Later, he became Lord Buckmaster. See DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1931-1940, 
at 1 19-21 (LG. Wickham Legg ed., Supp. 1949) (describing Lord Buckmaster's life). 
267. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.LR. 634, 635 (Ch. 1 9 1 3). 
268. Id. at 635. 
269. The story of the woman who appointed another woman as her attorney and then removed her 
is often told. 1 SELECT CIVIL PlEAs, case 141, at 56 (William Paley Baildon ed., 1 890). Generally 
speaking, the "2:-tcmey" was not a member of a recognized profession but simply one who spoke for 
another in court; thus any person could fulfill that role. 
Originally the job is rather "casual." Even a woman could do it; in 1 203 a woman 
puts her sister in her place and then removes her, but she is not called attornata. But in 
1313  a man claims "per Isabellam de Uptone attomatum suum". Katherine Bompuz in 
1 306 was "appointed" attorney to receive a gold ring. Thus the word is originally not 
technical but lay, if not popularly coined, while all the words with which it soon has to 
compete were by this time-though they, too, had once been of popular origin-stamped 
with ajural character. 
HERMAN COHEN, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND A7TORNA7VS TO 1 450, at 1 34 (1929) 
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter COHEN, A HISTORY]. Cohen also contributed an erudite two-part essay 
· on  the subject, The Origins of the English Bar, 30 LAW Q. REV. 464, 467 (1914); 3 1  LAW Q. REV. 56, 
62-63 (1915). 
The case of women advocates during Roman times is also often cited as evidence that women 
could and did serve as lawyers, although it also demonstrates the objections that men had to women 
attorneys, namely that they could be too energetic (therefore ill-suited to the practice of law). Quoting 
the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X, Cohen stated: 
The code ( 1 .8) is very emphatic in disqualifying any woman "however (wise or) 
learned" (sabidora) from practising, "for two reasons; it is not decent for a woman to 
compete publicly with men, in arguing for another: then because the sages in the past 
prohibited it after their experience of Calfumia." This story seems to have had a 
fascination for Latin jurists. 
COHEN, A HISTORY, supra at 422 (footnotes omitted). 
270. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634. 
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there was nothing to prevent a woman from performing a private 
duty, and the office of a solicitor was a private office. The disability 
extended only to the exercise of public functions. That women had 
not hitherto desired to exercise these functions merely meant that 
their qualifications had lain dormant, not that they did not exist. 
There was no disqualification either at common law or by statute.27 1 
The two advocates also presented a carefully constructed case on 
the question of statutory language, arguing that since women were not 
specifically exempted from becoming solicitors by the Act, that Bebb 
should be allowed to qualify, or in the alternative, that if women were 
not allowed to practice as solicitors by the terms of the Act, they could 
not be held to be in violation of it, should they fail to be admitted and 
enrolled by the Law Society. "If the use of the masculine gender and the 
word 'person' in other parts of the Act did not include women, then 
women were not included under that section, and they could act as so­
licitors without being admitted and enrolled, and could not be punished 
for so doing."212 Indeed, Ivy Williams, who would later become the first 
woman admitted to practice law in England, had challenged the profes­
sion with that argument in 1 904: 
There will be a band of lady "University lawyers." These University 
lawyers will say to the Benchers and the Law Society: "Admit us, or 
we shall form a third branch of the profession, and practise as outside 
lawyers." There is no law to prevent it. Ladies holding University law 
degrees, learned and skilled in the law, deservedly enjoying public 
confidence, could legally compete in vast fields of the solicitor's and 
counsel's most lucrative domains, and without infringing the law. 
And they need not trammel themselves with lawyers' trade union 
rules.273 
Bebb, however, professed herself willing to comply with certain of the 
requirements, such as apprenticeship, although she maintained that she 
could be exempted from talcing the preliminary examination.214 Further 
legislation of 1877210 and l 888216 set forth clarification in regard to the 
271. Id. at 635. Interestingly, no one seems to have remarked that the office of sovereign, the most 
public office in the realm, had been repeatedly and until 1 2  years before, spectacularly occupied by a 
person of the female sex. But see infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text. 
272. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634. 
273. Obiter Dicta, 39 LAW J. I ( 1904) at I. The reporter also quoted an American attorney who 
opined: 
My own observation of women lawyers, based upon thirty years' experience at the 
Bar of Illinois and of the Supreme Court of the United States, is that they do not succeed; 
indeed, hardly appear as advocates, however useful they may become as office 
practitioners . . . .  The few women I have ever seen in the Courts did n?t appe� to me to 
be conspicuous examples of success; and one of them, who had, I believe, gamed some 
notoriety, had done so in the Police courts by the sacrifice of qualities usually considered 
as feminine. 
Id. 
274. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 635. She was undoubtedly making reference to the Solicitors Act of 1 894, 
57 & 58 Viet., ch. 9, § 3 (Eng.). 
275. Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Viet., ch. 25, §§ 5, 7, 8 (Fng.). 
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fitness of applicants to sit for the required examinations and the necessity 
for a certificate to be presented to the Master of the Rolls attesting to 
acceptable completion of the requirements for entering the profession. 
Like many other questions in which the exact classification of 
women figured, the meaning of the word "person" was crucial to the 
interpretation of the statute, and therefore to the entry of women into the 
profession. 
Section 48 was the interpretation clause, and was very important. It 
enacted that "every word importing the masculine gender only shall 
extend and be applied to a female as well as a male; and the word 
'person' shall extend to any body politic, corporate, or collegiate, 
municipal, civil, or ecclesiastical, aggregate or sole, as well as an in­
dividual; unless in any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially 
provided, or there be something in the subject or context repugnant to 
such construction. m 
This "repugnancy" applied to section 2, the section setting forth the 
qualifications for the position of solicitor.278 Further, Bebb' s  attorneys 
argued, nothing in section 48 was repugnant to section 2.279 Note also, 
that the Interpretation Act of 1889, required that "unless the contrary 
intention appears,-(a) words importing the masculine gender shall in­
clude females; and (b) words in the singular shall include the plural, and 
words in the plural shall include the singular.'�80 
The Law Society also pleaded custom and the interpretation of lan­
guage as well as an inability to make such a momentous decision in ob­
jecting to Bebb's request.281 Mr. Hughes, one of the barristers represent­
ing the Law Society, argued that 
in this matter the Law Society was in the position of a public official. 
It was the registrar and was responsible for the register of solicitors. 
When the plaintiff and three other ladies presented their application 
the society felt that it was impossible to admit them without taking 
the opinion of the Court. With regard to the period before the modem 
Acts, there was no known instance of a woman practising as an attor­
ney or solicitor. The right to have an attorney, instead of the obliga­
tion to appear in person, only developed very gradually . . . .  The Act 
of 1843 was negative throughout. It proceeded on the footing that up 
to that time men, and men only, had acted as solicitors. Ordinarily, 
where words importing the masculine gender were used, they in-
276. Solicitors Act of 1888, 51  & 52 Viet., ch. 65, § 1 0  (Eng.). 
277. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 634 (quoting the Solicitor's Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 73, § 48 (Eng.)). 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Interpretation Act of 1889, 52 & 53  Viet., ch. 63, § 1 (Eng.). On English statutory 
interpretation, see PETER BENSON MAxwEu., ON 1HE INTERPRETATION OF STATIJI'ES 349 (G.F.l.. 
Bridgman ed., 7th ed. 1929) (reprinting the Interpretation Act). 
281. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 635. 
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eluded women, but that would not apply in this case, because it was 
not the custom for women to act as solicitors.282 
367 
Notice here the reversal of the traditional anti-female position that if a 
word is not used, this omission is deliberate and necessarily means that 
women are excluded. The Law Society acknowledged here that failure to 
specify that women were included was not fatal to the plaintiff's case. 283 
Instead, it took the position that the omission resulted from the failure of 
the drafters to recognize that women might actually request inclusion. 284 
Such tortuous logic suggests bad faith on the part of a Law Society 
that knew the temper of the times was slowly turning against it. In sup­
port of its position, it could only cite a Scottish case interpreting a voting 
statute, Nairn v. University of St. Andrews,285 in which women graduates 
of the University of Edinburgh were denied the right to vote for Parlia­
mentary electors,286 and another Scottish case, Hall v. Incorporated Soci­
ety of Law-Agents,281 whose reasoning ultimately paralleled that in Bebb, 
the Scottish equivalent of the Law Society had not opposed the admis­
sion of the petitioner.288 
Similarly, when addressing the question of section 35,289 Hughes 
argued that since the legislature did not specifically mention women, it 
could not have contemplated their inclusion in the profession.290 "Person" 
within the meaning of the Act necessarily meant "male."291 
For Mr. Justice Joyce, the question seemed to tum on whether the 
position of solicitor had any public duties associated with it.292 If so, then 
women, being disqualified from exercising public offices, were neces­
sarily disqualified from the profession. "According to common law, a 
woman was incapable of occupying a public office . . . .  It had been said 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. 25 T.L.R. 160, 1 60  (Sess. 1 908). 
286. Nairn, 25 T.LR. at 160. 
287. 3 Fr. 1059 (Sess. 1901 ). 
288. Hall, 3 Fr. at 1060. 
289. Hughes stated: . . . 
That from and after the passing of this Act, in case any person shall m his own name or m 
the name of any other person sue out any writ or process, or comme�ce, p�osecute •
. 
or 
defend any action or suit or any proceedings in any court of l�w _
or equity, w1tho�t bemg 
admitted and inrolled as aforesaid, or being himself the plamttff or defendant m such 
proceedings respectively, every such person shall and is here�y made incapable to 
maintain or prosecute any action or suit in any court of law or equity. for any fee, rew�
. 
or disbursements on account of prosecuting, carrying on, or defending any such action, 
suit, or proceeding, or .otherwise in relation thereto; and such offe�se shall be deemed a 
contempt of the court in which such action, suit, or pr�eeding s�all have been 
prosecuted, carried on, or defended, and shall and may be pumshed accordingly. 
Solicitors Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 73, § 35 (Eng.). 
290. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.L.R. 634, 635 (Ch. 1913). 
291 . Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 635. 
292. Id. 
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that a solicitor did not exercise a public function, but he was very much 
mistaken if solicitors of standing were not qualified to exercise certain 
·public functions."293 His Lordship did not believe he was mistaken.294 In­
deed, 
[h]is Lordship entertained no doubt as to the position of women be­
fore the modern legislation. He did not doubt that they were disquali­
fied by reason of their sex from acting as solicitors. Then there was 
the Act of 1 843. His Lordship read section 48, and said that such a 
clause as that was only to enable the drafting of the Act to be done 
more concisely than it might otherwise be. The same remark applied 
to the Interpretation Act. It was never intended to make such a revo­
lution. There was no statute which showed any intention of the Leg­
islature to alter the common law. The disability therefore still existed, 
and would exist until it was changed by the Legislature. The action 
must therefore be dismissed. 295 
Apparently, his Lordship felt no compunction about so actively inter­
preting the intention of the legislature, in contravention of the Interpreta­
tion Act of 1889.296 To suggest that statutory language that specifically 
includes women was written simply for the sake of efficiency is to make 
a mockery of any possible legislative intent.297 
3. The Court of Appeals Case 
Bebb pursued the matter, and in 1913  the court of appeals upheld 
the finding of Mr. Justice Joyce.298 
The action was brought by Miss Gwyneth Marjorie Bebb asking for a 
declaration that she was a "person" within the meaning of the Solici­
tors Act, 1843, and the amending Acts, and a mandamus to compel 
the Law Society to admit her to the preliminary examinations held by 
the Law Society under such Acts with a view to her becoming a so­
licitor. 299 
The appellate court focused on the question of interpretation of the 
statute, as the appellant's  new counsel, Lord Robert Cecil, requested.300 
Further, the issue of the disqualification of women to hold public office 
was by no means clear. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.). 
297. This kind of Humpty-Dumpty jurisprudence (that a word means what a person chooses it to 
mean, LEwlS CARROL, ALICE'S ADVE.NTIJRES IN WONDERLAND, AND THROUGH TIIE LooKING GLASS 
(1912)) recalls a 1947 Louisiana case in which the court refused to find the existence of undisclosed 
agency in spite of the fact that the relevant statute specifically provided for undisclosed agency. See 
Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852 (La. 1947). 
298. Bebb. v .  Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1 913). 
299. Hebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. 
300. Id. 
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�is contentions were ( 1 )  that unmarried women had the same legal 
nghts as men; (2) that at Common Law there was nothing to prevent 
women from becoming attorneys; and (3) that on the fair construction 
of the statutes on the subject they favoured the view that women were 
entitled to be admitted as solicitors. in Pollock and Maitland's  His­
tory of English Law (first edition), Vol. I, p. 468, it was laid down 
that women had the same private rights as men, but that there was no 
place for women in public offices. If that was to be taken as being 
true as regards public functions, the words must be construed nar­
rowly.301 
369 
Surprisingly, Mr. Cozens-Hardy, the Master of the Rolls, the official 
appointed to accept certificates from aspiring solicitors, volunteered from 
the bench that "women had acted as churchwardens."302 
Cecil also made the rather obvious point that women had ruled the 
country, both as queens regnant303 (i.e., in their own right) and as regents 
for absent kings or child sovereigns.304 
Queen Eleanor had acted in 1 253 as Keeper of the Great Seal. . . . 
Counsel then cited authorities to show that a woman had also acted as 
a hereditary Lord High Constable, by deputy, and as Marshal and 
Lord Chamberlain. There was authority that she could act as governor 
of a workhouse . . .  a sexton . . .  or an overseer. Thus there was no ab­
solute sex disqualification which prevented women from holding 
public offices, but their right to do so depended on the circumstances 
of each case. They were excluded . from military offices for want of 
physical capacity and could only hold them by deputy.305 
301 .  Id. 
302. Id. This comment was unpersuasive to at least one commentator. See Notes: Women and the 
Profession, 26 JURID. REV. 1 30, 1 3 1  (1914). On the duties of churchwardens as officers of the state, see 
generally WII..LIAM LAMBARDE, THE DUETIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, 'I'YTinNGMEN, AND 
SUCH 0rnER LoWE AND LAY MINISTERS OF 1llE PEACE ( 1 599); JOHN LAYER, THE OFFICE AND DUnE 
OF CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS AND OI'HER Tiffi OVERSEERS OF nm PooRE (1641); GEORGE 
MERrroN, A GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, CHuRCHWARDENS, OVERSEERS OF nm PooR, SURVEYORS OF 
1liE HIGH-WAYS, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY-STOCK, MASTERS OF nm HOUSE OF CORRECl10N, 
BAYLIFFS OFMANNORS, TOLL-TAKERS INFA1RS &C (l679). 
303. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. The most recent example was of course Victoria (1837-1 901), who is 
the subject of many biographies, including CAROLLY ERICKSON, HER L!'ITLE MArnSTY: THE LIFE OF 
QUEEN VICTORIA (1997). 
304. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. Among the most notable were Eleanor of Aquitaine, the wife of 
Henry II, who governed the kingdom during his absences fighting on the continent, Margaret of Anjou, 
the unpopular wife of Henry VI, who governed during his bouts of insanity, and Catherine of Aragon, 
who was named Regent while Henry VIII was off to fight with Francis I of France. Some historians 
have now begun to study the roles of queens as rulers, advisors and educators from the earlier Christian 
period through the middle Renaissance (roughly 500 C.E. to 1 500 C.E.). See PAULINE STAFFORD, 
QUEENS, CONCUBINES, AND DoWAGERS: THE KING'S WIFE IN TifE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 1 15-90 
(1983). 
305. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179 (citations omitted). The "Queen Eleanor" of Cecil's reference was 
Eleanor of Provence, the Queen of Henry III (reigned 121 6- 1 272). 
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Cecil also addressed the case of Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst,'l06 one of 
the cases on which the Law Society had relied to demonstrate that 
women could not exercise any public office. 
Lord Esher had expressed the view that a woman could not exercise 
any public function, and had relied on Chorlton v. Lings, but Lord 
Esher's dictum could not be supported by what was said by Willes, J., 
in that case, and was incorrect. If it was correct it would be difficult 
to see how female inspectors could be appointed under the Factory 
and Workshop Act, 1901,  section 1 1 8.307 
The case of Chorlton v. Lings308 was a suffrage case, an early at­
tempt to obtain the right to vote for women through an error on the part 
of the election commissioners. Mrs. Lilly Maxwell, a resident of Man­
chester, discovered that she had been erroneously entered on the electoral 
register and with the assistance of barrister Chisholm Anstey attempted 
� �� � �� � ��� � � � �� � An� � 
veloped the argument, the right to vote had traditionally been attached to 
property ownership rather than to gender.110 More than five thousand 
other women eagerly seized on the opportunity, also claiming the right of 
suffrage.31 1  The court of appeals rejected Mrs. Maxwell ' s  petition, pri­
marily because even if the right had ever existed, women had lost it by 
failing to exercise it. 312 This malicious argument paralleled the position 
that opponents of women's admission to the bar used to justify their ex­
clusion. How can one exercise a right that one has been assured one does 
not possess? Such reasoning had the effect of codifying the custom of 
denying women the vote, forcing the decision back into the legislative 
arena. But it appealed to the Bebb court which adopted the "custom" 
argument in rejecting her position.313 
At least one of the presiding magistrates, Lord Justice Phillimore, 
did not find Cecil' s  historical argument persuasive. Although the barris­
ter cited both the Pollock and Maitland work,314 a classic statement of the 
development of English legal history, and some of the Yearbooks of Ed-
306. 5 T.L.R. 472. (C.A. 1889). 
307. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179 (citation omitted). 
308. 4 LR. 347 (C.P. 1 868). 
309. Nonnan St John-Stevas, Women in Public Law, in A CENnJRy OF FAMILY LAW 1857-1957, 
supra note 18, at 256, 263-64. 
310. Id. at 263. 
31 1 .  Id. at 263-64. 
312. Chorlton, 4 L.R. at 347. 
313.  Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 1913). Eventually women did oblain a 
limited right to vote with the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 
5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.). 
314. FREDERICK POI.LOCK & FREDF.RIC Wll.lJAM MAm.ANn, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
216 (2d ed. 1903). On the difference between "countor'' (or serjeant) and attorney, see EDMUND 
BROWN VINEY CHRISTIAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS 3-4 (1896). 
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ward III,315 his Lordship objected that "at that time there was no profes­
sion of attorneys, but a litigant could appoint anyone to be his 
attomey."316 Cecil acknowledged that was true, but that after the profes­
sion had formally emerged, women had still been employed as advo­
cates. "Other authorities were Select Civil Pleas, Vol. 1 ., case 141 , p. 56, 
when a woman appointed another woman to represent her, and Bracton's 
Note Book, Vol. ii., case 342, p. 283 , and Vol. ill., p. 335."311 Cecil reit­
erated that the use of the word "person" in section 2 of the 1843 Act "in­
cluded a woman"318 and that section 48 mandated that the use of the mas­
culine gender incorporated women as well. 
[E]very word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and 
be applied to a female as well as a male; and the word "person" shall 
extend to any body politic, corporate, or coliegiate, municipal, civil, 
or ecclesiastical, aggregate or sole, as well as an individual, unless in 
any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially provided, or there 
be something in the subject or context repugnant to such 
construction. 319 
Again Lord Phillimore questioned Cecil, this time on the question of 
the rights of unmarried as opposed to married women to exercise the 
profession of solicitor.32° Cecil pointed out that 
his view was that it was a well-settled general rule of the Common 
Law that married women had no ordinary rights, and he did not con­
tend that section 2 of the Act of 1 843 conferred any new right, but 
that it confirmed and corroborated the right of an unmarried woman 
321 at Common Law to act as an attorney. 
As in France, the question of a married woman involved in a profession 
raised huge questions of autonomy and of conflict of interest, since a 
315. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. See 13 Y.B. Eow. 3 186 (1339). 
316. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. The role of attorney seems to have been an ill-defined and fluid one 
during the period. 
[A] man is allowed to put forward some one else to speak for him, not in order that he 
may be bound by that other person's words, but in order that he may have a chance of 
correcting fonnal blunders and supplying omissions. What the litigant himself has said in 
court, he has said once and for all, but what a friend has said in his favour he may 
disavow. The professional pleader makes his way into the courts, not as one who will 
represent a litigant, but as one who will stand by the litigant's side and speak in his 
favour, subject however to correction, for his words will not bind his client until th�t 
client has expressly or tacitly adopted them. . . . Just because the pleader makes hts 
appearance in this informal fashion, as a mere friend who stands by the litigant's side and 
provisionally speaks on his behalf, it is difficult for us to discover whether pleaders are 
commonly employed and whether they are already members of a professional class. 
Powxx & MAm.ANo, supra note 314, at 190-91. 
317. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179; see also supra note 269. 
318. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 179-80. 
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married woman was expected to conform to the wishes of her husband in 
matters of behavior, residence and other areas of life.322 
"Person" was also used in section 26 of the Solicitors Act, 1 860, which 
imposed penalties for wrongfully acting as a solicitor, and it was 
reasonable to suppose that it included a woman there. . . . In view of 
the rights possessed by women at Common Law it would require an 
express prohibition to prevent them from becoming solicitors. In 
several of the Colonies and in certain foreign countries women were 
pennitted to act as solicitors.323 
R.B. Finlay, who represented the Law Society, requested a clarifi-
cation of the appellant's position regarding the 1843 Act. 
[H]e understood that the appellant did not contend that there was 
anything in the Act of 1843 which conferred on women the right to be 
admitted as solicitors. Lord Robert Cecil said that he did not say there 
was sufficient in the Act of 1843 to remove any existing prohibition 
at Common Law, but that, in the absence of such a prohibition, it did 
confer on women the right to be admitted.324 
From the discussion of the meaning of the statutes involved, the 
crucial issue clearly became the question of whether women were cus­
tomarily advocates, or had customarily attempted to exercise such a role. 
Sir R.B. Finlay said that he relied on the fact that there was not a sin­
gle instance of a woman's having been admitted as a solicitor. This 
inveterate usage was of great weight, and the existence of such a long 
usage was relied on in Miss Bertha Cave 's  case noted in The Times of 
December 3,  1903, which was a case where Miss Cave had applied to 
be admitted to Gray's Inn, and in the Scotch case, Hall v. Incorpo­
rated Society of Law Agents in Scotland. If the appellant's  contention 
was right, women would equally be entitled to be admitted to the Inns 
of Court, and no doubt this would make dining in hall far more 
amusing; but the real answer was that no one had ever been 
admitted.m 
This type of specious argument is of course of the kind that was ad­
vanced to oppose the candidature of the daughter of Henry I to succeed 
her father as sovereign,326 and of the daughters of Henry VIII to succeed 
322. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 462; Lilly, supra note 1 20, at 431 .  
323. Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 191 3). 
324. Id. 
325. Id (citation omitted). 
326. This claimant was the Empress Maud, or Matilda, the only surviving and somewhat 
disa��le child of Henry I, who challenged King Stephen for the throne. She eventually abandoned 
her chum m favor of her son, the future Henry Il, but clearly his claim derived as much from his descent 
from her as the rightful queen as from his successful conquest. However, Stephen's claim was not 
without merit He was male, and also had a male heir, and was considered amiable. Although the barons 
had sworn fealty to Matilda, they had not sworn obedience to her husband, Geoffrey of Anjou, and 
some preferred a known quantity (Stephen) to an unknown and younger man (Geoffrey). See 
, 
CHR.!STOPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY ID: 871- 1 272, at 166-72 (1961 ). 
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him,321 not only because their sex seemed to disqualify them, but also 
because of the dangers of their marriage. 
Finlay's reduction of Bebb's application for equal admission to a 
prestigious profession to a simple request for social privileges suggests 
the desperation of an advocate who senses the shifting temper of the 
times. He did attempt to address the question of custom as it was codified 
in learned treatises and in contemporary case law: 
The passages in Coke Litt. were really conclusive on the law. They 
contained definite statements that a woman could not be an attorney . .  
. . There was, in fact, something repugnant to the word "person" in­
cluding a female-namely, the well-settled usage at Common Law. 
The cases showed that long usage ought to govern the law in these 
cases-Chorlton v. Lings and Jex-Blake v .  Edinburgh University.328 
The attraction of the argument of custom and the inertia of "well-settled 
usage" was enough to overcome Cecil' s  arguments: 
1bree grounds were alleged as proving disability. First, it was 
said that Lord Coke, in language which his Lordship said seemed to 
327. These queens were Mary I (reigned 1553-1558), the daughter of Henry's first wife, the 
divorced Catherine of Aragon, whose marriage to her cousin Philip, the King of Spain, seemed to 
validate all the country's fears about having a Catholic and a married woman as head of state, and 
Eliz.abeth I (reigned 1558-1603), the daughter of Henry's second wife, the beheaded Anne Boleyn, who 
learned from her sister's difficulties that too much religion and a husband were a sure road to disaster 
for a queen regnant On the children of Henry vm, see CAROILY ERICKSON, BLOODY MARY (1978); 
ELlzABETII JENKINS, EuzABETH TifE GREAT ( 1958); J.E. NEALE, QUEEN ELlzABETII (1934). I omit the 
ill-fated Jane Grey, whose claim derived from a badly drawn will of Edward VI, the son and heir of 
Henry VIII, and from acclamation by a Parliament that abandoned her after nine days. Her claim is 
actually interesting legally. See generally DAVID MATIIBW, LADY JANE GREY: THE SETTING OF 1HE 
REIGN (1972); ALISON PLoWDEN, LADY JANE GREY AND TIIE HOUSE OF SUFFOLK (1985). 
The next queen regnant was Mary II, of William and Mary fame, whose claim derived as much 
from Parliament as from her own descent from the discredited James II. After her death, her sister Anne 
should have succeeded but she very thoughtfully waited until the death of her brother-in-law, William 
ill. See generally HENRI VAN DER ZEE & BARBARA VAN DER ZEE, Wll.LIAM AND MARY (1973). 
Queens have been few and far between in English history, but females have passed their claims 
to the throne with very little question about their legitimacy to their descendants. Indeed, Princess 
Eliz.abeth, the daughter of James I and sister of James II, passed her claim, such as it was, through many 
generations to the Electress Sophia of Hanover, who was the ancestress of the Hanoverian (Windsor) 
line still on the throne today. See JOHN CANNON & RALPH GRJFATHS, THE OXFORD lLLUS1RA TED 
HISTORY OF TIIE BRIT1SH MONARCHY (1988). Recently, the Queen has expressed her support for a new 
law to end male primogeniture. See David Hughes, New Law to End Male Right to the Throne, DAILY 
�. Feb. 28, 1998, at 5.  
328. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at  180 (citation omitted); see also Jex-Blake v.  University of F.dinburgh, 45 
M. 549 (1873). Much of the opinion reflects similar concerns, and similar justifications, to those of the 
opponents of women's admission to the Bar. 
As to the expediency of ladies becoming medical practitioners it is enough to say that it is 
a fair subject for difference of opinion. To suggest jealousy of the rivalry of women as 
entering into the objection would be altogether absurd. Those who entertain the objection 
no doubt conscientiously believe that the result would be to diminish the delicacy and 
respect by which the female character in well-bred society is so advantageously 
surrounded. 
Id. at 564. See also SACHS & Wll.SON, supra note 3. 
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him not to be so doubtful as was suggested by counsel for the appel­
lant, had laid it down 300 years ago that a woman was not allowed to 
be an attorney . . . .  Lord Coke was speaking of attorneys not in the 
old sense in which the word would be used but of attorneys as a pro­
fessional body regulated by statute and recognized and created by 
statute between four and five hundred years ago. It might be that the 
Mirror of Justice was not a work of the highest authority, but the ref­
erence to it did not in the least take away from the value of Lord 
Coke's opinion. An opinion of his as to what was the Common Law 
required no sanction from anybody else. That alone, therefore, was 
evidence of what the Common Law was, and at Common Law 
women were under a disability which prevented their being attorneys. 
Apart from this opinion of Lord Coke there was the fact that no 
woman had ever been an attorney. There had been a long, uniform, 
and uninterrupted usage. Such usage was the foundation of the greater 
part of the Common Law and the Court ought to be very loth to de­
part from anything supported by long usage. Although, therefore, 
there had been a most interesting discussion as to what was or was 
not a public office, his Lordship could not help thinking that all this 
discussion was beside the mark. His Lordship said that he decided 
this case on the fact that at the time of the passing of the Act of 1843 
there was an existing disability which prevented women from being 
attorneys and which had not been destroyed by that Act.329 
Such an argument would, of course, allow absolutely no change in 
the common law whatsoever. It certainly would not allow the revolution­
ary decision by Lord Mansfield granting freedom to a slave brought to 
England after the argument that "[t]he air of England is too pure for a 
slave to breathe,"330 or of Chief Justice Holt in refusing to give effect to 
slavery in English domestic law, though the government of England 
might recognize it as part of the law of nations: "As soon as a negro 
comes into England he becomes free."331 While the legality of slavery 
was still an unsettled question through the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, such decisions called the practice into question, making the 
work of judges much less clear than the court of appeals in the Bebb case 
seemed to find it.332 The judicial position was clear: Parliament could 
simply not have meant what it said, because if it had, the result would 
have been the admission of women to the bar. Women had never been 
lawyers; therefore, Parliament simply could not have been serious. In­
deed, Mansfield and his like-minded brethren gave effect to a basic hu-
329. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 180 (citation omitted). 
330. Sommerset v. Stewart, 98 K.B. 499, 509 (1772). For a discussion of the impact of the "ftce 
au" language, see Jonathan A Bush, The First Slave (and Why He Matters), 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 599, 
626, 629 n.82 (1996). 
331. Stephen Sedley, Persons Aggrieved, l.oNOON REV. OF BOOKS, May 22, 1 997, at 26. On 
Chief Justice Holt's continuation of Mansfield's jurisprudence, see Bush, supra note 330, at 626, 629 
n.89. For more of Holt's language, see Smith v. Gould, 92 K.B. 338, (1706); Smith v. Brown & cooper. 
90 K.B. 1172, (1702). 
332. Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 179-8 1 (C.A. 1913). 
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man right throug� precisely the opposite conclusion. Absent a specific 
statement by Parliament regarding the acceptability of slavery, common 
law prohibited it.333 
The legal historian Nicolaus Benke identifies this kind of intellec­
tual behavior as one of his "Basics of the Patriarchal Program."334 These 
"basics" include: 
5. Be irrational. Establish some issues beyond rational discourse. 
Create your myths. 6. Be irrational. Create your logic, but break your 
own rules occasionally to assert your overwhelming power. 7. Immu­
nize your fundamental concepts against critical attack by calling these 
concepts "natural" or "essential," thus disguising norms as phenom­
ena or some physical reality and pretending they are valid regardless 
of historic conditions. 8. Whenever you express your concept of na­
ture, exercise a monopoly in interpreting it.335 
By deciding as it did, the court of appeals followed Benke' s patterns of 
patriarchy. In interpreting the relevant statutes as requiring denial of 
Bebb's  request for admission, the court followed rules 5, 6, and 7, thus 
mandating its adoption of rule 8.336 To do otherwise seemed to relinquish 
the power over who could speak in English courts, thus relinquishing 
control over whose speech was official and legitimate. In denying admis­
sion to women, the court of appeal demonstrated that it believed the only 
official and legitimate speech was exclusively male, modelled on shared 
nonns of education, experience and expectation. In Benke's analysis, the 
court's power created truth. It "express[ed] . . .  truth and power as if they 
were crucial for the existence and welfare of society as a whole."111 
Contemporary reaction ranged from great support for the Bebb deci­
sion to great criticism of it, both for its reasoning and for its result. One 
commentator noted with disapproval the introduction of legislation into 
Parliament but conceded that the profession as a whole was very unlikely 
to admit women sua sponte: 
We venture to think that the majority of the Benchers in the Inns 
would be opposed to the innovation, and that, even among those who 
are in favour of it, there would not be many who would interpret their 
333. For an analysis of the meaning of the Somerset decision, particularly with regard to the 
ttadition of slavery in American common law, see William R. Cotter, The Somerset Case and the 
Abolition of Slavery in England, 79 HlsTORY 3 1  (1994). After examining the various texts of the 
decision and the application of Somerset in the English courts through the first third of the ninetttnth 
century, Cotter agrees that the opinion effectively ended de jure slavery in England. Id. at 54-56. For 
other discussions of the meaning of Somerset, see id. at nn.5-8; Edward Fiddes, Lord Mansfield and the 
Somerset Case, 50 L.Q. REv. 499 (1934); Jerome Nadelhaft, The Somerset Case and Slavery: Myth, 
Reality and Repercussions, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 193 ( 1966); William Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield 
and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 43 U. CHI. L REv. 86 (197 4). 
334. Benke, supra note 195, at 201. 
335. Id. 
336. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 179-81 .  
337. Benke, supra note 195, at 201. 
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powers as justifying a course which is generally tak.cn to be c�n
.
trary 
to the common law. The claim of women to be admitted as sohc1tors, 
so far as it is founded upon the common law, has now been rejected 
definitely both by the English and the Scottish Courts. The Inns of 
Court claim absolute discretion as to whom they will  call to the Bar, 
subject to a somewhat nebulous visitatorial authority of the judges, by 
whom the discretion to call to the Bar has, in theory. been delegated 
to them. The Benchers would probably, much as they dislike interfer­
ence by the Legislature, refuse to make an innovation so entirely 
contr� to precedent except under the authority of an Act of Parlia­
ment. 
Making a sly allusion to Lord Robert Cecil 's historical argument in favor 
of his client' s  position, this writer went so far as to suggest that even 
should women be admitted to the Law Society, this admittance might 
still not be sufficient to guarantee them a place in the profession: 
Throughout the controversy it seems to be fairly generally assumed 
that if once the doors of the Law Society are thrown open to women, 
their demand to be called to the Bar must be admitted. We venture to 
suggest that such an assumption is unwarranted, and that few mem­
bers of either branch would admit that the same qualities are required 
in each. Speaking for ourselves, we are still among the unconverted. 
Even the fact that a woman has acted as Constable of England, as 
sexton, or as churchwarden, leaves us cold.339 
On the other side was a writer for the Green Bag,34{) the U.S. journal 
of legal comment, who suggested that the court of appeal had ducked the 
real issue, and in addition was guilty of extremely poor legal reasoning in 
coming to its decision.341 Quoting the Master of the Rolls, the writer sug­
gested a failure to acknowledge the importance of at least some of the 
facts presented: 
"We have been asked to hold," said Cozens-Hardy, M.R., in Bebb v. Th� Law Society, "what I for one quite assent to, that in point of in­
telbgen�e and education and competency, women-and in particular 
the apphcant here, who is a distinguished Oxford student-are at least 
�ual to a grea� many, and probably far better than many of the can­didates who wdl come up for examination. But that is not really for 
us to consider." This fact, though not for the court to consider, might 
�erefore be �ufficiently significant to be judicially noticed if not con­
side�ed. But 1t w�uld n�t have been a fact of sufficient importance for 
passmg remark if a high standard of professional attainments for �om�n ha� not become a commonplace of modern society ,  and if a situation did not exist in England to-day the character of which is at­tested by the fact that a considerable body of professional and lay 
338. Notes· Women and the p fl 
· 26 
339. Id. at i3t. ro ession, 1URID. REV. 130, 130-31 (1914) (citations omitted). 
340. Editorial The Adm· · if w, 
341. Id. 
' ission ° omen as Solicitors, 26 GREEN BAG 298, 298 (1914). 
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o�inion-i� would be �ufficient to cite Lord Haldane, Mr. Asquith, 
Sir John Simon, and Sir Stanley Buckmaster-favors the admission 
of women as solicitors. 342 
377 
This commentator came close to suggesting that women' s  intellectual 
attainments were in fact commonly so much higher than men's in similar 
situations that this fact in itself had become custom: 
[I]nstead of holding that the mental qualifications of women are not 
for the court to consider, the Court of Appeal, without going far out 
of its way, might properly have devoted some attention to contempo­
rary conditions, with a view to determining whether the position of 
women in the modem world constitutes a situation to · which the 
courts must give heed. The decision in this case was based on the 
"usage of the realm." But the "usage of the realm" is not simply a 
mass of ancient precedents which have come down from the earlier 
common law; it is made up of the vital, contemporaneous customs of 
an actual world. The entrance of women into innumerable pursuits to 
which they were formerly denied access has become, it would appear, 
one o f  those existing usages which a court may carefully consider in 
attempting to ascertain what the "usage of the realm" really is.343 
To bolster this contention, the writer, like the advocates in the Bebb case, 
appealed to a learned writer, although his choice is the American Roscoe 
Pound: 
The common law consists of positive rules and remedies, of general 
usages and customs, and of elementary principles, and the develop­
ments of applications of them, which cannot now be distinctly traced 
back to any statutory enactments, but which rest for their authority 
upon the common recognition, consent, and use of the state itself . . . .  
In truth, the common law is not in its nature and character an abso­
lutely fixed, inflexible system, like the statute law, providing only for 
cases of a determinate form which fall within the letter of the lan­
guage in which a particular doctrine or legal proposition is 
expressed.344 
For this writer the Bebb case illustrates an exchange of the tradi­
tional roles of the s�atutory and the common law. Instead of inflexibility 
and immutability, statutes such as the acts of 1 87?345 and 1 888346 repre�ent 
the new, that is, the opportunity of admitting women to
. 
the
. 
�rof�ss1on. 
The common law, for the judges involved, becomes the JUStif1c�t1on for 
the old, and loses the very character that has traditionally �en its gre
.
a�­
est strength-its flexibility and ability to accommodate social and pohtl­
cal change when codified law cannot. Even so, suggests the Green Bag 
342. Id. (citation omitted). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 298-99. 
345. Id. at 299. 
346. Id. 
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author, had the judges wanted to give the proper effect to changing cus­
tom, they could have done so and still have ruled against Bebb: 
The altered relation of women to trade and the professions does un­
questionably constitute a new modem u sage or custom which the law 
cannot ignore. It need not follow, however, that this custom has so 
fully established itself as to affect the legal profession as it has some 
other professions, and the Court of Appeal, if it had chosen to give it 
consideration, would not have had to decide in favor of the admission 
of women as solicitors. It could have said: "We are not led, by a sur­
vey of the situation now existing, to conclude that there has been any 
definite change in the custom of the realm with regard to the relation 
of women to the legal profession, notwithstanding certain tendencies 
that seem to be in that direction; these tendencies, in our judgment, 
have not had such an unmistakable result that we should deem our­
selves at liberty to affirm the right of women to practise law; by doing 
so we should be substituting a custom of our own choosing for one 
already existing, and that we have no power to do." Thus the court 
could have come to the same result as that actually reached, by a 
sound process of judicial reasoning; and probably a greater number of 
people would be satisfied with the decision, as it would have demon­
strated more cogently why this is a question for Parliamentary action 
and not one with which the courts are called upon to deal. 347 
The Green Bag further faulted the court for relying on a "casual dictum 
of Lord Coke which he may have borrowed from the Mirror of 
Justices"343 and criticized it for bringing the system of justice into disre­
pute.349 
So long as the employment of such reasoning survives, courts will 
continue to subject themselves to the danger of having their conclu­
sions discredited when reached by crooked paths, even though the re­
sults may be intrinsically sound, and would be accepted if they were 
approached along a straight line of argument.3.so 
In spite of the suggested line of reasoning that would have preserved the 
result, the implication is clear: the court could not legitimately reach a 
347. Id. at 298. 
348. Id. at 299. 
Pleaders are serjeants wise in the law of the realm who seive the commonalty of the 
people, stating and defending for hire actions in court for those who have need of them. 
E�ery pleader who acts in the business of another should have regard to four things:­
Fust, that he be a person receivable in court, that he be no heretic nor excommunicate, 
nor criminal, nor man of religion, nor woman, nor ordained clerk above the order of 
subdeacon, �or be�eficed clerk with the cure of souls, nor infant under twenty-one years 
of �ge, nor Judge m the same cause, nor open leper, nor man attainted of falsification 
against the law of his office. 
THE MIRROR OF JUS'rICES 47 (The Publications of the Selden Society; William Joseph Whittaker ed., 
189S) (emphasis added). 
' 
349. Editorial, supra note 340, at 299. 
350. Id. 
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conclusion that would endure for any length of time, regardless of refer­
ence to statutory or common law. 
V. CHANGES IN THE POLmCAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Supporters of women' s  admission were undaunted by an abortive 
attempt to pass a bill, introduced by Lord Wolmer, overruling the Law 
Society' s  actions in 191 2.351 After the decision of the court of appeals in 
the Bebb case, various women's rights advocates as well as the Commit­
tee for the Admission of Women to the Solicitors' Profession352 requested 
support from the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister, Lord 
Haldane,353 for a bill to admit women. The Committee consisted of such 
luminaries as Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Frederick Pollock (the historian), 
Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Mrs. Garrett Anderson (the physician) and other 
notables, as well as the four women involved in the Bebb case.354 One 
member quoted Edward Bell 's  comment that 20,000 women were law­
yers in the United States355 and reminded the Lord Chancellor that all the 
universities in England admitted women except Oxford and 
Cambridge.356 Other arguments advanced included those of emotion 
(women should have the opportunity of hiring solicitors of their own 
sex),357 and positivism (women should be allowed to do anything not 
strictly prohibited).358 The Lord Chancellor was sympathetic but cautious: 
"When he was in the other House he used to bring in a Bill for the re­
moval of  disabilities from women going far beyond that which they 
asked, and he still held to the principle of that . . . . Personally he was 
entirely in favour of the principle of the Bill . . . . "359 However. as a mem­
ber of the House of Lords, the Lord Chamberlain could not predict what 
might happen in the Commons,360 but he pronounced His Majesty's Gov­
ernment generally in favor of the bill.361 
A few days later the City of London Solicitors • Company passed a 
resolution to request the Law Society to oppose the bill,362 and eventually 
it failed to pass,363 undoubtedly because of the active opposition of both 
professional societies. 
35 1.  BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
STIJDY OFTHE ENGUSH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965, at 193 (1967). 
352. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 277. 
353 . ELIE HAI.EVY, A HISTORY OF TIIE ENGLISH PEOPUl IN THE NINETEENTII CENWRY: THE
 
Ruu: OF DEMOCRACY 1905-1914, at 505 (2d ed. 1 96 1  ). 
354. The Admission of Women as Solicitors, 5 8  Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 418, 418 (1914). 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. 
363. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 277. 
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The bill's defeat simply exacerbated tempers on both sides. One 
correspondent to the Solicitors' Journal suggested that the issue ought to 
be further debated in the magazine: "One contributor, I notice, has 
grounded his objections upon considerations of the hann it will do us 
and, if you will allow me, I will endeavour to shew why such a view, in 
the special circumstances of the case, should not be allowed to prevail."364 
After pointing out the economic advantages of allowing women to pur­
sue careers for which they were suited, he blasted the profession for 
failing to do as much for women as had physicians: 
The doctors, as a community, have set a chivalrous example in wid­
ening the field of women's opportunities. The lawyers should do the 
same. If women are left to realise that their only hope lies in them­
selves, they should at least be able to count upon men to put no ob-
1 ' th '  365 stac es m err way. 
However, he objected to the admission of married women: "[l]n an over­
stocked profession in which there is barely enough work to go round, it is 
unfair that any home, through the joint contribution of husband and wife, 
should, as it were, enjoy double rations."366 
Lord Buckmaster made additional futile attempts to reverse the 
Bebb decision through legislation in 1 9 1 7  and 1918,367 but was defeated 
by the Law Society's letter-writing campaign.368 The First World War put 
further action on the issue on the back burner. By the end of the war, the 
amount of significant political opposition to the admission of women had 
dwindled to the point that the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill 
aroused much less comment.369 
Ultimately two factors caused the change in the attitude of most 
members of the bar, most members of the government, and most mem­
bers of the public. One was women' s  full participation in the war effort 
during the period from 1914 to 1 9 1 8 .  Though proponents of women's 
entry into the legal profession might reject the notion as demeaning, the 
fact remained that women's contribution in every sphere of life and 
death310 demonstrated that they understood and were willing to uphold the 
364. Douglas M. Gane, The Admission of Women to the Law, 58 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 468, 
468 (1914). 
365. Id. at 469. But see the comments of Helena Nonnanton asserting the contrary in Barristers 
and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill, 63 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 500, 501 (1919). 
366. Gane, supra note 364, at 469. 
367. ABEL-SMrrn & STEVENS, supra note 351,  at 193. 
368. Id. On the Law Society's opposition, see LAw Socmrv, ANNuAL REPoRT 26-27 (1917); 
LAW SOCIE1Y, ANNuALREl'oRT 36-37 (1919). 
369. ABEL-SMITII & STEVENS, supra note 351,  at 194. 
370. &ii� Cavell, an English nurse, was executed in Belgium by the Germans as a spy. This 
oun:age galvaniz.ed even more willingness on the part of the British, if that were possible, to win the war 
agamst the arrogant Hun. See ROWLAND RYDER, Eorrn: CA VEU.. 223 ( 1975). 
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notions of duty and sacrifice. This participation seemed to answer the 
question of women's willingness to accept responsibility satisfactorily. 
. 
!he second fac�or was the en
t:�ce of women into the legal profes­
sion m other countnes whose trad1t10ns and standards of living seemed 
equivalent, or at least comprehensible, to the English, and the resulting 
commentary over the desirability of giving qualified women the same 
opportunity. In France, as in many of the United States and provinces of 
Canada, women had already been admitted, so that their wartime contri­
butions, while valued, were more expected.311 Likewise, their presence in 
the law was no longer quite such a disturbance. 
There are probably only a few women, comparatively speaking, to 
whom the practice of law is congenial or fitting; the same to but a 
slightly less extent is true of men. It is but rarely that any other type 
will seek admission. The number of women in active practice will 
probably never be large. But we have passed the period when only a 
few especially qualified women braved the difficulties of securing 
admission. 372 
To the British, the contributions of its female citizens were a great, 
and pleasant, surprise. As a contributor to the Solicitors' Journal and 
Weekly Reporter noted, not only had many men died in various wars 
over the past century, so that the numbers of persons who traditionally 
populated the professions had diminished greatly, but the very lack of 
available men to support women and children meant that women needed 
to be able to earn their own livings.373 Thus, the entry of women into the 
legal profession was a temporary necessity. 
[S]ituated as men now are, with their numbers diminished and their 
careers thwarted, the support of women collectively . . .  is probably 
outside their competence, and the sole alternative left to them is to 
admit women to all those centres of activity whence the means of 
subsistance is derived by the individual's own effort. The demand is 
upon every guild and body of men, and the profession of the law is 
t . 374 no an exception. 
The author advocated a short experiment, allowing women to enter �he 
solicitors ' branch for a period of time and then projecting an evaluation ' • J7S of their success to see if they should be encouraged to contmue. 
This writer was not willing to countenance the complete equ�Iity of 
men and women in the profession for various reasons, most of which are 
371 . The question of women's fitness for the bar was not settled until relatively late in the 
nineteenth cenrury however and it was a matter for judicial opinion until then. See In re Kilgore, 17 Pa 
W.N.C. 563 (1886); In re�ll. 39 Wis. 246 (1875); Women at the Bar, 21 U.w NOTES 124 (1
923). 
372. Women at the Bar, supra note 371, at 1 24. 782 0918) 373. Women as Solicitors: An Emergency Measure, 62 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 782, 
[hereinafter Emergency Measure]. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. 
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discussed in this article. Among them were serious doubts as to the abil­
ity of women to represent their clients as zealously as possible and the 
ability of men to represent their clients' interests in the face of such at­
tractive distractions as a female adversary.m However, he (and this arti­
cle was probably written by a man) found himself in agreement with the 
writer for the Bench and Bar,m a U.S. legal journal, that women could 
certainly perform many of the less "unfeminine" duties of the solicitor.378 
Like other commentators of the period, he used the military analogy to 
explain women's physical and intellectual shortcomings and to justify 
any inequality of treatment: 
[T]he profession of law, like the profession of anns, has a strictly 
polemical basis, the sole difference lying in the choice of weapons. 
Litigation is warfare in which the property, the liberty, and even the 
life of the individual is at stake; as, in the case of war itself, the pos­
sessions, the freedom, and the very existence of the State are in­
volved. The qualities called for in the defence of the individual are 
just those required for the protection of the community, only they op­
erate through a different medium. Fundamentally, they reside in 
force, and it remains to be seen whether women are competent to ex­
ercise force in competition with men in one sphere when they have 
been shewn incapable of exercising it in another. . . . These consid­
erations, however, apply only to the contentious side of professional 
life. Happily there is much that is pacific . . . .  [C]onveyancing and the 
wide range of practice falling under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 
is well within the moral and intellectual competence of women, and it 
would be better that they should apply themselves to this side of pro­
fessional work. 379 
Even in the 1980s, this attitude was still prevalent: "Associated with 
this 'club' analogy is the 'masculinity' of the law and legal practice. This 
serves to make more difficult the successful performance of the occupa­
tional role by women."380 Further, unlike E.A. Bell, many male barristers 
and solicitors in the 1970s and 1980s overtly or quietly blocked women's 
efforts to join their chambers: 
[T]he main stumbling block is simply prejudice, and this reveals itself 
most strongly at the crucial stage in a woman's career, when she is 
looking for a tenancy. Many chambers openly admit a "no woman" 
policy, and continue to do so despite the Sex Discrimination Act 1 975 
(which does not apply to the Bar, since sets of chambers are not part­
nerships and tenants are not employed). One particular set of cham­
bers which has always been known to have a no woman policy 
(amended to a "no other woman" policy after the daughter of the 
376. Id. 
377. Editorial, Woman in the Law, 17 BENCH & B. 7 (1900). 
378. Emergency Measure, supra note 373, at 787. 
379. Id. 
380. Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 30 (fOOlnote omitted). 
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Head of Chambers was admitted) has blatantly refused a woman ap­
plicant on the grounds of her sex.38 1 
The situation was similar in Canada: 
For almost all the years before 1970 legal education was dominated 
by the Law Society of Manitoba. Its essential feature was practical 
training: students were required to find a law office which would 
agree to admit them as articling clerks. It was advantageous for stu­
dents to have contacts, generally through a family member or close 
family friend, within the number of established lawyers. Someone 
who had no ready-made contact would have difficulty finding a law 
firm to take her or him at the age of 20 or 21 . The law firm would be 
testing the clerk as a potential long-term colleague. For women this 
system was more of a problem than for men. Because there were so 
few women already in the profession, there was no regular network. 
Women were regarded as a risk and widely expected to abandon the 
investment made in their training upon marriage.382 
383 
Women who were members of minority groups had an even more diffi­
cult time.383 Those firms which eventually did agree to take on women 
clerks tried to limit their careers by offering them positions with little 
possibility of advancement.384 
One American commentator attempted to turn the suggestion that 
women did not have as much reasoning ability as necessary to their ad­
vantage in the debate: 
We are told that women are not logical, not analytical; that they jump 
at conclusions. Well, sometimes it is a good thing to jump-you get 
there quicker. After you get there you can reason backwards and in­
variably find you are right, just like proving an example in arithmetic.  
Again, it  is all a question of habit, we haven 't been trained in those 
lines. Is there any difference between the brain of the average woman 
and the brain of the average man, and is the gray matter in a man 's 
brain so different that he alone can take up the profession of medicine 
or law?385 
However, this approach is not particularly persuasive. To suggest that 
legal reasoning can be created after the fact is the kind of result-driven 
decision-making that women themselves found objectionable. 
A. Attempts to Legislate Admission 
In order to address the question of the inequality of women's politi­
cal rights, the post-war government prepared a series of legislative ini-
381. Kemiedy, supra note 158, at 151. 
382. Kinnear, supra note 85, at 423. 
383. Id. 
384. Id. at 425. 
385. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 1 34. 
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tiatives which removed the most crucial disabilities: the right of women 
to stand for election, the right of women to vote and the right of women 
to enter into the practice of law. Not all of these initiatives were unquali­
fied successes. For example, initiatives limited the right to vote to 
women over the age of thirty ,3"" although men were entitled to vote when 
"of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity" in addition to other 
residency requirements. 111 
1 .  The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1 9 1 8388 
The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act attempted to enfran­
chise women by allowing them to participate in the making of law as part 
of the House of Commons: "A woman shall not be disqualified by sex or 
marriage for being elected to or sitting or voting as a Member of the 
Commons House of Parliament. "389 The Act thus addressed the concerns 
of a worried little article in the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly 
Reporter,390 which rehearsed the history of women in public offices, and 
opined that: 
Id. 
Lord Esher' s dictum as to the common law disqualification of women 
for the exercise of any public functions . . .  is obviously much too 
wide. Women may hold the sovereignty, and have done so. They may 
hold certain lay offices in the Church . . .  and, of course, may be pa­
tronesses of livings. But these are scarcely public offices in the State. 
They may be impanelled on a jury of matrons and not very infre­
quently this i s  done. There are also records of historical cases in 
which ladies h ave acted as sheriffs, returning officers, parish consta­
bles, overseers of the poor, and even commissioners of sewers. But it 
is doubtful whether their tenure of those offices was ever lawful. All 
the recorded instances occur in troubled times-between the Wars of 
the Roses and the conclusion of the Civil War, when every manner of 
illegality was occasionally committed by the powerful. It is probably 
the true constitutional view that, except as regards the succession to 
the throne, no right to hold any of these offices was really possessed 
by women at common law. The right to inherit the Crown is peculiar. 
It is wholly the result of the mediaeval doctrine that the King was 
paramount lord of all land in the kingdom, and therefore the rules of 
inheritance which applied to land applied also to the Crown. To-day, 
of course, the succession to the throne is regulated by a parliamentary 
386. Representation of the People Act of 1918, 8 Geo. 5, ch. 64, § 4 (1) (Fng.). 
A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for a constituency 
(other than a university constituency) if s�a) has attained the age of thirty years; and 
(b) is not subject to any legal incapacity; and (c) is entitled to be registered as a local 
government elector in respect of the occupation in that constituency of land or premises · 
. .  or is the wife of a husband entitled to be so registered. 
387. Id. §§ (1 )(a), (3). 
388. 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.). 
389. Id. §1. 
390. The Eligibility ofWomen For Parliament, 62 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 532 (1918). 
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entail, the Act of Settlement, and the limitations which govern an or­
dinary tail general are applied to the Crown by the terms of that stat­
ute. 
It may be assumed, then, that women were at common law dis­
qualified from sitting in either House of Parliament. Such a funda­
mental rule of the common law cannot be altered by the judges; it is 
not one of those minor principles-mostly existing in the realm of 
commercial law and the law of torts--which are capable of undergo­
ing expansion and development by mere judicial decision. Therefor 
an Act of Parliament is required to remove this disqualification. . . . 
[And t]here must be an express enactment in clear terms conferring 
the privilege claimed.391 
2. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919392 
385 
Parliament may have intended the Sex Disqualification (Removal) 
Act to address all remaining questions on the disparity between the civil 
inequality of men and women. Apart from specifying that women could 
not be prevented from holding public office, it also addressed the ques­
tion of women who wished to be admitted to the bar, but who had at­
tended universities not conferring degrees on women. This was a com­
mon enough occurrence for older students who had pursued legal studies 
before education, let alone admission to the profession. The Act contem­
plated the following for females: 
A woman shall be entitled to be admitted and enrolled as a so­
licitor after serving under articles for three years only if either she has 
taken such a university degree as would have so entitled her had she 
been a man, or if she has been admitted to and passed the final ex­
amination and kept, under the conditions required of women by the 
university, the period of residence necessary for a man to obtain a de­
gree at any university which did not at the time the examination was 
passed admit women to degrees.393 
The Act also applied to Scotland394 and lreland395 through alteration of 
statutes governing local practice,396 and Parliament intended it to be read 
391. Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted). 
392. 9 & JO Geo. 5, ch. 7 1  (Eng.). 
393. Id. § 2. 
394. Note its immediate effect. See Paterson, supra note 69, at 93. 
395. IRlsH L  TtMEs, March 15, 1919,at66. 
396. In the case of Scotland, the Act affected statutes such as The Local Government (Scotland) Act 
of 1894, 57 & 58 Viet, ch. 58 (Eng.); The Qualification of Women (County and Town Councils) 
(Scctland) Act of 1907, 7 F.dw. 7, ch. 48 (Eng.); The County, Town and Parish Councils (Qualification) 
(Scotland) Act of 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 39 (Eng.). 
In the case of Ireland, it affected The Juries Act (Ireland), 1871, 34 & 35 Viet, ch. 65 (Eng.); The 
Local Govcmrnent (Ireland) Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Viet, ch. 37 (Eng.); The Local Authorities (Ireland) 
(Qualification of Women) Act of 1911,  1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 35 (Eng.). 
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with the Solicitors Act of 1843.397 The relevant text of the Act reads as 
follows: 
A woman shall be entitled to be admitted and enrolled as a solicitor 
after serving under articles for three years only if either she has taken 
such a university degree as would have so entitled her had she been a 
man, or if she has been admitted to and passed the final examination 
and kept, under the conditions required of women by the university, 
the period of residence necessary for a man to obtain a degree at any 
university which did not at the time the examination was passed ad-. d 398 rrut women to egrees. 
3. Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill399 
The Law Society met on March 28, 1919, to discuss the implica­
tions of the Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill 
drafted by Lord Buckmaster, one of the lawyers who had represented 
Bebb, and backed by the Lloyd George Government. 400 The President of 
the Society suggested that the contributions of women in wartime (al­
though they had been dismissed by some detractors as being of little evi­
dence that women were intellectually capable of the demands of legal 
practice) were a great impetus toward the support of the bill by many 
members of the profession, who might not have been so inclined at the 
time of the Bebb decision: 
H the Bill had been introduced five years ago he did not believe such 
a meeting as this would have been held, but since then a great deal 
had happened and the war, which had made so many changes in the 
country, had made few changes so great as that in the relationship of 
women to the economic work of the country. He thought it was no 
exaggeration to say that, had it not been for the women of the country 
and the services they had rendered, the war might never have been 
won-it certainly would have been very much protracted. 401 
Even Sir Homewood Crawford, a solicitor who opposed the bill, 
wrote that, 
provided the Bar will by statutory enactment be as free to women as it 
is sought to make our branch, we ought not to place any further ob­
stacle in the way of women attaining the object of their ambition. It 
should, however, be most clearly provided for by statute that both 
397. See Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & lOGeo. 5, ch. 7 1 ,  § 2(3) (F.ng.). 
398. Id. § 2. 
399. See Women as Barristers and Solicitors, 53 IRISH L. llMES & Souc. J. 66 (1919). This 
bill docs not seem to have passed, but the enactment of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 
accomplished the same end. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1 
(Eng.). 
400. The Law Society: Admission of Women as Solicitors, 146 1..AW TIMES J. & RF.c. 400 (1919) 
[hereinafter Law Society: Admission]. 
401. Id. 
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branches are open for the admission of women, and Lord Buckmas­
ter's Bill in that respect requires strengthening.402 
387 
Samuel Garrett, who spoke in favor of the bill, pointed out that to 
deny women entrance into the profession of solicitor reflected 
the want of touch, between their Profession and the public. That want 
of sympathy and want of touch was, in his view, at the root of most of 
the evils from which the Profession suffered, and he could not imag­
ine anything more calculated to accentuate that want of sympathy and 
of touch than that they, in this moment of the country's history, when 
the large body of women had just been enfranchised and had taken 
part in a general election and had made their political opinion and still 
more their influence felt, that at this moment the society should pun­
ish to the world that they were going to seek to maintain an obstacle 
in the way of women earning their livelihood, if they choose to do so, 
in the solicitor profession. The whole sympathy of the country would 
be against them. . . .  They could not stop the Bill, any more than a 
bumble bee could stop an express train, and the choice before them 
was whether they would welcome it and receive it with open arms, or 
whether they would be dragged at its tail, struggling and screeching 
like an angry child . . . .  He begged them to remember that this was a 
matter which vitally affected the good name, the credit, and the repu­
tation of the Profession.40) 
Garrett's pragmatic argument was not the only one advanced in favor of 
the bill. Sir Walter Trower, another supporter, sidestepped the question 
of women's intellectual ability by characterizing the opening of the Pro­
fession as "a question of equality of opportunity.''404 For him the possible 
complications brought on by a woman's lack of intellect or physical 
stamina, or marital status, would eventually disappear: 
Whether women were better or worse than men, morally, physically, 
or intellectually, did not concern them. The question whether they 
would be hampered by matrimonial ventures did not arise. All these 
questions would be dealt with and tested by competition and experi­
ence. If women proved themselves to be as good at business as men, 
they would succeed; if not, they would fail. Men had no more to say 
on the subject; he hoped that in any case they would afford
. 
the 
women a cordial welcome. It had been said in that hall on previous 
occasions that the Profession was overcrowded, and that solicitors 
dreaded the competition of women in the field in which they were 
engaged. He did not think there was any man present who ��uld 
venture to say personally that he objected to women's compeutton; 
that he was afraid of any woman competing with him.� 
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 410. 
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
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E.A. Bell, the solicitor who had agreed to accept Gwnyeth Bebb as a 
clerk, suggested that women would have an uplifting effect on the at­
mospheres of court and law office.406 Finally, a Mr. Braby suggested that 
although it might be true that women might not be suited to the practice 
of law, they would never have the opportunity to learn the profession if 
they had no access to it: 
[P]eople could never learn to govern themselves, or to do the work 
they wanted to do, until they were given the opportunity of learning 
how to do it. Women must be given the opportunity of showing what 
they could do. He was quite sure that in a very short time, when they 
found the necessity for doing this class of work as it should be done, 
they would fit themselves for doing it as well as had the men. He be­
lieved there was one country, Thi bet, where the entire government 
was in the hands of women; they even acted as policemen, and men 
were not allowed out after eight o'clock in the evening.407 
One speaker with the unfortunate name of G.B. Crook announced 
himself against the bill, finding the objections to female solicitors over­
whelming: 
He was very sorry to have to say it, but the proposer and also the sec­
onder of the motion had entirely failed to make out any case. The first 
argument which had been put forward was that the ladies had helped 
to win the war. Let that be admitted; if they had not done so would 
they have been worthy of companionship in any sense whatever? Was 
it not their hearths and their homes that the men went out to defend? 
Were not they as interested in the success of the war as were men? . .  
. Were [the ladies] anxious to become soldiers, or sailors, or police­
men, or to do anything to support by force that law which they were 
seeking to administer? If ladies were to come in equally with men in 
the administration of the law and they were then to put upon men the 
· enforcement of that law, would that be equality? No, it would be a 
case of privilege, and he understood that in these days privilege was 
to be abolished and not established. -
Crook's  objection that women ought not to be solicitors until they 
showed themselves willing to take on the same roles as men was viewed 
as spurious by his listeners, who pointed out that as soon as women were 
allowed to do so, they did.409 He finally attempted to justify his fallback 
position, the differentiation of the law as a profession completely sepa-
rate from any other, by asserting that · 
All honour to Miss Nightingale and those nurses who had been Miss 
Nightingales during the war, but a nurse was one thing and a lawyer 
406. Id. 
407. Id. 
408. /d. at 410-l l .  
, 
409 .
. 
I�' at 41
_
1 .  Note that in the matter of militacy language, for example, women lawyers now tell 
'war Stories, that 1s, accounts of their experiences, as readily as their colleagues who are men. 
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was another. Everyone present, as lawyers, knew that the business of 
the c�untry came ultimately to the advice of the lawyer. . . . Parlia­
ment itself would have to
. 
s�ut u� to-morrow if there were no lawyers 
tJ:iere . . . .  Unless the ad�101strat10n of the law was in the highest pos­
sible hands, how could 1t be expected to continue? If ladies were to be 
admitted to the membership of the Bar, of course it would follow that 
the Bench woul� 
.
be open to them, and there would be lady judges. 
How would the 1d10syncrasy of the sex be got over in that case?4'0 
389 
For Crook, as for a dwindling number of opponents, pleasing differ­
ences of dress symbolized frightening differences in quality of thought."' 
Unable to demonstrate the truth of his assertion that the quality of the 
female thought process is deficient, Crook categorized it as different, 
therefore inadequate, and presented misreadings of history and his own 
opinion of divine intent as evidence: 
Let them consider for a moment whether they would abandon allure­
ments of dress. If ladies abandoned these and other allurements pecu­
liar to them and depended upon their brains and not their bodies, then, 
of course, they would be equal persons with men. But ladies would 
never do so. There would be in the administration of the law all kinds 
of mixed motives, and how that would work out he would leave to the 
judgment of his hearers. It was certain it would not work out to the 
dignity of the law. When Queen Mary was on the throne she could 
not keep her axe off the neck of Lady Jane Grey, nor could Queen 
Elizabeth keep the axe off the neck of Mary Queen of Scots, any 
more than Eve could keep her hand off the apple. The judicial factor 
was not a part of woman; the Almighty never intended to instil it in 
her.412 
A returnee from the Great War, Lieutenant Wood, responded that if 
women were poor lawyers they would have no clients,413 a point also 
410. Id. 
41 1 .  Id. 
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made by Normanton414 and by the American lawyer Gertrude Handrick.4's 
"If women as solicitors turned out to be incapable, he was sure the gen­
eral public would not consult them . . . .  The public said they believed in 
equality of opportunity; they believed that women should have equal 
rights with men, therefore that they s hould be allowed to enter the Pro­
fession."416 Neither Lieutenant Wood nor any other speaker found accept­
able the suggestion that women should be admitted as a "reward" for 
their service and support during the Great War: 
[T]hey ought not to speak of their willingness to give the privilege to 
ladies of coming into the Profession as a war bonus. He abhorred the 
thought that it was giving something as a reward. He wanted women 
to have the privilege because he believed they had an inherent capac­
ity and ability equal to that of men, and he could not see any possible 
valid reason why they should so long have been debarred from earn­
ing their living, as probably they were well able to do, in the same 
way as the other sex. . . . Why because a human being was born a 
woman should she be compelled to retire into oblivion and be de­
barred from exercising the gifts and talents with which she had been 
endowed?411 
Some supporters of the bill nevertheless questioned whether women 
were generally capable of performing the duties necessary. W.A. Sharpe, 
Vice-President of the Law Society, while voicing support, admitted that 
like Mr. Crook he "criticised the sphere and the powers and the abilities 
of women. Those criticisms seem to be true . . . .  "•1s However, 
he thought that, whatever women might be, they had never been 
given the opportunity of trying how they could develop themselves 
and improve and expand their powers in the practice of the law. He 
was not an advocate for a woman becoming a solicitor, because in 
many respects he did not think the solicitor's a suitable occupation for 
a woman, any more than he thought a woman would make a good 
soldier. But he was not in the position of the man who would never 
go into the water until he could swim and therefore never learned to 
swim at all. He wanted to find out what those abilities were . . .  .419 
Neither Sharpe nor R.W. Dibdin, a member of the Society's gov­
erning council and an opponent of the bill, believed that many women 
would avail themselves of the opportunity of entering the profession.4
20 
Dibdin, furthermore, rearticulated the idea of a "reward" for women who 
had participated in the war effort, and suggested that perhaps women 
414. Admission ofWomen, supra note 186, at 429. 
415. Women in the I.Aw, supra note 15, at 134. 
416. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 41 1 .  
417. Id. (stat.ementofH. Monger). 
418. Id. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. at 41 1-12. 
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would now want to be soldiers and a great many other things that they 
were no more suited for than for the practice of law: 
What they had to decide upon, as being eminently acquainted with 
the needs and duties of the law, was either that women were suitable 
to be members of the Profession or they were not. . . .  Personally, he 
believed they were quite unfit-for many reasons. This was saying 
nothing against them. They were quite unfit to serve in the army as 
soldiers, but many of the arguments ought to go as far as to say that if 
they wanted to go into the army we should be compelled in the same 
way to let them go. It was quite absurd . . . .  They were all agreed that 
women should have equal opportunities with men in matters which 
they could manage equally well; but he did not think it would be to 
the interest of the country, to the interest of the Profession, or to the 
interest of women themselves, that they should become members of 
the solicitor branch . . . . 421 
Neither was evidence that women, who had already entered the medical 
profession successfully, particularly persuasive. Sharpe pointed out that 
few women actually practiced medicine422 and Charles Mackintosh, an­
other speaker, asserted that 
the evidence of the medical profession would go to prove that women 
would not be likely to do better in the solicitors' profession, and that 
it was not likely that the solicitor's profession would attract them. 
The council had considered the matter, and they .were satisfied that 
women would raise the tone of the Profession as a whole and that 
they would not be litigious when they had the opportunity. The so­
licitor's was a contentious profession, the medical profession was not. 
Women, as a rule, did not shine as litigants, and probably would not 
shine as advisers. 423 
With these comments, Mackintosh c ombined the "moral uplift" 
argument with the argument that women simply did not understand legal 
thinking, particularly in litigation, and thus found himself in a quandary. 
He could not conceive of a legal profession in which disputes might be 
resolved other than through the traditional (read: "male") means of ar­
gumentation and discussion. That a woman lawyer might approach a 
dispute differently and offer alternatives to litigation was not within his 
understanding. Indeed, such alternatives may not actually have existed at 
the time, since their origins would have been nurtured by lawyers who as 
yet did not exist. This lack of empathy with the possibility that the law as 
practiced by women might afford new and innovative methods of dispute 
resolution prevailed among the leaders of the profession forty years later. 
As expressed by the Bar Council in 1 969, " ' [t]he fact has to be faced . . .  
that the profession of barrister requires the masculine approach (however 
421 .  Id. at 412. 
422. Id. at 41 1-12. 
423. Id. at 412. 
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fallacious it may be) to reasoning and argument, and women only suc­
ceed in such activities if they have a masculine disposition. '  "424 The Bar 
Council thus asserted its belief in a flawed but traditional legal argument 
than an attempt to reconfigure or reinterpret law to create new political 
and social opportunities. 
H. Westbury Preston, the final speaker, agreed that most women 
would not prove to be capable of law practice and that the very require­
ments of entrance to the profession would keep them out. m His objection 
to the bill was that it did not go far enough. To him it was more logical 
that the bill be an 
omnibus Bill. It was asked why should women be admitted to the Le­
gal Profession and not to the profession of the architect, the account­
ant, or the Churoh [sic], and he failed to understand why it should be 
so. If there was any right behind the proposal it should apply to all 
professions . . . .  Women in the past had been forced into one or two 
channels. It was very desirable in the interest of the country that the 
channels should be increased . . . . 4
26 
The debate ended with a vote of 50 for the admission of women and 33 
against, including two members of the Council of the Law Society, R.W. 
Dibdin and W. Melmoth Walters.427 
Certainly, English solicitors were not alone in their concern over 
women's abilities in the traditional area of litigation. The U.S. publica­
tion Bench and Bar noted that 
[t]here may be some women who are adapted to advocacy, but we 
believe that the majority of those who obtain admission to the Bar are 
not, and further, that the time is hardly ripe for the entrance of many 
women into this particular department of practice. It still savors of the 
incongruous and jars upon what are called the "conservative" sensi­
bilities, to see a woman plead in court, however ably she may per­
form her part. 
428 
424. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 158 (quoting BAR COUNCIL, SUPPlEMENfARY MEMORANDUM 4 
(1969)). 
425. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 412. 
426. Id. Mr. Preston proposed an amendment to that effect. Id. Apparently, the first woman to 
receive the doctorate in architecture was Marie Frommer in 1919. See Spotlight on Women 
Architects, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRm., Oct. 1 8, 1987, at F28. Women were admitted into the 
priesthood of the Church of England, not without controversy, in 1994. See Bells Ring as Church 01 
England Ordains Women Priests: Ceremony Follows Long Debate and Sometimes Bitter 
Opposition, ST. Loms POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 1 3, 1 994, at l lA. 
427. Societies: The Law Society: Admission of Women as Solicitors, 63 Souc. J. & WKLY. RFJ'. 
414, 418 (1919). 
428. See Editorial, supra note 3n, at 8. 
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However, 
[i]n the other departments of legal work . . .  women may find a wide 
field for usefulness, where they can easily compete with, and in some 
of which they may perhaps excel, the men. We refer especially to the 
field or fields of legal writing. These, as it seems to us, offer a splen­
did opportunity at the present time to the talents of the trained women 
lawyers . . . .  Women lawyers, also, could hold their own with men, 
and might perhaps surpass them, as brief-writers. Large offices would 
find bright, reliable young women lawyers of great service in prepar­
ing lists of authorities and briefs of cases at all stages, and independ­
ent women practitioners could undoubtedly obtain much employment 
of this nature from busy lawyers with smaller establishments. 429 
393 
Even some supporters of women lawyers, both in England and in 
the United States, believed that they ought to be channelled into areas of 
practice that made the most of their traditional image of femininity, just 
as supporters of women physicians believed that they were best suited to 
the practice of obstetrics, gynecology and public health. Some women 
attorneys even voiced this uncertainty: 
One would suppose . . .  that the majority of a woman lawyer's clients 
would be women. This has not been my experience, nor apparently 
the experience of most women lawyers. The average woman seems to 
prefer the legal advice of a man. Not infrequently she will ask the 
woman lawyer of her acquaintance for her opinion as to the matter in 
· which she is interested and for hints as to how to proceed, but when it 
comes to taking definite legal action, she will retain a man . . . .  In my 
opinion, there are certain branches of legal work which men are better 
equipped to handle than women, and this sphere should not be in­
vaded by the latter. For instance, the vast majority of our criminal 
cases, and, more especially, general trial work and political litigation. 
But there is one field which, while it does not distinctly offer women 
a choice for legal practice, yet finds its most patent appeal among 
women lawyers. I refer to campaigns for and against legislation 
which directly affects the welfare of women and children, both in 
their legal status and their economic rights.430 
Others, however, asserted that there were no essential differences be­
tween the capacities of men and women. 
B. The Admission of Women to the Legal Profession 
Ivy Williams, a graduate of the Universities of Oxford and London, 
was called to the Inner Temple, May 10, 1 922, as England's first female 
barrister.431 Williams "surpassed all previous records in the Bar Examina-
429. Id. at 8-9. 
430. Jean H. Norman, Increasing Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 12 OHIO L REP. 255 (1914). 
431 .  Occasional Notes, 153 LAW TIMES 336, 337 (1 922). American legal journals of the period 
also heralded her admission. See English Notes: Women Learned in the Law, LAW NOTES, July 
1922, at 76. 
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tions,'�2 and had been active in the fight to gain women's  admission.433 
yet even the excellence of women advocates could not overcome lan­
guage that implied that women could adequately represent only certain 
types of clients: 
In the ten years following the enabling Act we read of women suc­
cessfully pleading cases and on December 3rd., 1926, a woman advo­
cate appeared with a brief in the Privy Council. To indicate the atti­
tude towards women in Law we quote from an article in the Man­
chester Guardian (Weekly) of February 4th, 1927: "It is  gratifying to 
find that so much of the work of the ordinary practising barrister is 
suitable for women. Some cases, indeed, involving the interests of 
women and children m� be more sympathetically and successfully 
conducted by a woman.' 34 
Shortly after Williams' s admission, Carrie Morrison was admitted 
as a solicitor, after she passed all appropriate examinations and com­
pleted her clerkship.43� She profited from the "reward" aspect of women's 
participation in the war. "Miss Morrison, in virtue of distinguished serv­
ice in the Intelligence Department during the war, has been treated as an 
'ex-service' student, and has had the term of her articles reduced to two 
years. "436 
Gray's Inn, which had tossed Bertha Cave's application aside nearly 
twenty years before, recognized the inevitability of admitting women on 
January 28, 1920 after the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) 
Act. Francis Cowper enthusiastically stated: 
Mrs. M.E. Share-Jones, the first woman student, joined the Inn. But 
the distinction of being the first woman was not to be hers. That was 
to be achieved by Miss Edith Hesling, admitted in October, 1 920, and 
called on June 13, 1923. She became Mrs. Bradbury and her daughter 
Anne was herself admitted in 1948 and called on June 6, 1 95 1 .  At 
Gray's Inn, more than any other Inn, women established themselves 
as part of the community on a footing of unembarrassed equality and 
a day came in Trinity Term, 1937, when the Treasurer, Lord Atkin, 
called to the Bar his daughter Mrs. Rosaline Youard.437 
That the climate surrounding the question of female admission to 
the bar had changed to a certain extent was evident from a rather rueful 
editorial in the Law Times which compared Williams to a woman equally 
learned in the law who did not have the opportunity to practice.438 The 
432. Ruby M. Wigle, Sisters in law, 6 CAN. B. REv. 419, 420 (1927). 
433. As early as 1904, Williams had objected loudly to the exclusion of women from the 
profession. See supra note 1:13 and accompanying text 
434. Wigle, supra note 432, at 420. 
435. The First Woman Solicitor, 86 JUST. PEACE 647 (1922). 
436. Id. 
437. COWPER, supra note 161, at 126. 
438. Occasional Notes, supra note 43 1,  at Jn. 
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Honourable Charlotte Sugden, daughter of Lord St. Leonards, "assisted 
her father in the writing of the well-known text-books in which opinions 
find their expression which are scarcely less authoritative than the judg­
ments of Lord St. Leonards. ""39 Miss Sugden appeared as a witness in the 
proving of Lord St. Leonards' s will, and "proved herself fully conversant 
with all legal technicalities and niceties, [and] in large measure deter­
mined the issue in the establishment of the will and of an important prin­
ciple of the law of evidence . . . . "440 
The question of married women at the bar continued to be a sticky 
one. 
Until recently, women had to sacrifice marriage as well as mother­
hood to become solicitors: in 1921 ,  1 8  per cent of women solicitors 
were married compared with 74 per cent of men; in 1951 ,  the propor­
tions were 24 and 70 per cent; and as late as 1966, only a third of all 
1 . d 441 women awyers were marne . 
As Theresa Doland (Cornelius), an American lawyer of the period, 
noted, when she eventually married: 
[I] had been practicing law about four years and I had accumulated 
somewhat of a practice, and I thought the name "Theresa Doland" 
was just as much stock in trade as anything I had and I was loath to 
give it up. I have looked up the subject very carefully and have stud­
ied the law upon it and I am of the opinion, if I understand it, that 
there is only one person in the state of Michigan that can stop me and 
that is Mr. Comelius.442 
VI. CONTINUING DEBATE 
A. Women as Members of Circuit and Session Messes 
The "'old boys' network" in the English legal profession extended 
to the circuit and session messes, which were both professional and so­
cial organizations allowing members of the profession to join together in 
congenial surroundings and share conversation, meals and experiences.""3 
These messes were described as "primarily social clubs,'"""' and partially 
served the same function as does membership in a private country club 
today .445 As one American lawyer explained: 
439. ld. 
440. Id. 
441. ABEL, supra note 18, at 174. 
442. Theresa Doland, Remarks at w Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Michigan Bar 
Association, 6 MICH. ST. BJ. 44, 45 (1926). 
443. Women Barristers and Bar Messes, 155 I.Aw 'TIMES 151 (1923) [hereinafter Women 
Barristers and Bar Messes /}. 
444. Id. 
445. "It's hard to imagine that a woman could have been pushed out of her job in favor of a man 
who could golf, but that's what happened to Susan Nichols in the early 1980s in a Philadelphia suburb." 
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Every London barrister, early in his career, joins a circuit. He usually 
selects one where he may be somewhat known to the solicitors, and 
where, perhaps, his family have property or associations. Formerly 
and, in fact, long after the advent of steam, judge and counsel "rode 
the circuit"-as was done in the early days of our own county Bars . . .  
. Each circuit has its "mess" with interesting traditions of midnight 
carousels and records of fines of bottles of port inflicted upon mem­
bers for various delinquencies. The modem mess, besides procuring 
special rates at the hotels, constitutes a sort of itinerant club; render­
ing possible a discipline for breaches of professional propriety by ex­
pulsion or denial or admission, which is  the most drastic punishment 
short of disbarment.446 
Membership in a circuit was both restricted and exclusive. 447 In order 
to maintain control of their members, the circuits increasingly imposed 
practices, including a type of blackballing, that allowed them to regulate 
appearances in particular courts and by particular barristers.448 
Women barristers quickly realized that exclusion from these socie­
ties meant exclusion from a very important part of the routine activities 
of their colleagues.449 Thus the question of women's entrance to these 
dining halls and reception areas became of great concern both to them 
and to their male colleagues.4so 
Immediately the limitations of legislation became apparent. The Sex 
Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 451 which required formal profes­
sional acceptance of women, could not mandate their personal or social 
acceptance by the vocal minority of men who did not want them there. 
The debate began almost immediately and writers waged it enthusi­
astically in the pages of the nation's  legal journals. Intoned the Law 
Times: "The Law Society has admitted women members to all the privi­
leges of membership and so have the Inns of Court. It is to be regretted 
that Circuit and Sessions Messes have not so far shown themselves 
Carolyne Zinko, Los Altos Hills Company Helps Put Women on Par, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1997, at Pl 
(discussing the role of country clubs to enhance business relationships). 
446. . THOMAS l£ARNING, A PHILADEI..PHIA LA WYER IN TIIE LoNOON COURTS 171-72 ( 191 1 ). 
447. ABEL, supra note 1 8, at rr!. 
448. Raymond Cocks, The Bar at Assizes: Barristers on Three Nineteenth Century Circuits, 6 
KINGSTON L. REV. 36, 40 (lrr76). 
449. Kinnear, supra note 85, at 41 1.  
450. Exclusion was a problem for some Canadian women students at exam time. 
One woman who graduated in the 1950s recollected that when the final examinations 
came to be written, the women were separated from the other students lest the men be 
distracted. "I was told by the Dean that . . .  their whole lives depended on their success in 
the exams . . . .  It would have been funny if it hadn't been so sick. Creating a stink would 
have done no good at all." 
Id. at 433. At my own law school, "ladies' clay," an occasion during the school year when only wom�n 
were called on (or harassed, depending on one's view), was a vanished but still remembered tradition in 
the early 1980s. 
45 1.  9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71 § l(b) (Eng.). 
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equally generous."452 However, it pointed out that women would find it 
difficult to join a group that did not want them as members.453 It sug­
gested a compromise: women should not have to pay for circuit sub­
scriptions if they cannot be admitted into the mess, but they might want 
to wait until more men were comfortable with the idea of their presence 
before pressing the issue.454 After all, they lost little by so doing except 
"the doubtful pleasure of dining in inadequate numbers at what is a 
men's dinner.'"'55 
Like the suggestion that women were incapable of understanding 
the "rules of the game," attitudes that echoed these comments were still 
in evidence fifty years later. 
The atmosphere of legal practice is strongly coloured by attitudes in­
dicative of male arrogance. . . . [M]ale condescension is expressed 
through archaic courtesy and banter and by a refusal to take women's 
ideas and actions seriously. This phenomenon may be a generalised 
feature of our society, but it is emphasised by the club-like character 
and mannered quality of the legal profession and by the absence of 
women in positions of power within it. By all accounts the manners 
that maketh the legal man can in certain circumstances be most op­
pressive to the legal woman.456 
The Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter agreed with the Law 
Times' s correspondent: 
[T]here are privacies of mess life which render it inconvenient to mix 
the sexes. On the other hand, it is obviously not equitable to exclude 
women altogether from the opportunities of gaining experience thus 
afforded to the Common Law Bar, and no one has proposed to do so. 
Various circuits and sessions are adopting slightly different plans, but 
the general scheme seems to be the admission of women to full rights 
of membership, but without the right · to attend mess, and conse­
quently without any subscription or a reduced subscription. In this 
way women receive all the usual benefits as regards notice of sittings, 
postal arrangements, attendance in court, court briefs, admission to 
the poor persons' defence list, and the like; while the seclusion of the 
masculine mess is preserved. Women, of course, can form a mess of 
their own and adopt a Bar hotel of their own in each circuit town; al­
though, except perhaps on the Home Circuit, their numbers are not 
likely to justify such a plan in the near future. On the whole, the pro­
posed compromise-which falls [sic] to be considered by most Bars 
at an early date-seems fair and liberal.457 
452. Women Barristers and Bar Messes I, supra note 443, at 1 5 1 .  
453. Women Barristers and Bar Messes, 155 L.Aw TIMES 196 (1923) [hereinafter Women 
Barristers and Bar Messes II]. Not being Groucho Marx, the ladies insisted on exclusion. 
454. Id. 
455. Id. 
456. SACHS & Wll.SON, supra note 3, at 179. 
457. Women Barristers and the Circuits, 67 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 179 (1922). 
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The suggestion that women barristers ought to be satisfied with the 
idea of either limited membership in an existing order or full member­
ship in a new order is a traditional one familiar to any minority group. 
Limited membership in the existing group consisted of privileges which 
the women were due in any case as full members of the profession. It 
carefully did not include those intangible but real benefits of membership 
that enhance professional relations through social interaction and nourish 
a career in a profession built on shared values and the ability to reach 
compromises through congenial and ongoing relationships. Likewise, 
creating a barristers' group consisting only of women members, while 
minimizing the problem of difficulties with males who did not want to 
associate with them, did not address the very question of the creation of 
and nurturing of professional and social relationships. Women barristers 
might very well get along famously, but they did not, to begin with, have 
the personal and professional connections that they needed to advance in 
the profession. Either suggestion . required nothing more from the men 
involved than that they tolerate the existence of women in the profession, 
and that they grant only those privileges that a majority might well feel 
were not sufficient, but that a significant minority felt were far and away 
the most that women could expect. Both journals implicitly recognized 
this fact. 
Neither the Law Times nor the Journal suggested that women might 
band together with like-minded men and start a mess which included 
both sexes, a suggestion that would have addressed the problem admira­
bly and would have sent a clear signal to the holdouts. Further, it negated 
the impression that a separate women ' s  mess would simply be the result 
of childish pique at not being included in an exclusive club. Eventually, 
one mess admitted women and breached the social wall: 
[A]t a Grand Night of the Bar Mess of the South-Eastern Circuit, held 
at Lewes on the 2nd inst., the question of admitting women barristers 
to the mess was discussed, and decided by a majority in favour of 
their admission. The election of two women candidates-Miss Bright 
Ashford and Miss Llewellyn Davies-was then proceeded with, and 
both candidates were elected. 4.18 
Some restrictions continued until 1964, including exclusion from 
activities other than meetings and some meal functions. 4.19 In that year, the 
Midland Circuit still banned women from all activities, presumably be­
cause they '"inhibit[ed] the atmosphere' and 'completely alter[ed] the 
character and nature' of the messes•'460 and amazingly disapproved of 
female participation in the mess "because they felt ' that in so doing [the 
458. Women Barristers and Bar Messes II, supra note 453, at 196. 459. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 156; see also ABEL-SMITH & STEVENS, supra not.e 351, at 43l-32 (noting that some circuits only allowed women to attend meetings and some dinners). 460. ABEL-SMrrn & STEVENS, supra note 351 ,  at 432. 
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women] are in some way advancing their professional chances. "'461 The Northern Circuit allowed women into meetings and selected dinners.462 
This combination of bad faith and misogyny resulted in the excoriation 
and expulsion of one young female who secreted herself in the hall dur­
ing a males-only concert at Gray's  Inn during which 
vulgar jokes and songs combine[d] with large quantities of drink . . . .  
This kind of episode typifies the traditional flavour of the Bar which, 
with few exceptions, is an echo of the public school, the military 
mess and the gentlemen's club. Women are just not "chaps"; and the 
men are certainly not prepared to make any concessions to make 
women feel more welcome.463 
Podmore and Spencer note, however, that even in the 1980s women 
solicitors and barristers continued to suffer from exclusion and hence, 
exclusion from the intangible but real advantages that membership in a 
profession dependent on social interaction could provide: 
In some professions-particularly in the law, but in medicine also­
the nature of social interaction is modelled on that of exclusive men's 
clubs. This "clubbable" atmosphere, which permeates the courts, bar­
risters' chambers, solicitors' practices and local law societies, is a 
considerable barrier for women to overcome . . . . Exclusion from full 
participation in the "club" and its activities is certain to inhibit the ca­
reers of women lawyers. 464 
B. The Issue ofWomen's Dress in Court 
The obvious symbolism inherent in allowing women to take meals 
with their male colleagues while riding the circuits was only one of the 
gender-related issues that confronted the profession. The garb of the 
English lawyer is one of the most distinctive symbols of that walk of life. 
The debate over whether women called to the bar should either be re­
quired or allowed to affect the robe and wig of the English barrister was 
somewhat heated.465 For male opponents, the traditional barrister's 
.
dre� 
symbolized exclusivity both through gender and through profession. 
The traditional dominance and power of the male was reinforced �ough 
his control of the legal apparatus.467 To allow women to practice law 
might have become a necessary evil. It did not follow that �ey should 
also be permitted to wear the costume of the law, thus creatmg an �­
drogynous look that made it more difficult for onlookers to determme 
461 . Id. 
462. Id. at 43 l . 
463. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 1 56-57. 
464. Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 29-30. 
465. Wig Debate, BARRISTERS & Souc. J., Apr. I, 1922, at 81 . 
466. Id. 
467. Id. 
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which of the barrister class were legitimate and which were recent inter­
lopers. 
In Ireland, women wore the traditional wig, apparently without any 
comment, an outcome which the Justice of the Peace found "ludicrous . . 
. . It is generally assumed that no such outrage will occur here, and that 
women practitioners will be required to substitute for the wig a black 
biretta. The principle is clear. A women [sic] in Court as in church 
should have a head-covering, which technically a wig is not.''468 Entrusted 
with the duty of making this momentous decision was a committee of 
five "eminent judges," including the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of 
the Rolls.469 Citing the Daily News, the Barristers' and Solicitors' Jour­
nal continued: 
The five judges have so far had no feminine adviser to assist them at 
their deliberations. One of the proposals made by the Judges' 
Committee is that women barristers should wear a cap similar to that 
worn by the women graduates aild undergraduates at Oxford, but the 
women students who are reading for the Bar are said to be in favour 
of wearing wigs, and it is probably that they will be asked their 
opinion before the judges' decision is made absolute. Some definite 
rules will also have to be laid down in regard to the dress to be worn 
under the gown. As it is against etiquette for barristers to wear light 
suits, it is probably that women will be prohibited from wearing 
coloured blouses and skirts, low necks, and short sleeves, when in the 
courts . . . . 470 
The editor of the Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal added that 
"[t]he question has not created any difficulty in Ireland, where lady bar­
risters wear the same style of wig and bands as men. The effect is cer­
tainly far from ludicrous. It is regarded as very becoming to the lady 
wearers. "411 In the early 1990s, barristers were still debating the wig 
question: 
The Commercial Bar Association, representing 500 commercial 
lawyers, argues that many consider wigs to be uncomfortable and 
outmoded, and that they can alienate and intimidate people in court. 
They have backing from the highest echelons of the legal pro­
fession. In an interview with the BBC yesterday, the new Lord Chief 
!ustice, Baron ?"aylor of Gosforth, admitted that the " 18th century 
unage enshrouding the law is one of the factors which makes us seem 
out of touch." 
He added: "I do not believe we are really out of touch, but I 
have made no secret of the fact that I believe we should probably 
468. Id. 
469. Id. 
470. Id. 
47 1 .  Id. 
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shed wigs and robes. However, I would not fire into doing that with­
out consultation and without seeing what we are going to do, which is 
not quite as simple as it may seem. 
"One could just have ordinary suits or one could have the kind 
of gown they have in the United States, or various other alternatives 
which we have to look at closely .'9472 
401 
However, some male barristers now find a female colleague's wig an 
incredible attraction: 
But for many the wig is an evocative and inseparable element of 
the practice of law, with all its faults. One male barrister said: "It's 
about the sexiest thing a woman can wear. There is something about 
the severity of a wig that makes any woman look attractive." 
Woman lawyers, understandably, wish to distance themselves 
from such antediluvian attitudes. Helena Kennedy, one of the coun­
try's best-known female QCs, said: "I feel strongly that part of the 
mystification of the law is added to by the wearing of the garb which 
alienates many people from the legal process. 
"I want to see the wig go, particularly in criminal courts, where 
people can be very fearful. I think the majority of people in the pro­
fession are confident of their own success and don 't need the prop of 
fancy dress."473 
The Committee of Judges and Benchers of the Inns of Court ended 
by recommending the same dress for both men and women barristers, 
which upset some people in the legal press: 
The Committee of Judges and Benchers of the Inns of Court 
who have been considering what would be the appropriate robes for 
women to wear in court after their call to the Bar have "expressed a 
wish" that the dress of women barristers in court shall conform to the 
following rufos:--( 1) Ordinary barrister's wigs should be worn and 
should completely cover and conceal the hair. (2) Ordinary barrister's 
gowns should be worn. (3) Dresses should be plain, black or very 
dark, high to the neck, with long sleeves, and not shorter than the 
gown, with high, plain white collar and barrister's bands; or plain 
coats and skirts may be worn, black or very dark, not shorter than the 
gown, with plain white shirts and high collars and barrister's bands.474 
472. Gervase Webb, The Law Wants a Verdict on Wigs in Court, EVENING STANDARD (London), 
Apr. 28, 1992, at 14. 
473. Id. Sexuality as an undercunent in the relationship of (male) lawyers to their chosen 
profession should be obvious from the traditional saying that the law is a jealous mistress. "I will not 
say, with Lord Hale, that 'The Law will admit of no rival . . .  . '  but I will say, that it is a jealous 
mistress, and requires a long and constant courtship. It is not to be won by trifling favors, but by lavish 
homage." Joseph Story, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in MlscELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF 
JOSEPH STORY 503, 523 (William W. Story ed., 1852). 
474. Women Barristers, 66 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 411 ,  41 1 (1922). 
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After reporting this unsatisfactory compromise, the �olicit
ors' 
Journal and Weekly Reporter objected to th� �ight of wom�n m the
 tra­
ditional barrister's garb.415 The wig was traditionally a man s head cov­
ering, not a woman's, sniped the Journal, and .
"as much out of place �n a 
woman's head as any masculine article of attire-we forbear to particu-
larize-on her body. "416 
This disapproval was as much a function of its unwill
.
ingne�s t? deal 
with the niceties of the wig' s  positioning on the head as its objection to 
this change in custom. Sir Herbert Stephens' concerns about the manner 
of wearing the wig evoked the Journal to fuss: 
The wig must "completely cover and conceal the hair." How shock­
ing should a stray lock emerge ! Sir Herbert says it cannot be done 
when the hair is "bobbed"; but how does he know what that means? 
And with other modes the wig will give a "hydrocephalous, ungainly, 
and ludicrous appearance." "Hydrocephalous" sounds forcible, 
though we are glad it is not of our using.m 
The Journal defensively concluded: 
It may be said that our criticism is destructive . . . .  What have we to 
say constructively? But that is really for the Committee when the 
matter is referred back to the them-as it ought to be-for re­
consideration. At any rate, they need not encourage the women to ape 
the men in their dress. B oth Sir Herbert Stephens and Lieut-Col. 
Hawkes. . . offer suggestions-a biretta, or toque, or coif. But, no 
doubt, the best solution would be just his or her own natural hair for 
everybody .478 
By contrast a New York judge objected to female hat-wearing in his 
court.419 As one legal reporter pointed out, women traditionally wore hats 
even in places of worship; to fixate on the headgear, rather than on the 
thoughts coming out of the head it covered, seemed inordinately petty.480 
Indeed, the traditional garb associated with the English Bar dates 
only from the 1 7th century.481 B efore that, the long gown seems to have 
475. Women Barristers and Wigs, 66 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 40 1 ,  40 1  (1922). 
476. Id. 
477 .  Id. 
478. Id. (citation omitted). Hair seems to be a continuing concern for critics of women attorneys. 
Note the inane discussions of Marcia Clark's new hairstyle during the OJ. Simpson trial. See CNN & 
Company (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1995). See also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Johnnie Cochran 
& Marcia Clark: Role Models?, in PoSTMORTEM: THE OJ. SIMPSON CASE 1 17, 121, 124. (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996) (discussing undue attention given Clark's hairstyle and clothing throughout trial). 
479. Women Lawyers at the Bar with Hats On, 14 1..A w NOTES 122, 1 22 (1910). 
480. Id. Virginia Drachrnan quotes nineteenth-century U.S. attorney Lelia Robinson as remarking that � hat was a. tremendous tacti� proble� f?r a woman lawyer: "Shall the woman attorney wear her hat when argumg a case or making a motton m court . . . or shall she remove it?" Drachman supra note 255, at 2414. • 
481. J.H. Baker, The Origin of the Bar Gown, 49 1..AWGUARDIAN 1 7  (1969). 
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been worn traditionally by both "learned" persons and the male lay 
population.�2 Further, it seems that lawyers in general wore simple long 
gowns of various colors.43 The familiar black robe seems to have gained 
favor only after the reign of Henry VII ( 1485-1509).484 After the reign of 
Charles II (1660- 1685), when it represented mourning for the dead king, 
the profession finally formally adopted it as official lawyers' garb.�s 
Wigs seem to have come into fashion after the Inns of Court prohibited 
benchers, particularly the ebullient young adventurers of the Tudor and 
Stuart courts, from wearing "hats, cloaks, boots spurs, swords, daggers 
and long hair'- which symbolized the aggressive practices antithetical to 
a dispassionate and nonviolent dispute resolution regime. Because those 
so regulated were male, we may postulate that wigs became more associ­
ated with that sex than with the other, thus the argument that wigs are a 
male and not a female "head covering." Such an argument smacks of the 
contemporary assertion among French male avocats that a decree of the 
Paris Parlement of 1 540 forbidding lawyers from sporting facial hair is 
proof that women should continue to be barred from the profession, since 
women have none.�' 
Once the committee made the decision that women and men barris­
ters should dress alike, the bar discouraged women from retaining any 
mar.ks of female attire: 
Meticulous rules are imposed and their strict interpretation endlessly 
discussed. To be the very model of a perfect lady barrister means 
looking as indistinguishable as possible from one's male colleagues. 
Warnings are given at an early stage in one's career to remove dress 
rings and nail polish when appearing before a certain lady judge. 
"Dresses or blouses should be long-sleeved and high to the neck . . . .  
Wigs should, as far as possible, cover the hair, which should be 
drawn back from the face and forehead, and if long enough should be 
put up.',488 
Clearly the "sex kitten" or "siren" look is out of place. 
482. Id. 
483. J.H. Baker, The History of the Gowns Worn at the English Bar, 9 COSTUME 15 (1975). 
484. Id. 
485. Id. 
486. Baker, supra note 481,  at 17. 
487. The argument states: 
On invoqua serieusemenl un a"ete du Parlemenl de 1540 qui 'in1erdit aux avocats de 
porter la barbe et la moustache.' C' etait done que les femmes ne peuvent etre avocates. Et 
cette objection nous etonne; l'a"ete suppose au contraire que lesfemmes on1, par avance, 
respecte le texte, puisqu' elles ne portent ni la barbe ni la moustache. 
[They cite seriously a decree of the Parliament from 1540 that "prohibits lawyers from 
having a beard or a moustache." This meant that women could not be lawyers. And that 
objection astounds us; the decree assumes on the contrary that women have in advance 
complied with its words, because they wear neither beards nor moustaches.) 
CORCOS, supra note 134, at 1 9  (translation by author); see Corcos, supra note 37, at 455. 
488. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159 (citing Notes for Guidance on Dress in Court, in BAR 
CouNC:n: s ANNUAL STATEMFNJ' 52 (1973)). 
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These rules are sacred to the heart of the older woman practitioner, 
going back to the days when admission to a man's world w�9 
sue� a 
privilege that women confonned even in their mode of dress. To �ts 
credit the Special Committee refused to act as
. 
a watchdog of skirt 
lengths and referred the question of �ess 
.
straight back !O. the B� Council. It is extraordinary how much time is waste! on tnv1a of this 
kind while the real problems continue to be ignored. 
Like dress, language did and does carry mean�� �yond the literal. 
The arrogance of the male lawyer continued to d1m1msh the efforts of 
women attorneys into the 1970s and 1980s: 
One County Court judge in Berkshire who had a notorious reputation 
as a misogynist used to refer to women barristers . in open court as 
"chorus girls" and "silly girls". During a road acc1d�nt case, �here 
the woman driver was represented by a woman hamster, the Judge 
gratuitously gave the court the benefit of �is . jaundiced_ 
view . of 
women drivers. The male counsel for the plamtiff obsequiously m­
quired if the judge held the same views of women barristers. This sort 
of male togetherness is frequently used in a competitive way to un­
dermine the professional confidence of women practitionerS.491 
VD. THE ENTRY OF WOMEN INTO PROFESSIONS RELATED TO LAW 
In general, the objections to women's  entry or full participation in 
the legal profession paralleled objections to their entry or full participa­
tion in other professions. 
489. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159-60. To a great extent this seems to continue to be true both 
in court and in law school. Christine Farley tells the story of a male colleague who counseled her to 
modify her style of dress in order not to convey the wrong impression to students concerning her 
expectations for class performance. 
As he saw it, I either need  to in fact be nice, or, alternatively appear not to be nice. I 
explained to him that I had already decided that it was not my goal to be nice, and I 
wondered why students would draw the contrary conclusion when my actions had not 
betrayed my intentions. lben he commented on my appearance. Noting that I was 
wearing a sweater, he told me that as a young woman I could not afford to wear anything 
"soft." He suggested instead that I wear dark, "severe-looking" suit jackets. 
Farley, supra note 1 1, at 344. 
During a break from a winter 1995 CIE session a female Cleveland Heights judge admired my 
deep purple wool coat, then told me she hoped I reali7.ed I could never wear that color in court. On 
another occasion, a male colleague at my fonner law school and I were discussing dress with a Jaw 
student My colleague pointed out that my turtleneck sweater, blazer and wool skirt were quite 
appropriate and attractive for an academic environment but "of course" would never do in court, and 
that his own dark suit was marginal for a court appearance, but gave him a somewhat more severe image than he would have liked for classroom teaching. 
490. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159-60. However, some women as well as men regretted the 
loss of women's special, protected status. Mary Lathrop, the first woman admitted to the American Bar 
Association, commented: "I'm rather tired of rights. I'd love to have a few privileges." Virginia G. 
Drachman, � New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge of Sexual Equality in Early Twenlieth-Cennuy 
America, 28 IND. L REV. 227, 2'1:/ ( 1995). 
491 .  Kennedy, supra note 158, at 157. &e also Delfs, supra note 15 (discussing gender bias in the 
courtroom). 
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A. The Judicial Branch 
The horror that solicitors such as G.B. Crook felt at the thought of 
females on the bench492 and the ambivalence that J.A. Symmonds ex­
pressed493 were only two of the reactions to the thought of female magis­
trates. The English legal journal Justice of the Peace observed that the 
reception accorded the recently introduced Justices of the Peace (Qualifi­
cation of Women) Bill 
justifies the anticipation that this refonn in our judicial system may 
be looked for at an early date . . . .  The principle which is thus to have 
legislative effect given to it is an important one, although its adoption 
into the law of the land would not be likely to have anything like the 
direct result which followed from the recent concession of the par-
1. fr h" 494 1amentary anc 1se to women. 
In its discussion of the proposed legislation, the journal pinpointed the 
problem with much of the long tenn parliamentary attempt to grant 
women equal civil and political rights.495 The legislation drafted suffered 
from one of two flaws.496 Either it was ineffectively written, so that those 
so inclined could find, with the assistance of like-minded judges, ways to 
circumvent the intended application of the statute,497 or it was written so 
that it granted women a severely limited scope of participation.498 Thus, 
Parliament often needed to revisit questions it had alre.ady considered: 
[W]hile there is in theory no limit to the number of justices who may 
be appointed in any county, in practice the number is adjusted to what 
are likely to be the demands on the time of the holders of the office, 
and new members are appointed only as and when the step is neces­
sary to keep the roll at its normal strength. The Bill merely provides 
that in making a selection to fill up such vacancies the claims of a 
woman to selection shall not be ignored because of the fact that she is 
a woman. The removal of the disqualification of women to sit as jus­
tices where they would but for their sex become justices ex officio is 
all the more notable that the common law disability of women in this 
respect has been so recently affirmed by Parliament. The Qualifica­
tion of Women (County and Borough Councils) Act, 1907, section 1, 
when granting admission to local offices to women provided that a 
woman if elected as chairman of a county council or mayor of a bor­
ough should not by virtue of holding or having held that office be a 
justice of the peace.499 
492. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 410-ll .  
493. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429. 
494. Women on the Bench, 83 JUST. PEACE 246 (1919). 
495. Id. 
496. Id. 
497. Id. 
498. Id. 
499. Id. 
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The journal predicted that women wo�ld, by vu:ue of _
ne��r legislation 
written to remove impediments to therr occupation of JUd1c1al seats, de­
cide cases before they argued them, although it expressed this thought in 
language that could be taken either as admiration or as disapproval: "It 
would not be out of keeping with their traditional disregard for common­
place paths of progress if women attained to the bench before reaching 
the bar ... soo 
B. Juries 
While participation on a jury is not a professional occupation, it 
does serve as a basic part of the English legal system. Thus, female par­
ticipation on juries was a matter of continuing debate throughout the 
period. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act allowed the excuse of 
women "because of the character of the issues involved or the evidence 
to be given. "501 Some men apparently went to great lengths to avoid jury 
duty themselves, even putting their property in their wives' names.502 
C. The Legislature 
1 .  House of Commons 
The right of women over the age of thirty to vote for members of 
the House of Commons was granted through the Representation of the 
People Act of 191 8501 and their right to be elected to the Commons was 
established through the Parliament Act of 1918,504 even though it was 
"not a fit place for any respectable woman to sit in."505 In 1 9 1 9, Nancy, 
Viscountess Astor,506 became the frrst woman to be elected to that branch 
of the legislature, succeeding her husband, who had been elevated to the 
House of Lords.507 The L<iw Times noted that in Lady Astor' s  case, 
500. Id. 
501. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, 83 Jusr. PEACE 330 (1919). See Sex Disqualification 
(Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, Ch 71,  § l(b) (Eng.) (stating women may be exempted "by 
reason of the nature of evidence to be given or the issues to be tried''). The Jurors (Scotland) Act was 
amended in 1920 to allow women to serve as jurors. See The Jurors (Scotland) Act of 1920, 10 & 11  
Geo. 5,  ch. 53, § 1(1)  (Eng.). 
502. See Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification o/Women) Bill, 63 SOuc. J. & WKLY. REP. 500, 
501 (1919). 
503. Representation of the People Act of 1918, 8 Geo. 5, ch. 64 (Eng.). 
5�. The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1 918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.). As one 
American commentator pointed out, while women under 30 could not vote, they could be elected to the 
Commons at any age, which was also true of the Netherlands. See Women Members of Parliament, 13 
AM. Pot.. So. REv. 1 14, 1 15 (1919) [hereinafter Women Members) . 
505. See Women Members, supra note 504, at 1 14. 
5_06. lady Astor was the fonner Nancy Langhorne, a member of an old, established Virginia 
family. See DicnONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1961-1970, at 43 (Supp. 1981). 
507. See Occasional Notes, 148 LAW TiMEs 218, 219 (1919) [hereinafter Lady Astor]. The custom 
of w� succeeding their husbands to a legislative position has since become somewhat notorious in the Urutcd States. In 1972, Lindy Boggs of Louisiana succeeded her husband, the late Hale Boggs, in 
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the personal equation invests her presence in the House of Commons 
with surroundings absolutely unique and unparalleled. The first 
woman member . . .  who has been elected to that assembly for the 
discharge of Parliamentary duties was not, strange to say, born a 
British subject. Lady Astor is by birth an American citizen, and has 
become a British subject by marriage. She is accordingly qualified for 
election and sitting and voting in the House of Commons under the 
provisions of recent legislation by the fact of her marriage with a 
British citizen.508 
407 
That Lady Astor would not have been eligible for her seat had she 
not been married was an ironic circumstance not lost on the article's 
author. Further, her husband was the son of a naturalized British subject 
who only obtained his right to sit in the Lords upon the passage of the 
Naturalization Act of 1 870,SO'J which allowed naturalized citizens not born 
the U.S. House of Representatives. See Lindy Boggs to the Vatican, THE HCYJUNE, Apr. 18, 1997, at 
142. Muriel Humphrey was named to her late husband's Senate seat on January 25, 1978. See Patricia 
Grice, FYI: Time Capsule, STAR·l'RIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 20, 1997, at 18. Lurleen Wallace was 
elected governor of the state of Georgia in 1966, succeeding her husband George who could not 
succeed himself. See The Associated Press, Jan. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4408437 (listing key 
dates in the life of fonner Alabama Governor George C. Wallace). Much earlier, Rose McConnell Long 
finished out her dead husband's Senate tenn. See Jane McKee, The Roll Call Quiz, ROLL CALL, July 17, 
1995. Later, another Long widow, Cathy, succeeded her husband, U. S. Representative Gillis Long. See 
Mitchell Locin, Clout Southern Style: When It Comes to Politics, Chicago Ain't Got Nothin' on the 
Pelican State, Cm. TRIB., June 2, 1985, at Cl8. 
Some of these women were undeniably able, and had simply put their husbands' careers ahead 
of their own political ambitions, as women have traditionally been expected to do. The jury is still out 
on others. One commentator wrote: 
rrJhe United States, in a strange and sentimental nepotism, prefers widows. Perhaps it is 
our idea that the American woman is a kind of clinging ivy to her husband's oak; that 
they are two minds with but a single thought, and that a constituency which has found 
itself admirably represented by a husband, unfortunately deceased, can have equal and 
identical perfection by electing his widow to take his place. Perhaps it takes a particular 
kind of ability to live with one of our masculine representatives at Washington; the 
characteristic of being a good mixer, say; of being able to deal with refractory and wilful 
personalities; and any one who survives that association may have durable and excellent 
personal qualities. Or perhaps we merely wish to pay a sentimental tribute, of the kind we 
offer when we subscribe to a memorial window: something to please the family. 
Alzada Comstock, Women Members of European Parliments, 20 AM. PoL. Sa. REV. 379, 383-84 
(1926). At least one influential contemporary commentator interprets this tendency more cynically, 
calling it the "Aashdance" phenomenon, after the popular film· of the same name in which an aspiring 
dancer has her way to the top smoothed by a sympathetic, attractive, and wealthy suitor (a late-twentieth 
century retelling of the Cinderella story, CHARLEs PERRAULT, CINDERELLA, OR TIIE UITLE GLASS 
SUPPER (1954)). See FARRELL, supra note 15, at 91-100 (1988). 
In real life, almost all of America's one hundred wealthiest women made their 
personal fortunes on their husband's' or father's death, and many women with power 
flashdanced to it on their husband's death, such as Helen Copley, who quit her job as a· 
secretary when she married the president of Copley Enterprises on her husband's death, 
or female U.S. Senators such as Muriel Humphrey, elected with no prior experience upon 
the death of Hubert Humphrey; or Margaret Chase Smith, elected after the death of 
Senator Smith; or Katherine Graham of the Washington Post, or Joan Kroc of 
McDonald's. 
Id. at 58-59. While parts of Farrell's book appear to be special pleading, he docs point out many of the 
critical areas in which men's and women's socialization tend to promote misunderstanding. 
508. Lady Astor, supra note 507, at 219. 
509. The Naturaliz.ation Act of 1 870, 33 Viet., ch. 14 (Eng.). 
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of English parents to sit in either House.51° Further, as �e wife o� a peer 
and a member of the aristocracy, Lady Astor could be tned for crunes by 
the Lords by virtue of her sex, and yet she could not occupy a seat there. 
Her membership in the Commons, coupled with her husband's se
.
at in the 
Lords, made legal nonsense of the old idea that husband and wife were 
"one person in law: " 
A statute of Henry VI. declares the law to be that peeresses in their 
own right or by marriage shall be tried before the same judicature as 
other peers of the realm. . . .  It would be an interesting question 
whether a peeress by marriage who was also a member of the House 
of Commons would, on a charge of felony, be of trial of nobility or 
trial as a commoner by a judge and jury. A wife in the House of 
Commons with a husband in the House of Lords upsets absolutely 
and completely the old idea of the rights and obligations involved in 
the marriage status. From the earliest times it has been laid down as a 
fundamental principle of law, a principle upon which the whole law 
relating to husband and wife . . .  has depended, that by virtue of the 
marriage a husband and wife become one person in law . . . .  Viscount 
Astor in the House of Lords and Lady Astor as the occupant of a seat 
in the House of Commons . . .  are, though husband and wife, not one 
person in law . . . .  The election of a married woman to the House of 
Commons may be regarded as a death warrant to all the disabilities 
entailed by coverture on the persons, the property, or the transactions 
of married women.51 1  
An American observer of the period quoted Lady Astor's wry commen­
tary on her political style and that of a female colleague: 
Lady Astor's own description of her own methods is given in the 
following words by Marjorie Shuler in the American Review of Re­
views for January 1 924: "I get very keen on a thing and go after it. 
The men say 'There's that terrible woman' ;  and they run away from 
me. They tum to Mrs. Wintringham and say, 'There' s  that good, kind, 
homely women; let's  talk to her' .  And Mrs. Wintringham just smiles 
and smiles, and skins them alive-but they don' t  know it."'512 
510. Id. 
5 1 1. Lady Astor, sup�a note 507, at 219 (citation omitted). Nancy, Viscountess Astor, was the 
woman, who once told W111Ston Churchill, "Winston, if you were my husband I should flav 
fti "th · " "Madam " Ch hil 
or your 
co ee WJ poison. • urc I replied, "if I were your husband I should drink "t" Cathe · 
Fitzpatrick, Well Equipped, MILWAUKEE J. SEN"11NEL, July 13 ,  1997, at I .  
I nne 
512. Comstock, supra note 507, at 380. Comstock also discusses wo be f the Ge 
S edish C _ _._ 1 aki 
men mem rs o nnan, 
w , """"uos ov an, FIJlllish, Hungarian U S Dutch and Norwe · I · I · tha Th · thin odd 
' 
· . 
., .' gian eg1s atures, noting t ere is some g . about the geographical position of the countries in which these women members, deputies and senators, are to be found. They exist in a fringe around the no� and east of Europe. �ranee, Italy, Spain, and the other countries along the Mediterranean are out of It entirely To fi d th f · di 
· · · · 10 e group o women Ieg1slators of longest 
f;
stan ng, rthone must go up ���nd the Scandinavian countries, to the Finns, who Jive arther no . than any other c1v1hz.ed people in the world. 
What 1s there about the barren north hi h · 
medi · and l"ti ? An 
. w c stimulates women to go into law, cme, po 1 cs · d what is there about blue Mediterranean skies which keeps 
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Lady Astor soon had a third colleague, Mrs. Clara Phillipson. Political 
wags nicknamed the three female members of the Commons "Society" 
(Lady Astor), "Sobriety" (Mrs. Wintringham) and "Variety" (Mrs. Phil­
lipson, who had been an actress).513 The 1924 Labour Government 
brought in Margaret B ondfield, a former shop assistant whose interests 
were workers' rights and who became the first woman member of a 
British govemment.514 
2. House of Lords 
After the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act,515 the 
question arose concerning women's eligibility for the House of Lords as 
well. The Solicitors' Journal pointed out that the Sex Disqualification 
(Removal) Act was "framed in very general and wide terms"516 and 
agreed that Parliament had only envisioned election to the House of 
Commons.511 It may have seemed that the spirit of legislation like the 
Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act518 and the Sex Disqualification 
(Removal) Acf 19 which seemed to confer on women the same political 
rights as men should have addressed the problem of peeresses like Vis­
countess Rhondda,520 but discussion in the Lords resulted in a decision to 
consign that issue to a specific enabling statute. 
A committee appointed in 1922 found that no existing piece of leg­
islation, including the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1 9 1 9,521 
specifically removed the disability. In its eyes, membership in the House 
of Lords was neither a civil or judicial office or post, nor a profession or 
vocation: 
them out of the professions and out of politics, and induces them to spend their days 
running little shops? 
Id. at 379. Weather may have something to do with it, but the religious and political orientations of 
these countties also encourage or discourage the recognition of and respect for women's achievements 
to varying degrees. 
5 13. Id. at 380. 
514. Id. at 380-81. 
515. Sexual Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § l(b) (Eng.). 
5 16. Alteration of Women's Legal Status, 64 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 250 (1 920). 
517.  Id. The journal further clucked that a very similar piece of legislation passed in New South 
Wales did not correspond exactly with the British statute. "This question of sex-equality legislation 
seems to be one of those in which uniformity throughout the Empire would be desirable." Id. 
5 1 8. The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.). 
519. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10  Geo. 5, ch. 71, § l(b) (Eng.). 
520. Regarding peeresses, Francis Palmer stated: 
Peeresses, whether they be peeresses by birth, by creation, or by marriage, are 
entitled to the same privileges as peers, but if a peeress by marriage should afterwards 
intermarry with a commoner, she forfeits her privileges. By the Lords' Standing Orders, 
No. 53, it is ordered and declared by the Lords that privilege of Parliament shall not be 
allowed to minor peers, noble women, or widows of peers, saving their right of peerage. 
FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, PEERAGE LAW IN ENGLAND 152 (1978). Peeresses could, however, be 
tried in the House of Lords. Id. at 1 8  (citing 20 Hen. 6, ch. 9 (Eng.); 6 Geo. 4, ch. 66, § 12 (Eng.)). 
521. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71 ,  § 1  (Eng.). Viscountess Rhondda commented rather sourly that the 
word "removal" "had never succeeded in getting outside its brackets." SHIRLEY M. EoFF, VISCOUNTESS 
RHONDDA: EQUALIT ARIAN FEMINIST 87 (1991 ). 
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A person shall not be disqualified by sex or �arriage from �e exer­
cise of any public function, or from being appomted to or holdmg any 
civil or judicial office or post, or from entering or _
as�uming or �arry­
ing on any civil profession or vocation, or for achmss1on to any m�or­
porated society (whether incorporated by Royal Charter or otherwise) S22 
The committee's procedure in reaching its decision was met with some 
derision: 
[N]o report, however ably drafted, can alter the fact that the proce­
dure adopted is open to grave objection. At the first hearing the then 
Attorney-General intimated that he could not dispute the soundness of 
Lady Rhondda 's construction of the statute, and the Committee re­
ported accordingly, whereupon the House recommitted the matter in 
order that a full Committee might hear the present Attorney-General 
argue against a submission that his predecessor in office had pro­
nounced unassailable ! Naturally the proceedings wore a certain air of 
unreality.523 
Apparently, the committee also made the suggestion that legislative 
history was necessary to determine the exact intent of Parliament with 
regard to the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act.524 Since the Interpreta­
tion Act was intended to address just such questions, appeal to parlia­
mentary debate was unusual and probably illegitirnate.m Early in the 
debate over the 1 9 1 9  Act, however, the Justice of the Peace sniffed that 
the press had misunderstood the intent of the bill and addressed itself 
particularly to the question of Viscountess Rhondda and other women 
holding titles in their own right: 
If we may judge from the Press notices, clause 2 seems to be a good 
deal misunderstood. It merely provides that in the patent of any peer­
age granted in the future there may be a valid limitation authorising 
the holder, if a woman, to sit and vote in the House of Lords. The po­
sition of women who are now peeresses in their own right is not in­
tended to be affected.526 
It also noted that the Government might legitimately continue to close 
the civil and foreign services to women.527 
Th� House of Lords proved the Justice of the Peace right in its in­
terpretation. The Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords did not 
read the wording of this statute to include a peeress•  s right to sit as an 
522. 
523. 
524. 
525. 
526. 
527. 
9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.). 
IAdy Rhondda's Case, 86 JUST. PE.A.CE 255, 255 (1922). 
9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71 ,  § 1 (Eng.). 
IAdy Rhondda's Case, supra note 523, at 255. 
The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, supra note 501 ,  at 330. 
Id. 
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equal among that body.'28 While Viscountess Rhondda could both vote 
for and serve in the House of Commons, she could not take her seat as a 
peeress of the Realm. For the Committee, the Sex Disqualification (Re­
moval) Act of 1919, was "not sufficient to carry out so momentous a 
revolution in the constitution of the House of Lords."'29 For the Law 
Times this result was understandable but regrettable: 
When such acknowledged experts [as Lord Haldane and Lord Birk­
enhead] differ, it is difficult to express any opinion, but it must now 
be taken that the House of Lords is the only place where women are 
forbidden to exercise any public function, and where men alone have 
"a seat, place, and voice." In this country we have no Salic law, and a 
woman may fill the highest place in the Empire. Women as common­
ers may give their services to the State in the House of Commons, 
and no logical or other reason exists why a woman, a peeress in her 
own right, should be excluded from the other estate of the realm.s30 
In 1 925, Lord Astor attempted to remedy the situation with a bill, which 
was defeated by a two-vote majority,'3' even though backers attempted to 
make a strong historical argument in support: 
Ladies of birth and quality sat in council with the Saxon Witas. In 
Wightred's great council at Beconcild, A.D. 699, the Abbesses sat 
and deliberated, and five of them signed the decrees of that council 
along with the king, bishops, and nobles. In Henry m and Edward I's 
time four Abbesses were summoned to Parliament, viz.: of Shaftes­
bury, Berking St. Mary, of Winchester, and of Wilton, In the 35th 
[sic] of Edward m were summoned by writ to Parliament to appear 
there by their proxies Countess of Norfolk, Countess of Onnonde, 
Countess of March, Countess of Pembroke, Countess of Oxford, and 
Countess of Atholl. These ladies were called ad colloquium et tracta­
tum: "The old prerogatives of the Crown have not perished, nor can 
they become obsolete through desuetude. Nullum tempus occurrit 
Regi." Mr. Bagehot on one occasion recommended a persual of the 
pages of Comyn's Digest, or any other such book, under the title Pre­
rogative; and Mr. Freeman has observed that it is hard to see how, ex­
cept when they have been taken away by Act of Parliament, any p�w­
ers which were exercised by Edward I (among them the summonmg 
of women to the House of Lords) could be refused to Queen Victoria. 
If writs of summons to peeresses in their own right were issued in the 
exercise of the prerogative, the House of Lords would hav� n� power, 
and probably no desire, to prevent the entry of these ladies mto the 
Gilded Chamber.s32 
528. Id. 
529. The Law and the lawyers: Peeresses andParliament, 154 �W TIMES  �· I (1922). 
530. Id. Note the reference to the French, who admitted women m 1900. Shirley M. Eoff devo
tes 
several pages to the fight to enter the House of Lords. See IloFF, supra note 521,  at 81-88· 
53 1 .  Peeresses in the House of Lords, 29 LAW NOTFS 'fl (1925). 
532. Id. 
412 DENVER UNNERS/1Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2 
Note the rejection of the argument advanced in the Chorlton and Bebb 
cases, that a sort of latches barred women's rights in this area. 
D. The Police 
In February 1920, the Home Secretary established a committee to 
inquire into the entry of women onto the police force.'" Its report ap­
peared on July 24, l 920.s34 Commenting favorably on the performance of 
women during the war, the committee recommended that they be used 
particularly in cases of violence against women or children.''� In a com­
ment that seems to reiterate the suggestion that women simply "did not 
get it," the committee believed that w omen police officers should be 
strongly impressed, as indeed all police officers should be, with the 
necessity of getting the victim's story unadulterated with the sugges­
tions of the statement taker. Specializing in work of this kind is apt to 
give the latter a subconscious desire to get a statement so complete 
that it will exclude the defences which his or her experience teaches 
are usually set up, with the unhappy result, at least in the case of a 
child, that by the time she comes to give evidence in court, she is no 
longer telling her experience, but reciting a statement. �.1{) 
It is tempting to see in this caution a suggestion that w omen police offi­
cers would be more sympathetic, thus less objective and less profes­
sional, in obtaining statements from young victims of abuse or violence. 
If this inference is accurate, was the committee also slyly suggesting that 
women police officers are not as intellectually or psychologically capa­
ble as male officers overall? 
Certainly at least some of the members of the committee thought 
that women police officers were not as physically able to carry out all 
duties required of an officer. "The committee think [sic] that police­
women should not be required to perform duties which necessarily in­
volve �e exercise of physical force and exposure to physical danger, and 
upon this they base a recommendation that, normally, the pay of police­
�o�en should be l?wer than that of policemen."537 But, "[t]hey will fin.d 1t �tfficult to convm_ce the women of the justice of their view on this pomt. The women will probably argue that while men are fitter for some 
duties, they are fitter for others, and that both kinds of fitness should be 
533. Women Police, 84 JUST. PEACE 355, 360 (1920). 534. Id. 
535. Id. 
536. Id. 
537. Id. Apparently women did not eat h 
hildren Thi 
. de 
as muc as men, or pay as much in rent, or care for as many c . s attitu was current among op f the note 37, at 468• ponents o avocates as well. See Corcos, supra 
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equally remunerated. "538 Indeed, such women would find support for that 
argument in the pages of the committee' s  own report. 
The Justice of the Peace pointed out another contradiction in the 
committee's report regarding the responsibilities of women police offi­
cers: 
The committee recommend [sic] that women employed to perform 
police duties should make the declaration of a constable in the same 
form as men, and that they should be invested with the legal powers 
and status of constables, but that regulations should be made in each 
force clearly defining the duties they will and will not be primarily 
expected to perform. It is a little difficult to see how constables sworn 
"to act as constables for preserving the peace, and preventing robber­
ies and other felonies, and apprehending offenders against the peace," 
can be dispensed from the performace of part of their vow by regula­
tions made to save them from the danger of carrying it out in its in­
tegrity. However, probably no one will quarrel with the practical 
• S39 comprormse. 
vm. CONCLUSION 
Like movements to admit women to the legal profession in other 
European countries, the English movement represented a natural out­
growth of the increasing demands of half the population for admittance 
to a system that both creates and reflects the political and social envi­
ronment. The arguments for and against the admittance of women to the 
bar greatly resembled those advanced in other societies. Yet some argu­
ments were more forcefully put forward because of the reliance on advo­
cacy by the common law legal system. For example, the suggestion that 
the naturally aggressive stance of the English barrister and solicitor was 
not one that the English woman could easily replicate or understand. Yet 
proponents of women' s  participation countered this by asserting that 
women could add their own particular brand of kindness and under­
standing to the mix, an argument was also made in other instances,540 and 
that is still heard today. 541 
538. Women Police, supra note 533, at 360. 
539. Id. 
540. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 455.  
541. Many new "self help" books dramati:ze the differences in male and female thinking. See 
generally FARRELL, supra note 15; JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARs, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS 
(1992); SHAPIRO, supra note 131;  TANNEN, supra note 204; DEBORAH TANNEN, TuAT'S NOT WHAT I 
MEAN: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKF.s OR BREAKS RELATIONSHIPS (1986); DEBORAH 
TANNEN, You Jusr DoN'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990). That some 
men continue to translate their wish to dominate into workplace behavior is documented in such serious 
but never solemn books as EMn..Y Torn, Ms. MENTOR'S IMPECCABLE ADVICE FOR WOMEN IN 
ACADEMIA (1997), which includes a description of a phenomenon which she calls "peacocking": the 
tendency of males to "show off' at academic conferences by asking "questions" of female speakers that 
actually have nothing to do with the subject. 
414 DENVER UN!VERS/1Y LAW REVIEW 
[Vol. 75:2 
The English legal profession furiously disc�ssed the issue of the 
admittance of women for over fifty years, and this resulted from both a 
lack of support at the governmental level for feminist causes and the 
power of the organized English Bar.542 Wh ile wom�n in the �nited Stat�s 
and Canada had only to convince one state or provmce at a time to adnut 
them (no easy task), admission in one state was still, in a sense 
.
. t?tal 
victory. While they had several routes open to them fo� . adm1ss1
.
on, 
women in England still needed to convince an already sensitized major­
ity of the nation 's legal profession, including the most influential mem­
bers of the legislature, the Inns, and the Law Society. In the end, what 
convinced a majority of the profession, if  not to support, at least not to 
oppose the admission of women, was their contribution in the war effort 
and their clear willingness to share the burdens that men had heretofore 
formally recognized as theirs alone. 
The battle for women's admission to the bar in England was harder 
and longer than in France. Two factors were crucial to its success. The 
performance of women during the war was an obvious justification, even 
though some male and female supporters maintained that political rights, 
in particular admission to a profession, should not be a reward for doing 
one's civic duty. As one analyst points out with regard to the suffrage: 
The effect of the war was, however, precisely the opposite of that ex­
pected. Within two years and a half the conflict brought the suffra­
gists an advantage which n o  amount of agitation had ever won for 
them, i.e., the official support of the government, and a few months 
more carried their cause to a v ictorious conclusion which would 
hardly have been reached in a full decade of peace. There were two 
main reasons for this tum of events. One was the necessity which the 
war imposed of undertaking a wholesale revision of the electoral 
system, leading to the decision to base the franchise upon personal 
right rather than property relationship, and inevitably suggesting an 
equality in rights, as individuals, of women with men. But the funda­
mental reason brought forward b y  the war for enfranchising women 
was the great variety and value of women's services to the nation 
during the conflict. This was the thing that won over thousands of 
former opponents, from Mr. Asquith down.543 
For many men, including lawyers, actions speak louder than words. 
Even more impoi:tant were the decades of debate, during which all 
arguments for and agamst were trotted out and examined, and the weaker 
�guments against admission finally though quietly dismissed as insuffi­
cient t? deny women an opportunity that equally qualified men had for 
cen�es. The government which shepherded through the Sex Disquali­
fication (Removal) Act had a much easier job than it would have had 
542. ;LIE ffALEVY, 2
. 
� HISTORY OF� ENGLISH PEoPLE 478-482 (1 934). 543. .A.O., The Bntish Representation of the People Act, 1 2  AM. POL. SCI. REV. 498, 500 (1918). 
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�enty or ten years before because �ore of the �entiment of the profes­
sion, as well as the mood of the pubhc, was behind women's admission. 
Some women thus began to think of the law as a possible career even 
though some social and professional barriers remained to be removed 
and when the opportunity presented itself had readied themselves to talc� 
advantage of it. 
In France, by contrast, the liberal government had no difficulty in 
righting what it considered to be a grievous wrong three years after it 
occurred .  Yet the opinion of the majority of members of the profession 
was not yet in sympathy with the government's  policy. Questions about 
women' s  competence lingered and fewer women pursued the possibility 
of a legal career during the first twenty years that it was open to them. 
The arguments advanced against women's ability to practice law 
seem intuitively to mitigate against the equal ability of women to prac­
tice law, and to lend a semblance of legitimacy to the idea of "separate 
but equal." But this impression is mistalcen. That women practice law 
differently from men is not an indictment, but a recognition of the differ­
ences of biology, gender, and socialization, and is particularly apt in the 
practice of the common law. 
Facts and interpretations matter at common law. Thus is old law 
rethought and new law made. That the arguments used against the admis­
sion of women to the profession were so similar in England, the United 
States and France demonstrates that the pervasive opposition based on 
certain assumptions about the abilities and rightful place of women in 
society had no geographical or political boundaries. Further, legislation 
could not alter these shared societal assumptions any more than it af­
fected the beliefs of male supporters of the women's movement that fe­
males should be allowed to practice law. In France, the debate took place 
after the admission of women; in the United States, before and during the 
admission, because it was accomplished jurisdiction by jurisdiction; and 
in England, before the admission finally came about. But in each case, 
the debate served as an emotional and psychological exercise necessary 
to the maturation of the profession. 
Women like Gwyneth Bebb in England and Jeanne 
.
ch
.
auvin in 
France, along with their male supporters, were ahead of their tllile by a 
few years, but their efforts eventually made possible the entry of wom�n 
into the legal profession. They defined the scope of the debate that still 
goes on. Today's young women attorneys, who face the same J?nd� of 
pernicious arguments, may not recognize the danger f ?� margmahz�d 
groups who wish to participate in the ongoing legal, pohtical and social 
discussion that shapes our society. Some contem�l�ti?n of the. 
nature of 
�e recurring arguments over gender issues that tn�iali�e real d.
�feren�es 
m thinking and conceptualizing legal concepts will yield additional m­
sights into the interactions of male and female attorneys as well as men 
and women in all spheres of life. The opponents of women lawyers may 
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have been right, after all, and the supporters .
�
ron�, P?�arily because 
the law continues to be "constructed as male: that 1�, 1t is pr�su_
me� to 
be "rational, logical, dispassionate, objective, professional, mum1datmg, 
and demanding."544 
· 
Further, the social skills that women cultivate in order to attract 
husbands serve them ill in the workplace. 
"Time tested secrets for capturing Mr. Right," such as "don't call him 
first," "be quiet and mysterious," or always "let the man take charge," 
are not time-tested strategies for attracting clients ' business and sen­
ior lawyers ' admiration. 
[T]his contradiction between feminist stereotypes and professional 
success has long left women in a double bind. They risk seeming too 
assertive or not assertive enough. The competitiveness and self­
promotion that legal cultures reward are not the characteristics that 
society most values in women or that many women value in them­
selves.545 
Until law, like society, finds a way to value the thought processes and 
contributions of one-half of the population, it will continue to see women 
as lesser partners if they maintain their "female" qualities and lesser 
women if they adopt "male" characteristics in order to succeed. 
As long as success in law is identified with those characteristics, 
and women are not, women will continue to have difficulty in obtaining 
recognition for their achievements as well as the right to be mediocre, 
not superior, as practitioners. The double standard that dictated the ex­
clusion of women from the legal profession in England and continues to 
underlie evaluations of women attorneys by some of their male col­
leagues is a standard that celebrates and condemns what we normally 
term "masculine" values, those which women are necessarily lacking. 
[A] woman can be criticized both for being too powerless as a 
woman, and for being too forceful for a woman . . . .  [W]hat is seen as 
assertive in a man is seen as aggressive in a woman. And even ag­
gressiveness, which may be admired in men, is penalized in women. 
Rather, women should be deferential and they should smile. They 
should not tell people what they know . . . .  They should be attractive 
544. Farley, supra note 1 1 ,  at 389. Farley points out that adjectives consistently used to describe 
"law" as a discipline are also consistently used to describe male law professors. Id. at 349-50. See also 
Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in lim Pouncs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453 (David 
Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
545. Deborah L. Rhode, Fluttering Eyes Won't Cut It with Clients, NAT'L LJ., June 23, 1997, at 
A15 (quoting sociologist Cynthia Epstein). On continuing bias against female lawyers' styles in the 
worlcplace and its effect on their success, see JEANNE Q. SVIKHART, FAIR MEAsURE: TOWARD 
E'.FH!cnVE AITORNEY EVALUATIONS (1997). 
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but not too pretty, agreeable but not too accommodating, assertive but 
not too aggressive, and knowledgeable but not too erudite.5-46 
417 
Whether women are better suited than men to an active search for 
alternatives to traditional means of legal dispute resolution than to the 
angry advocacy that sometimes prevails, or whether they are simply ac­
culturated to prefer outcomes other than "win or lose," whether these 
alternatives are desirable, and which of them we can and should institu­
tionalize are subjects which demand further exploration by both women 
and men. Women, like all traditionally marginalized groups, necessarily 
must change both the form and the substance of a profession they enter. 
What evaluation and use we make of this observation will inevitably 
shape the evolution of the law and of society. 
546. Farley, supra note 1 1 ,  at 339 (foomotes omitted). 
